


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INTRABLOC

Situation of Hungarians in Transylvania

Documented

25000120 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP (Supplement)
in Hungarian 30 Jan 88 pp 1-4

[Article by Ferenc L. Gazso: "Transylvania, the Largest Minority" under the rubric "To Be Hungarian in Romania"; boxed material as indicated]

[Text] Leaving the border, one comes almost immediately to a large city. The sign reads: Oradea. We are on the streets of Nagyvarad. Since we are seeking the Nagyvarad of old, [the poet] Ady's "Paris on the banks of the Pece [Petza Brook]," we keep going until we reach the Koros [Crisul] River.

Although the official signs are not bilingual, we encounter oral bilingualism everywhere. Before the dairy shop, where about a hundred people are forming a queue already at 0700. At the registrar's office, which is not even open, but the end of the queue is already somewhere in the middle of the block. A man scolds his woman loudly in Hungarian, because she left some document at home. She talks back to him in Romanian.

This early in the day, the visitor has no hope of gaining admission to the "Mullerei," Ady's favorite cafe, where he wrote his vitriolic articles lashing the "respectability" of the Nagyvarad canons, and the sharp practices of the likes of Kalman Szell in Budapest. The Muller Confectionery is now a museum. In front of it there is a statue of the poet, opposite a statue of Martinescu. Anyone who has seen the Ady memorabilia may consider himself lucky. The museum is open from 1600 to 1800 three days a week, and from 1000 to 1400 another three days.

Along the old military road—but in the opposite direction from the one in which the Tatars, Turks and the Austrian troops once marched—we proceed toward the Kiralyhago Pass [Piatra Craiului], Transylvania's [Iron] gateway [at Bistra]. The landscape could easily be mistaken for the Trans-Tisza Region. A glance at the map shows we are traveling over a geographically integrated and closed region. Transylvania—officially it now has an area of 99,800 square kilometers—lies embraced by the Eastern Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps.

Europe's largest national minority lives in this region. Between 2.0 and 2.5 million Hungarians according to estimates, 12 to 13 percent of the country's entire population. But official Romanian population statistics published in 1977 mention 7 to 8 percent, or 1.7 million Romanians of Hungarian nationality.

Watching villagers along the Kalota [Vladeasa] going home from church on Sunday, Endre Ady remarked: "How much color, and what composed and dignified faces." Now the splendid national costumes are worn only rarely. Embroidery, however, is still being made in

designs inherited from great-grandmothers. Gay tablecloths, pillows and blouses greet us like bunting for kilometers. Sitting at the gates of their homes, the women are doing needlework. The colors are somewhat harsh, because store-bought thread is inferior to old thread. And the quick glance of the merchant seems to have replaced the composed and dignified look on the women's faces. A richly embroidered large-size shirt costs 600 lei. But anyone who pays with sugar, spices, soap or medicine, or who perhaps brought some sweets, can be certain of a discount.

Both young and old are hitchhiking in Transylvania if they want to travel. With tanks mounted on their roof, the propane-fueled buses remind one of bathyscaphs; they have passengers riding even on their steps.

The foreigner who wants to reach the interior of Transylvania must join a queue for gasoline vouchers. And that is what we too had to do. During the one-hour wait, four people approached us about selling them forints. They offered us 100 lei for a 100-forint bill; you pay 170 forints for 100 lei at the official rate. And three people offered us 250 lei for a 10-liter gasoline voucher that we bought for 100 lei.

A young hitchhiker we picked up told us he worked 50 kilometers from home and had to commute 2 or 3 hours a day. A graduate of a health-care lyceum, he had been able to find employment only as a [female] "district nurse." His graduating class had been the last one allowed to take the state board examination in their mother tongue. Well, he had to live. His pay, including commuting allowance, was 2,200 lei. His wife had 112 days of maternity leave and could stay at home with their infant son. But they were already worrying how the baby would tolerate the day nursery. The baby would just have to stand it, because a neighbor willing to babysit was asking 800 lei and meals, and that they could not afford. They had been allotted an apartment not so long ago, but the mortgage alone eats up half of his salary. And commuting was not cheap either, he added. Bidding us farewell, he wanted to hand us 20 lei. That was the custom. Not even the locomotive engineer would let you ride free on the locomotive's bumper.

Marosvasarhely Comedians

Marosvasarhely [Tirgu-Mures] lies windward, and we are met by the penetrating smell of ammonia. Here too, just as in every large city in Transylvania, the old city seems to be shrinking amidst the rows of prefabricated tenements. Housing construction is keeping pace with the rapid industrialization that involves nationwide redeployment of manpower. According to cautious estimates, Transylvania's urban population has increased by nearly a million residents in 25 years. Romanians from beyond the Carpathian Mountains constitute the bulk—at least 80 percent—of the influx of in-migrants. The state is helping them to resettle; by providing from 10,000 to 30,000 lei of resettlement aid, for instance. All

this is proceeding in a plan-conforming manner: according to a government resolution adopted in 1968, the cities enumerated in the resolution are assigned annual quotas of in-migrants. The population of Marosvasarhely may have increased by a thousand in 1987. As the "district nurse" with the Newgate fringe told us, he could not now move to the city even if he wanted to, because he was not on the list of in-migrants.

Marosvasarhely is now a county seat. It has always been and remains a Romanian administrative center. First it was the capital of the Autonomous Hungarian Province, formed in 1952 of the four counties that then were still inhabited predominantly by ethnic Hungarians. The next reorganization was in 1960: regions with pure ethnic Hungarian populations, such as the Sepsiszentgyorgy [now Sfintu Gheorghe] and Kezdi [Kezdivasarhely, now Tîrgu Secuiesc] areas, were not included in the Maros [Mures]-Autonomous Hungarian Province, but other regions with ethnically mixed populations were annexed to it. The next reorganization came only seven years later, in 1967, when Romania restored the system of counties; once again the map was redrawn, and the population's breakdown by nationality changed. But you will not find any detailed data on this in the official population statistics for the past 10 years.

The motor vehicles of the Israeli, German and Hungarian tourists—most of them relatives returning home for a visit—are busily rumbling in the center of the city. With its glazed-tile roof, the former city hall—now the headquarters of the county party committee—on the Square of Roses reminds one of the Cifra Palace in Kecskemet. And the interior of the Palace of Culture resembles the Budapest Conservatory.

The tourist can see also the landmarks of modern architecture. The Municipal Theater, for example, built in the early 1970's. The Hungarian section's bilingual playbill advertises Shakespeare's comedy "As You Like It." But the theater's experts are by no means in a mood for comedy. Due to the all-pervasive economization drive, the state subsidy for the theater's Hungarian section has been cut from 7.0 to 2.0 million lei. The rest of the operating costs has to be raised somehow, which of course is not peculiar to Romania alone. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to stage performances. In Kolozsvár [Cluj], the Hungarian company's allocation for scenery and costumes this year is 50,000 lei.

Committees of experts at the national and county levels carefully screen the theaters' policies on their repertoire. These committees see to it that a good many Romanians are also included among the playwrights whose plays the Hungarian companies present. Pessimistic plays are not staged these days. It is being rumored in theatrical circles that this was also the reason why even the Romanian company of the Nagyvarad State Theater had to revise its plans to present [Madach's] "The Tragedy of Man," in a Romanian translation by Octavian Goga.

When we were in Nagyvarad, a bilingual playbill of the State Theater advertised Andras Suto's comedy "The Merry Ghost." But we did not find his name in any of the bookstores, there or elsewhere. This is true also of Karoly Kos whose name was deleted from textbooks, and copies of whose works were returned for pulping, the very year that marked the centennial of his birth. The audiences on evenings of bilingual performances tend to be small. But the performers are able to tour also outside the county, if they get permission to do so from the county cultural committee.

The artists are not in a privileged position, and they too bear their share of the hardships. Last year, for example, the Marosvasarhely Philharmonic began its season later than usual, and until then its members were on leave without pay. Actors—Romanians and Hungarians alike—actually get only 70 to 80 percent of their pay on average. In comparison with industrial workers, engineers or economists, however, this does not constitute discrimination.

It will gradually become a problem where to find actors for the roles of Adam and Eve in the Paradise scene, if some Hungarian theater does manage to present "The Tragedy of Man" after all. Namely, the enrollment of Hungarian students at the Istvan Szentgyorgyi College of Dramatic Art has been declining over the past decade. Last year, the freshman class again comprised only three or four students.

At the Teleki Documentary Library, which owns several old Hungarian books that are unique, only two rooms are open to the public. In the glass cases you find a Xerox copy of the Koncz Codex, the songs of Sebestyen Tinodi, and the first Tibetan dictionary compiled by Sandor Korosi Csoma. But the exhibition of paintings by Imre Nagy de Zsogod has disappeared from the walls. Nor can the paintings by the outstanding artists of the Nagybanya [Baia Mare] School be seen in the art gallery of the Palace of Culture. They have been removed temporarily, the caretaker told us.

Street names change frequently. Rakoczi Street has become Avran Jancu Street. Kossuth Street and Bethlen Promenade have also been renamed. And Nyar [Summer] Street has been rechristened Primavera Street; in other words, spring is here.

Let us turn off the main highway into the Nyarad [Nirajului] Valley where durum wheat and hops grow, the region of Gyorgy Dozsa's youth. Here every square foot of land is farmed, so much so that there is room for flowers only in the windows. Wherever you look in summer, you find red geranium blooming in white glazed pots hanging over the green fences.

Funeral in Erdosszentgyorgy

Gyulakuta [?], originally Gyula Vezer Kutja (Chieftain Gyula's Well), is a settlement that dates back to Arpad's time. Industrialization has already reached this far: a

thermal power plant is emitting smoke at the end of the village. We are seeking the Calvinist church, and a young woman gives us directions. An elder woman wearing a kerchief adds some good advice: stay away from the Kukullo [Tirnava], because anyone unfamiliar with the river "could easily croak in it."

The village has 2,500 residents. But there are only six Romanian families, and their children are still young. That is why instruction is in Romanian only in the first four grades of the ten-year school.

Romania issued an education decree in 1973. It prescribes that at least 25 pupils are necessary to start a fifth grade with Hungarian as the language of instruction. In secondary school, instruction may be in Hungarian if there are at least 36 students in a class, but the language of instruction must be Romanian even if only three Romanian children attend.

The minister arrives on a path along the outer edge of the village; only the locals know of the path's existence. The church, with its painted sunken wooden panels in the coffered ceiling, is from the 13th century. Chieftan Arpad's red-and-white banner can be seen on a fresco fragment. Nearby is the elaborate coat of arms of the Lazar family, the patrons of this living. Isn't history amazing though? Janos Lazar gained ignominious fame at Madefalva [Siculenii], but here on his one-time estate people remember him as a benefactor. There are two marble tablets recessed in the wall of the church, honor rolls in memory of "our dead resting on foreign soil" killed in World War I, and of the "killed in action" in World War II. The surnames are the same: two generations mourned by the Csaszar, Koncz and Laszlo families.

Several villages farther, in Erdoszentgyorgy [Singeorgiul-de-Padure], women dressed in black are bearing the church banners. Behind them a young minister and members of the choir lead the male mourners. A widow is being buried. She came to the village just recently, to live with her son. Even so there are about 200 of us attending the funeral. Someone notes that three times as many people would be attending had the deceased been a long-time local resident. She was a Calvinist, yet more than one bell is tolling for her in this ethnically mixed, two-denominational village. The bell of the Greek Orthodox church is also tolling. The Romanians in the neighborhood paid to have it tolled. That is the custom hereabouts. Another local custom is that the relatives of the deceased offer brandy and home-baked brioche to the mourners descending from the hillside cemetery. To Hungarian, Romanian, villager and stranger, to everyone who paid his respect to the deceased.

Why? For the authentic answer we had yet to drive several hundred kilometers, to hear a Haromszek County [mainly Covasna, and also Brasov and Bacau Counties] shepherd say: "Man to man, there has never been any trouble in Transylvania." The Calvinist has

always lived in peace with the Greek Orthodox, the Romanian with the Hungarian, and the Szekler with the Saxon. In 1934 Karoly Kos, whose publisher was the Transylvanian Literary Guild, wrote the following on this topic: "A thousand years is a long time, even in the lives of peoples and cultures. During a thousand years, a wonderful miracle happened here in Transylvania: three peoples and three cultures are living side by side or interspersed, yet all three are preserving—because they are able to preserve—their respective identities. At the same time, they are also acquiring a common character distinguishing them from any foreign or related neighboring people and culture."

Somewhere along the Nagykukullo [Tirnava-Mare] we met an engineer. Because he is planning to visit Hungary, he wanted to go to the megye seat to expedite some official papers. He has a close relative in Hungary, but "merely" a first-cousin, and not a lineal relative whose letter of invitation the Romanian authorities would be willing to accept. He will be coming to Hungary as a tourist. He was waiting in vain for the bus. It had run out of diesel fuel, and its afternoon run was cancelled.

This engineer's latest visit to Hungary was in his childhood. His decision to visit Hungary again has been a difficult one. He does not wish to sponge on his relatives. But now that he will be unable to buy forints, he worries about his lack of mercenary spirit. Because of his young daughter's illness and her need of prolonged medical care, he has even been thinking of resettling in Hungary. But one hears so many rumors . . .

A laboratory technician in her twenties, married to a husband who is an Italian citizen, has been waiting 7 months for her immigration papers. She received fairly quickly Bucharest's approval in principle, but was dismissed from her job at the end of that month. Since then she has been sitting and waiting.

A university professor and his schoolteacher wife have found casual work in a cannery to tide them over. They are nailing crates because they have themselves and two children to support while their case is being thoroughly investigated, at several levels.

At his press conference in the autumn of last year, the Hungarian government spokesman revealed that in 1986 the Hungarian authorities received applications from 3,284 Romanian citizens for permission to settle in Hungary. In the first half of 1987, the number of Romanian citizens desiring to settle in Hungary was 3,308. The Hungarian authorities decide such applications in accordance with the existing international agreements, based essentially on considerations of family-reunification.

A district physician along the Aranyos [Aries] River asked, more as a rhetorical question, the following: With so much coming and going, who will remain here? The engineer we met prefers to stay. He finally obtained

a good position with a large plant, and one has to appreciate a good job. Upon graduating from university, he had to work as a probationary engineer for three years, far from home. Fortunately, with the help of his parents, he was able to return from Moldavia. In the case of most intellectual professions, a person living elsewhere has to apply for a vacancy. Let the competitive examination decide, and may the best man win! In most cases, of course, the winner is the applicant with the best connections.

As we listen to this young man, it strikes us that he is speaking Hungarian with an accent and occasionally has to search for words, although he comes from a Hungarian family. He does not deny being more fluent by now in Romanian than in Hungarian. After all, his language of instruction from the age of 15 on was Romanian. Conversation at his parents' table is still in Hungarian, but at home he and his wife occasionally switch to Romanian. If for no other reason, for the sake of their young daughter—to spare her a disadvantage later in school.

There is no question of his ever wanting to deny his Hungarian nationality, and he merely prefers to speak the language in which he is more fluent. In Transylvania, the meetings and ceremonies are also conducted in Romanian. He is a sports fan, and the sports newspaper is published only in Romanian. He would gladly read newspapers from Hungary if they were available, just as even now he turns the radio dial to and from Kossuth Radio. But newspapers are not coming in from Hungary, and even the subscriptions have been canceled. The only paper that gets through undisturbed to one of his friends is SAKKELET, but he himself is not interested in chess.

The question is who is to teach, where and how? At Babes-Bolyai University in Kolozsvár, the use of Hungarian as the language of instruction has been limited by the 1980's exclusively to students majoring in the Hungarian language and literature. Enrollment is declining constantly, and the [freshman to senior] classes are down to between six and eight students each. Since two years ago, even the ideological subjects are being taught in Romanian. About then, Hungarian ceased to be the language of instruction at the once separate College of Fine Arts and Music, and it is being used at present only in two lyceums that train Hungarian kindergarten teachers and elementary-school teachers.

The last time Hungarian-minority students from Romania graduated in Hungary was in 1979. Since then not one student has arrived here on a scholarship or for a year abroad. Minority students are explicitly forbidden to use lecture notes or professional literature from Hungary.

If someone in Transylvania nevertheless manages to graduate from the university with a major in Hungarian or some other language, he must first spend three years as a probationary secondary-school teacher in the Regat

(Old Romania). Then comes the qualifying examination. If the probationary secondary-school teacher flunks this examination, he loses his diploma. If he passes and wants to teach in Transylvania, closer to his home and family, he has to apply for vacancies, since he is now residing elsewhere. In the end, the already mentioned competitive examination decides whether he gets the job. Actually, nobody has ever heard of a competitive examination for teachers of secondary schools in this part of Romania during the past six years, although the announcements about such examinations are being watched very closely.

In two years, 1985 and 1986, 240 teachers who speak only Romanian were appointed to teach in Hargita [Harghita] and Kovaszna [Covasna] Counties, where Hungarian-speakers account for 80 percent of the population. In the case of these teachers, the language of instruction was determined by their own mother tongue, rather than by the mother tongue of the students.

Bidding the young engineer farewell, we quote him Gyorgy Bessenyei's comment: "A nation lives on in its language." He had never heard it before but liked the thought, he reflected, and then hurried off to his sick daughter.

The engineer was not a complaining sort. And the secondary-school physics teacher, who had been explaining the law of the conservation of matter to four Hungarian and two Romanian classes in 1985, did not complain either. A year later, it was decided higher up to turn this ratio around. And that happened in a city where 85 percent of the population spoke Hungarian. Since then he has been explaining everything in both languages. He is teaching his homeroom class in Hungarian, because there is no Romanian among the students in that class. They go on excursions throughout Transylvania, and camping in areas where reception of Hungary's television program is still good. He is demanding and strict, raising the standards as high as the ability of his students will allow. Of the 36 students graduating from his homeroom class, 22 were admitted to university or college. True, most of them did not continue their studies in Transylvania. Those who have left, as well as the ones able to stay, are constantly beseeching him for books. He distributed several copies of Andras Suto's work "My Mother Promised Me Light Sleep" among his students, leaving none for himself in the end. Therefore he quotes from memory the line that has become the word: "... the grass bends with the wind but survives."

At Petofi's Grave

In Eastern Transylvania, ever-fewer people have heard of Gyorgy Bessenyei, but Sandor Petofi is everyone's good friend. He has quite a cult. Streets and squares have been named after him. His statue, usually facing Balcescu's, stands in a central location, in Szekelykeresztr as well as in Csikszereda [Miercurea Ciuc]. And also in Segesvar [Sighisoara], of course, close to where the poet

met his end. In the outskirts of Feheregyhaza [Albesti], where the lancers probably overtook him, there is now a fountain from where a fresh springlet flows. Over the fountain, a sculpture showing the poet in high relief. The last one to talk to him was Jozsef Lengyel, the defeated army's surgeon who was then treating the wounded. That is what a man of about 50 tells us as we wait for our turn at the fountain. He is a driver for one of the plants in Segesvar. Every year on the anniversary of the poet's death, he comes here with his sons.

Szekelykeresztr, the place from which Petofi went off to battle, is quite near. But that is already Hargita County. There and in Kovaszn County the signs are bilingual in many places. In the cultural center we find paintings by Imre Nagy. "Colors salvaged from beneath the hoarfrost," wrote Suto about Eastern Transylvania's stubbornly persistent painter, his elderly close friend. Imre Nagy saw the flowers of summer even under 50 centimeters of snow. "Were I to say that I did not see as far as spring, I would put down my brush," he confessed once when he was already over 80.

The old pear tree is still standing at the Gyarfás manor, where Petofi spent his last night. Legend has it that the poet recited his poems to the Gyarfás daughter under this pear tree. Before the tree, a plaque with the following verse by Sandor Kanyadi: "The old tree is dying/Petofi's ancient pear tree/It is rumored to have watched him/write his last poem." Sandor Kanyadi resigned from the Romanian Writers' Union the summer of last year. Since then he has been sharing the fate of Karoly Kos's lifework.

We meet with a friendly reception wherever we go, and are treated generously to what little they have. Sipping home-made wine, we listen to an accounting of what a couple—both the husband and the wife teach—spend. They were able to buy a pig; the price was 2,000 lei, because the sow was not state-owned; but this is the only kind of pig one may raise for slaughter. They bought wheat and fodder for 4,000 lei, to supplement their rations. This is where their money goes, and also on their two grown sons. The younger one just finished the tenth grade and is planning to continue his studies at the university. His elder brother graduated from the lyceum three years ago. Since then he is doing casual work when he can find some, and is persistently taking the entrance examination. He was an honor student at the lyceum, yet last year was the third time he flunked the university entrance examination. Since 1984, the test is administered in Romanian also in Transylvania.

As long as there were admission quotas based on the population's relative breakdown by nationality, between 7 and 8 percent of the Hungarian applicants were admitted to university. But that is now a thing of the past. The governing principle at present is: "Do not split up anything that is integral in practice!" Now there are no admission quotas for the nationalities. According to

knowledgeable estimates, at best only 4 or 5 percent of the Hungarian-speaking students are being admitted to higher educational institutions in Transylvania.

Strangers in the Home

It is past 2200 when someone knocks on the door. Teenage boys and girls, members of the amateur theatrical society, would like to come in and discuss their roles with their teacher. They had planned to perform a scene from an Ede Szilageti play in the "We Sing of Thee, Romania" cultural competition. But the playwright and the play were not on the approved list, and therefore they have decided to do Jokai once again.

Midnight is approaching, and we are preparing to leave. Our hosts are not asking us to stay, because of the regulations: anyone who fails to report that a stranger is staying in one's home overnight can be fined 3,000 to 5,000 lei. And what would happen if they reported it? we inquired. "We would be lodging information against ourselves. We do not know of anyone ever being granted permission."

Good Luck! The visitor is welcomed with the traditional miner's greeting at the gate of the Parajd [Prajd] salt mine. A bus takes us underground. When we return to the surface, a blaster barters crystal salt for soap. He tells us that what we visited is a new working. The arched entrance of the old mine was closed in 1981. Up until then, international artist camps were organized here; statues and chandeliers were carved of salt, and tourists came to admire them. All this is now a thing of the past, because the old mine became flooded.

The road from Parajd leads straight to Korond [Corund], a village noted for its pottery. More than 300 potter families make the famous Korond pottery. At the roadside stands, in addition to jugs and plates, there are also glazed earthenware figurines—pairs of doves, and Laurel-and-Hardys. But authentic painted Korond jugs—decorated with snake, bird and tree motifs—are not available at the roadside, only in the village, at shops like the ones belonging to the Pallos and the Jozsas. They do not advertise; anyone looking for them will find them.

Just as in Farkaslaka [Lupeni] one can find Aron Tamasi's birthplace, on a small, steep street off the beaten track. Returning home from work, the Farkaslaka locals watch from the corner of their eye who greets them and how, and only then do they tip their hats. Hereabouts one encounters only Hungarian-speakers. In his will made in Budapest, the author of the "Abel" series specified that he wanted to rest in his native land. After the author's death, when the two Szervatiuszes decided to carve the author's legendary characters, for the sculpture the locals rolled down from the Hargita a huge granite block weighing several hundred kilograms. Abel could have had such attachment in mind when he said

the following sentence that is inscribed on the first page of the visitors' book at the author's birthplace, now a museum: "We are in this world so that we may be at home someplace in it."

Balazs Orban, the romantic historian and the author of the six-volume "Szekelyfold Leirasa" [Description of the Land of the Szeklers], probably felt most at home in Szekelyudvarhely [Odorheiu Secuiesc], referring to it as "the mother city of the mother county." In days of old, the free Szeklers held their national diets here. These days Szekelyudvarhely is outside Transylvania's mainstream, because construction of the railroad line that will link it with the Csik [Ciuc] Basin is just now beginning.

The dance-hall movement, which spread throughout Transylvania in the 1970's, briefly made Szekelyudvarhely an intellectual center nonetheless. At the annual meetings—they soon outgrew the cultural center, and eventually even the sports field—the young people of Szekelyudvarhely were teaching the Hungarian-speaking Csangs of Moldavia to dance the Szekler folk dances. The Hungarian program on TV covered the meeting each year. By the 1980's, the dance-hall movement pattered out, and soon thereafter the Hungarian program on TV also ceased.

We are preparing to cross the Hargita, the snow-capped range that runs almost parallel with the Carpathians and extends as far as the Erdovidek [forest-covered Hargita foothills], the birthplace of the storyteller Elek Benedek. At the city limits of Csikszereda, a Hungarian sign reads: "Szereda welcomes its dear guests." Csiksomlyo [Sumuleu Ciuc], a place of pilgrimage at Pentecost and noted also in literary history for its one-time passion plays, is now actually a part of Csikszereda. We are climbing Calvary Hill that guards the area, but are arrested by the sound of an organ from St Mary's Church. A wedding is taking place. The bride, Maria, is wearing a headdress embroidered in gold. The bridgroom, Levente, steps before the altar wearing a Hungarian braided tunic, like the ones worn in 1848. Their friends, young people in their twenties, are dressed in Csik folk costumes as they line up to congratulate the young couple whom the priest escorts to the church door.

Close Companionship of Horse and Man

From a place of rejoicing it is less than a half-hour ride to a place of mourning—Madefalva, where on the night of 7 January 1764 the mercenaries of Baron Siskovics massacred nearly 200 young Szeklers, because they were unwilling to serve Habsburg oppression and refused military service for Maria Theresia. There is a memorial in the village to the victims of the Madefalva massacre. And the fortified churches in the vicinity remind us of the free Szeklers' mission to defend their homeland, and of the constant jeopardy in which the local people lived.

A rare event sets this Sunday apart from the others. When we were in Csikdanfalva [Danesti], a carriage race was being held on the football field. A brass band played, bacon was being barbecued in the tents, and popsicles were being sold. The local party secretary read his opening address from a flatbed truck. The race was a trial for the Daciada national sports competition that "accurately reflects the close companionship of horse and man." The decorated carriages lined up. The chairman of the Csikcsico [Ciceu] village council wore Szekler trousers. The chairman of the Csikdanfalva agricultural cooperative, the senior veterinarian, and the manager of the stud farm were dressed in their Sunday best and wore riding boots. They were the ones who matched their skill in driving a team of horses. The locals applauded them.

Along the winding mountain road in the vicinity of Lake Gyilkos [Rosu], the villages closely clinging to one another gradually disappear. Nearby is the Bekas [Bicaz] Gorge, through which the Cumans, Pechenegs, Tatars, Turks, the tsarist troops that crushed the War of Independence, and the combat materiel of both world wars once swooped down from the mountains. If you look up in the gorge, you see the "Altar Stone" instead of the sun. Legend has it that this is where the locals prayed when they were fleeing from the Tatar invaders. Now the arms of the Romanian Socialist Republic, and the date 1944-1984, glitter in gold at the summit.

Unfortunately, the Majercsik family from Pecs also made it to the gorge and paint-sprayed its name on the face of a rock.

Since the reorganization of public administration, Haromszek County is [mostly] Covasna County. But Sepsiszentgyorgy remains the county seat. The area leading to the city is marshland. At least you do not have to fear the bears, the locals claim, because bears will not venture onto marshland. Lights in the 11-story hotel are turned off at 2000. To save electricity, they reassure us at the desk. A room is not available. The hotel is full of Romanian tourists who are on an organized tour of the country's landmarks.

Singing, With Not Much Hope

To find accommodations, we have to drive on as far as Lake Retyi [Reci]. "There is a wedding in our street," we hear the familiar song. Softly, more as if the singers were humming to themselves, rather than with the boisterousness of someone in high spirits. Bringing a bottle of brandy, we join the singers squatting in the dark. By the light of the glowing cigarettes we see that they are a just graduated class of boys and girls. Striking is their "azo" dialect, and we could easily be sitting on the shore of a lake over here in Vas County. Likewise conspicuous is their reserve. The boys, not to mention the girls, are not drinking. ("Forest, forest, Maros District round forest.")

They graduated from an industrial lyceum. And because the new school regulations ban Hungarian commencement parties, they came to this southern Csik County lake to say their good-byes. They will stay as long as their food lasts. ("I will sell my horse at sunrise.")

The boys, and also the girls, studied gas-fitting and plumbing. In their last year, the boys had workshop practice to learn the tricks of their trade. The girls learned dressmaking, and later house painting. ("You are quite a lad, Tyukodi.")

All the student in the class were Hungarian-speakers. Romanian became their language of instruction only in the eighth grade. ("Aron Gabor's bronze cannon is bedecked with flowers.")

It does not really matter what is on the certificate. The important thing is to have a school-leaving certificate, which enables one to apply for admission to further study. Almost everyone of them has applied somewhere, and they are now waiting for an answer. With not much hope, because during the last two years—following their choice of trades—they did not learn much. True, they were not taught much, either. ("Below the Csitar Mountains.")

Those who are not admitted to further study are placed in jobs. They are given an address where they can find employment as a driver's mate, seamstress, farmhand, or perhaps even as a gas-fitter or plumber. Whoever refuses the job placement may try his or her luck elsewhere, but cannot hope for anything more than casual work. Or he or she may sit at home another year, but now as an adult, anoward Brasso [Brasov], a city with a population of 200,000. Spoken Hungarian gradually fades around us. The decorated Szekler gates disappear, together with the rows of open, street-facing houses. In their place there are the uniform, closed, court-facing homes. In the fortified Lutheran church in the village of Hermany [Harman], and in its vicinity, one hears only German-speakers. Just as in Brasso the Hungarian-speakers are interspersed here and there with Romanian- and German-speakers.

Rows of prefabricated tenements greet us along the several kilometers of the length of Brasso, this most urban of Transylvania's cities, the one-time Saxon model city. Brasso is rapidly expanding, but one finds signs of change even on a tour of its old historic section. In the Middle Ages the market square—now called the Piata 23 August—was surrounded by a wall. When we were there, it was fenced off, and militiamen were keeping sightseers away from the fence.

We had to make a 1-km detour to reach the now barely accessible Black Church, the easternmost significant monument to European Gothic. Its walls were blackened by smoke in the fire of 1689, but the church itself

miraculously survived. And it was also unique on our trip to be able to read, from tableaus in five languages, the history of the centuries-old struggle for the sheer survival of this church.

These days one does not have to fear church-burning "infidels." After all, churches throughout Transylvania are always safe. On the wall of the Ursuline Sisters' Church in Nagyvarad, a plaque shows that here the water level of the flooded Koros was waist-high in the last century. Inside the church, a hand-written bilingual sign on the wall reads: "Attention. The church is open daily from 0900 to 1800. If you find that the door cannot be opened from the outside, please phone 34094. Entrance to the church is barred only maliciously, while it is being looted. As it was just the other day."

Hungarian intellectual life in Brasso has seen also better days. In the period between the two world wars, BRASSO HIREK was the most prestigious Hungarian daily in Transylvania. Liberal writers and journalists, such as Aron Tamasi and Sandor Kacso, were grouped around it. Today the city does not have even a Hungarian school, although only Marosvasarhely has a larger Hungarian-speaking population.

We walked the streets of Brasso, Romania's second largest city, on a bright sunny day last year, not knowing that by mid-November the market square, fenced off and guarded by militiamen, would become the scene of dramatic events. On 2 December 1987, an AGERPRES ROMANIAN PRESS AGENCY report informed the world merely that the truck factory in Brasso had held an extraordinary workers' meeting, had fired the old management, and haprevious management had circumvented the laws and regulations. It had arbitrarily equalized the employees' earnings, regardless of performance. All this served as the backdrop against which certain workers of the factory committed "actions foreign to the socialist system," AGERPRES wrote.

The ROMANIAN PRESS AGENCY report was 17 days late. For it was on 15 November that a serious incident occurred in Brasso. More than 10,000 demonstrators staged a protest that Sunday morning, the day of the local municipal elections. According to the local correspondent of the Ujvidek [Novy Sad] MAGYAR SZO, army units literally occupied Brasso to help the police disperse the crowd of demonstrators. Two policemen were killed in the clashes, and many of the demonstrators were arrested.

All this was missing from the AGERPRES account. Indeed, even NEUER WEG, the local German-language newspaper, covered only the municipal elections. It reported that two brass bands had been playing in the city, and then its members had marched in closed ranks to cast their ballots.

Actually the demonstration started out from the Steagul Rosu (Red Flag) Truck Factory, where the wages of more than 20,000 workers had been docked because of shortfalls in plan fulfillment. More accurately, the workers had received barely more than half of the wages owed them. The factory's director general had promised the workers that everybody would get paid on Sunday, if they volunteered to work that day, in honor of the municipal elections. But on Sunday the workers were informed that disbursement had to be postponed because the bank was closed.

The crowd then left the factory and marched off toward the city center. According to the reports of foreign correspondents, confirmed by eyewitness accounts, the demonstrators entered public institutions and carried away the food found in the cellars. Western news agencies reported that the Romanian Security Service hauled off over a thousand persons from the scene.

Shortly after the events in Brasso, several hundred university students took to the streets in Temesvar [Timisoara]. Leaflets were distributed in Kolozsvar, and gasoline-filled rubber tires were set afire in downtown Bucharest.

After this important detour in space and time, let us return to Brasso and proceed once again toward the interior of Transylvania. We drive through a series of Saxon villages without meeting a single soul. Since the mid-1970's, more and more people have been emigrating from this area. The villages are becoming depopulated.

The Sun Rises Twice in Torocko

If we turn off the main highway onto a macadam road, we reach Torocko [Rimetea]. The last of the German artisans to settle here arrived in the 13th century, bringing with them the art of ironmaking. The sun rises twice in Torocko. First, normally. And then it seems to have changed its mind and hides behind Szekelyko [Piatra Secuiesca] that looms over the village. From there the sun emerges again, smiling and already high in the sky. Danger often threatened the Torocko residents, and they became accustomed to it. They survived even the closure of the iron-ore mines, the source of their livelihood, when the residents had refused to provide soldiers for the emperor's army. Now, just as in Kalotaszeg [Depresiunia Huedinului], the practice of having only one child per family is wreaking silent genocide. There is hardly a child to be seen in the village. The people are suspicious, like someone disturbed in his hiding place; they receive the stranger with alarm.

Just as Szekelyko provided refuge for the residents of Torocko in times of danger, the walls of the boarding schools did the same for the intellectuals of Transylvania. More than 300 years old, the boarding schools in Kolozsvar, Marosvasarhely, Szekelyudvarhely, Sepsiszentgyorgy, Csiksomlyo and Zilah [Zalau] operated the first printing presses and introduced theatrical plays.

Perhaps Nagyenyed [Aiud] ought to head the list, for having given the world so many talented people. The engraver Miklos Totfalusi Kis; Janos Apaczai Csere, the encyclopedist who died at the age of 34; Sandor Korosi Csoma who explored our roots; the mathematician Farkas Bolyai; as well as Zsigmond Kemeny, Miklos Barabas and Samuel Koteles—they all started out from Nagyenyed. And so did in our time the poet Lajos Aprily, and that present master of fiction, Andras Suto. Once also the Nagyenyed boarding school was forced to flee from the Turks and found refuge in the caves of Szekelyko. The school bell still stands in the yard of the barracks-like building. Next to it a sculpture showing Gabor Bethlen, the boarding school's founder, in high relief. The prince appears to be ducking, worried about the school's future. It is now an industrial lyceum.

By the time we get to our room in the Belvedere, Kolozsvar's luxury hotel, we have again missed the news on Romanian TV. We would have switched channels, but there was an aluminum plate screwed over the dial.

We tour the city. The splendid bronze equestrian statue of Matyas Hunyadi still stands in front of Saint Michael's Church, across from the statue of Romulus and Remus with the wolf. The just king's birthplace can be reached in a few minutes on foot. Two houses from it is the birthplace of the Haiduk captain Bocskai. The building now houses the Statistical Office, and one of its officials leads me to the plaque discreetly installed in the courtyard.

The last day is for paying our respect to the dead. The signs of change are evident also in the Hazsongard [Hajongard] Cemetery. Among the tombstones that have fallen face down, we are looking for the graves of Apaczai, Szenczi-Molnar, Josika, Brassai, and Jeno Dzsida. An elderly man has brought fresh flowers to his uncle's grave. He has come to bid his uncle good-bye. For in Hazsongard, too, graves can be leased for another 25 years only by a lineal descendant of the deceased resting there.

[Box, Supplement p 4]

Reasons for Publication

Our series is seeking the answer to the question of what it is like to be a Hungarian beyond our borders. Therefore it is an anomaly that on this occasion we are presenting also facts and figures applicable not only to the Hungarians living in Romania, but to most Romanian citizens as well. We are doing this because the picture we present of the Hungarians in Transylvania would be incomplete without describing also their living conditions.

Last December, the national conference of the Romanian Communist Party outlined the tasks for the coming years. Nicolae Ceausescu, the general secretary of the party, said in his speech: "Romania is now turning to the

decisive phase of building a developed socialist society. By 1990, it will have to be past the stage typical of developing countries, and will have to enter a new, higher level: it will have to become a moderately developed socialist country. Probably around the year 2000 we will be able to say that we have built a comprehensively developed socialist society."

The year 2000 is still far away; meanwhile the tasks awaiting solution are unquestionably many. Namely, essential foods are still being rationed throughout Romania. But the rationing regulations are different in the cities than in the villages, and they also differ by counties. And they are again different depending on what you are: an intellectual, a blue-collar worker or a farming peasant. Because the last category does not have ration cards. If the peasant is a member of an agricultural cooperative, he is entitled to a household plot of about a third of a yoke, and to certain allotments in kind. We jotted down the rations of a village intellectual at the time of our visit (and it is by no means certain that the rations have not been reduced since then): 30 dekagrams of bread per day, and a half liter of cooking oil and a half kilogram of sugar per month. Meat is not rationed in that area, because carcass meat and cold cuts are rarely available. And when they happen to be available, within minutes there is a queue several hundred meters long, and everything is sold out in half an hour. Everyone who can has a garden, and at industrial plants the workers are growing crops under plastic sheets.

Romania reduced its foreign debt from 10.5 billion dollars in 1981 to 6.4 billion by the end of 1986, but at a considerable price: the situation of the industries in need of investment is worsening, and the people are suffering want. According to a decision of Romania's State Council, the consumption of electricity was limited up to now to 47 kWh/month. With the onset of cold weather, however, even this limit has been reduced: an urban family living in a three-room apartment, for instance, is allowed 35 kWh/month, but a rural household is allowed only 21 kWh/month. (Earlier the average Romanian family consumed about 200 kWh/month.) If the limit is exceeded by 5 percent, the electricity bill is increased by 50 percent. The penalty for exceeding the limit by 10 percent adds 200 percent to the electricity bill. If a household exceeds the limit by more than 10 percent, service is disconnected.

When we were there, domestic car owners were rationed 30 liters of gasoline per month, but this has been reduced to 25 liters since then. They cannot get all of this amount at one time, nor can they stop at just any gas pump whenever they choose. Rural car owners use up half of their gas ration just driving to their designated gas pump and back. At the pumps, 15- to 20-hour queues are not uncommon. Foreigners do not have to stand in line, but they cannot pay for the gasoline in lei. Gasoline coupons are sold at hotel desks.

Stove pipes extend from apartment windows in the cities, because even in overcoats the residents could freeze to death for the amount of warmth central heating provides. The apartments are using 15- and 25-W light bulbs. The cities are shrouded in darkness at night, because there is no street lighting.

Since a year ago, only hospitalized patients are entitled to sick pay. Persons recovering from illness at home do not get anything while they are on sick leave.

The AGERPRES ROMANIAN PRESS AGENCY reported early last December that Romania was holding out the prospect of suspending the servicing of its 1.9-billion-dollar debt to the World Bank, because—and we quote from the Ujvidek MAGYAR SZO—"the international financial institution is incompatible with democracy and is pursuing policies that are discriminatory."

[Box, Supplement p 3]

Radical Decline of Hungarian Media, Culture

Press, Print Media

There is a central Hungarian-language daily, called ELORE. In addition, each Hungarian-speaking county has its own Hungarian daily. Weeklies and magazines—IGAZ SZO, KORUNK, UTUNK and A HET, for instance—appear periodically, but between 1975 and 1980 their size has been reduced by about 30 to 40 percent. At the same time, their prices have been raised by 100 to 150 percent, which is about double the average price increase for publications. Among the Hungarian publications of long standing, the journal MUVELODES folded in January 1986. The entire No 3/1987 issue (120 pages) of KORUNK, founded by Gabor Gall, was devoted to reprints of works attacking the history of Transylvania.

TV, Radio

Between 1975 and 1982, there were 2.5 hours of programs in Hungarian a week on TV. This was reduced to 1 hour in 1983. At the end of 1984, however, TV programs in Hungarian were discontinued, the facilities and equipment were split up, and the staff fired. In 1984, the regional radio studios in Marosvasarhely and Kolozsvár met the same fate. At present, with the exception of one or two hours a day broadcast in Hungarian over Radio Bucharest, no electronic medium in Romania provides a forum for the Hungarian-speaking population.

Books

Since 1986, the Hungarian-language main editorial office of the Kriterion Publishing House in Bucharest (headed by Geza Domokos), with a regional editorial office in Kolozsvár, has exclusive right to publish books in the language of any national minority. From the late

1960's to the late 1970's there were, in addition to Kriterion, also the Facla and Dacia regional publishing houses, and Hungarian works were published in the counties as well. In comparison with the situation that existed 10 years ago, the number of titles and the runs of the published literary and popular-science works have dropped to about half or a third. The publishing houses for political literature and textbooks occasionally publish a work in Hungarian.

Theater

There are separate Hungarian theatrical companies in Kolozsvár and Temesvár, and Kolozsvár has also a Hungarian opera company. Until January 1987, Sepsiszentgyörgy likewise had a separate Hungarian theatrical company, but it has been reduced to a section since then. There are Hungarian sections operating within the Romanian theaters in Marosvásárhely, Nagyvárad and Szatmár [Satu Mare]. And we should include here also the few puppet-theater sections that still exist.

Museums, Libraries, Collections

Since the late 1940's, traditional Hungarian-minority institutions such as the Teleki Documentary Library, for instance, have been merged as sections into their Romanian counterparts. Only the library of the Roman Catholic Seminary in Gyulafehérvár [Alba Iulia], and that of the Calvinist Seminary in Kolozsvár, have remained independent. The Guild Museum in Kezdivásárhely was closed recently, and its material is now undergoing restoration.

[Box, Supplement p 2]

Hungarian-German Nationality Council

The Council of Workers of Hungarian-German Nationality was set up in 1968. It is an interest-representing organization, without any staff. Initially (between 1968 and 1971) the council debated such impoof the national body.

After a lengthy interval, the council held its latest meeting on 26 and 27 February 1987. At this meeting and in the subsequent press campaign, the Hungarian People's Republic was accused of falsifying the history of the Romanian people, of revanchism, and of interfering in Romania's internal affairs. As the Hungarian government spokesman pointed out in his statement of 2 April 1987, these accusations are being widely disseminated in Romania and abroad, but they lack any foundation whatsoever, are disrupting cooperation between two neighboring socialist countries, and are harming the fundamental interests of both the Hungarian and the Romanian people. Our government spokesman emphasized that it is in the interest of both neighboring countries and peoples to work on resolving the arising controversial questions and on strengthening their ties of friendship.

Speaking of the nationality issue at the Romanian CP's national conference last December, General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu declared: "Romania is an integral national state." In his words, "various nationalities settled in Romania" over the years and have been living together with the Romanian people. Everything the minorities achieved is the fruit of joint effort, the speaker said.

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Death of Hungarian-Minority Priest in Romania Reported

Secret Police Said To Be Responsible
29000006 Paris *LE MONDE* in French 3 Mar 88 p 3

[Text] AFP—Imre Tempfli, a Catholic priest, member of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Romania, has been killed by the Romanian secret police, according to a statement, on 1 March, by the British religious institute, Keston College, which cites "reliable sources" on the spot.

According to a Keston College spokesman, Friar Imre was seen for the last time in December 1987 at his former parish in Sighetu Marmatiei (the northwestern part of the country, the region bordering Hungary). He had been removed from this parish by the authorities in 1985 and transferred to another village in the county, Homorodú de Jos, because, according to the spokesman, "the police did e disappearance of Friar Imre is not without precedent, the spokesman stresses, reporting that in February 1984 another priest, Geza Palsi [as published], was beaten to death by the Romanian Securitate. The Institute also notes the disappearance of several other clergymen.

Satu-Mare Diocese Denies Report
29000006 Paris *LE MONDE* in French
20, 21 Mar 88 p 5

[Text] AFP—The Romanian Catholic Diocese of Satu-Mare in Transylvania denied, on Friday 18 March, the report that a Catholic priest had been killed as a result of an accident caused by the Romanian secret police. Father Imre Tempfli, whose death was reported by the religious institute, Keston College, located in Great Britain (*LE MONDE*, 3 March 1988), is safe and sound and carrying out his activities in the parish in Homorodú de Jos, diocesan authorities state.

/06662

French Press Reports on Romanian 'Refugees' in Hungary

Governmental Committee Set Up
29000005 Paris *LE QUOTIDIEN PARIS* in French
16 Mar 88 p 19

[Text] At least 10,000 Romanians have recently taken refuge in Hungary, Hungarian premier Karoly Grosz revealed. For the most part, they are members of the Hungarian minority in Romania who are fleeing the country which they complain about because of its very difficult living conditions and its forced assimilation, who go to Hungary on tourist visas. The last figure officially presented in Budapest in regard to the number of refugees was 6,000. Mr Grosz, who received representatives of the churches, announced that the government had set up an interministerial committee to deal with this matter and that it was going to "allocate large amounts of money" for these refugees. At the same time, he condemned the "exploitation" of the "regrettable phenomenon" of Romanian refugees by "a political group with strong nationalist motivations."

The fate of Romanians of Hungarian origin, which is a matter of widespread concern among the Hungarian population, has become one of the demands of the dissident opposition, which is calling for more involvement on the part of the authorities. The issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania (about 1.8 million people) is a sore point between the two neighboring communist countries, Hungary and Romania. In a speech at the beginning of the month, the number 1 Romanian, Nicolae Ceausescu, criticized "those who leave their country to go to live somewhere else."

Dissidents Contact Embassies
29000005 Paris *LE QUOTIDIEN PARIS* in French
17 Mar 88 p 18

[Interview of a Romanian dissident given to *QUOTIDIEN* by reporter Jean-Francois Richard in Budapest: "The Soviets Understand Our Fight"]

[Text] A number of Romanian dissidents have decided to go to live in Hungary. The "Free Romania" group, specifically Ion Petru who is responding to our questions today, believes that its activity is better coordinated in Romania.

Question: You are a Romanian of "pure stock." Why have you taken refuge in Hungary?

Ion Petru: In our country it is impossible to oppose Ceausescu. Hungary is the country which is most receptive to the sufferings of the Romanians. Besides, there are the ethnic, geographic, and historic realities which link the two Romanian regions, Transylvania and the Banat, to Hungary. There are so many bridges between the two states.

Question: What is your situation in Hungary?

Petru: We arrived as tourists. We stayed here clandestinely. After 8 months of clandestine existence and political activities, we went to the Hungarian authorities to legalize our situation. So far we have not obtained the necessary documents but we have confirmation from different sources that this will not take long. Perhaps this will be the first time that one socialist country will be giving citizens of another socialist country the status of political refugee! But this takes time.

Question: What is the political program of the "Free Romania" group?

Petru: The "Free Romania" group advocates the overthrow of the Ceausescu dictatorship by nonviolent, pacifist means. Only if our peaceful measures prove to be ineffective will we accept the use of other means of combat. But the current situation in Romania, as well as the international situation, leads us to believe that our methods are adequate for achieving our program. As long as the people rally to our side.

Organizing the Protest

Question: Concretely, what activities are you developing against Ceausescu?

Petru: First of all, through the international press. Especially, with the assistance of Hungarian generosity, we want to give a message to the Romanian people: we are asking them to protest against the dictatorship by putting out their apartment lights for at least 3 minutes, every day, at 2200 hours.

Question: Has this movement been successful so far?

Petru: Obviously it is very difficult to travel between Hungary and Romania to collect sufficient information. Also, it is difficult to keep in constant contact with the representatives of our group in Romania. But we have confirmation of the fact that the residents of Cluj (the capital of Transylvania) have followed our orders. This prompted the authorities to cut off the electricity at 2200 hours each day. This can only help us because they recognize their weakness themselves.

At the USSR Embassy

Question: You contacted the Western embassies and the embassies of the Eastern European countries. How did they react, specifically, the USSR Embassy? Do you expect something from Gorbachev?

Petru: We contacted the various embassies last summer. But our illegal status and the remnants of our fear, acquired in Romania, made us fear each police officer standing guard in front of the embassies. However, we passed on our group's analysis of the situation in Romania and we made contact with the political counsellors.

Both for the Western countries and for the USSR. We also wrote to the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior and informed the Romanian Embassy of our existence.

At first, the Western embassies were afraid of a possible provocation. The Soviets seemed to be interested. We had two contacts with them on the same day, during the course of which we asked them for political and economic assistance against the Romanian regime. They told us that they were perfectly aware of the present situation in Romania and that Ceausescu's personality bothers them considerably. But they refuse to interfere in Romania's internal affairs. Even though they did not hide Question: You always are in awe of the Romanian "Securitate" in Hungary. Are you afraid that your life is in danger?

Petru: In light of our status and our activity, we are aware that we run the risk of being liquidated by the "Securitate" if it manages to discover us. That is why I have used the pseudonym of Ion Petru.

/06662

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Regard for Citizens' Needs Advised
24000073 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
5 Mar 88 p 1

[Text] During the time of the national democratic revolution, in February, as well as in the initial years of the socialist build up, there was born here the well-known Gottwaldian slogan "Face the Masses." It was an expression of the union of the party with the people, of the leading political functionaries with other citizens. It contained the most basic revolutionary order of the times—to be as close as possible to people and real life, to know well society's needs, to know how to find a timely solution to them. We have to admit to ourselves that with the passing years much has changed in this style of political activity, that many a party functionary became detached from the working people in factories and villages, that there has been self-satisfaction with achieved results, etc. That was a step toward setting unrealistic slogans in social practice. Perhaps this was also the reason for underrating the political work of the masses and ideological education in general, why party, trade union, as well as young people's schooling was not linked to the problems which move society. Difficult problems were not being resolved or were postponed, which as a result led to a political crisis in the party and in society. The Right used this situation to mount demagogic attacks on the principles of socialist politics, on the substance of the socialist system. The year 1968 reaped the bitter fruit of the political approach also characterized by the severance of the links with working people. It is not surprising that various opportunistic rightist groups seized the initiative within society and with the applause and support of our class enemies tried to reverse the February revolution. Regrettably, we have

lately tended to forget this, one of the most valuable of lessons. There are party agencies and organizations which are satisfied with general approaches, for whom paper reports and formal information seem sufficient. There are professional party workers who spend more time sitting at a "green table", instead of spending most of their working hours in basic organizations, among the working people. Deservedly criticized are also cases of prodigious administrative work required by some regional party committees. This, of course, is also a problem of many social organizations of the National Front. For that reason it was urgently emphasized at the 7th Plenum of the KSC Central Committee that for every political as well as economic official the correct approach should become a matter of course: regular contact with the broad strata of the working people—confer with them, put their knowledge to use, take account responsibly of their opinions, and resolve problems with their cooperation. In other words, engage in social dialogue. And at the same time they should not avoid questions and opinions expressed by our fellow citizens. In plain words, where we do not take action, we leave the field open for the success of demagoguery and lies, half-truths and whisper campaigns, and that is when distrust, disbelief and dislike gain ground. To achieve good results, fulfill the objectives of our party, the tasks which await us, is not possible without enlisting the majority of our working people, and, let us not be afraid to say it, every one of us. A mere establishment of party objectives does not in itself mean that citizens will approach them with initiative and action. Without a conviction of their correctness, without a patient, personal campaign of thousands of party functionaries and all other parties and social organizations of the National Front, the objective will remain on paper and will not succeed in energizing anybody into action. A personal approach has enormous influence, but ultimately the greatest and most potent influence is by example—in work, in function, as well as in social life, in the street, in the family. For that reason, we must base all activities of party agencies and organizations of the National Front on working with the people, solve key problems with their participation, confer with them, learn from them, generalize their experiences and suggestions, make use of them. The current objectives of our society cannot be achieved merely by correctly adopted resolutions. That would not be enough. To push through profound changes in all sectors of national life will require enormous energy, great persistence and tenacity, necessity to shed various obsolete concepts, overcoming of manifestations of inertia and formalism, administrative methods, in other words everything that is out-dated and is hindering our progress. Bureaucratic, cavalier, or careerist traits have nothing in common with the profile of an active functionary. On the contrary, moral purity, self-sacrifice, courage, initiative, and imaginativeness are held in high respect by the people. The struggle for social changes leading to improvement is exemplified by enthusiasm, modesty, and self-denial, particularly on the part of management personnel. We are striving for political openness. Merely a simple wider dissemination

or communication of our objectives or the objectives of this or that local management is not enough. Political openness also means a wide acceptance of information from below, a widely informed public generally, democracy and control, that is, an active participation in ensuring stated goals. There are thousands of cases where an open approach by a director and other supervisory personnel toward the working people, detailed explanation of a measure, be it a not very popular one, or a personal example by communists, made it possible to implement tasks which until recently were "unimplementable." Such was the case also in the shoe factory Svit Gottwaldov, where for years they have failed to fulfill the plan, in some textile factories in the East Bohemian Region, in a number of collectives of the Prague Ceskomoravská Kolben Danek, in Slusovice, Cifer, and others. And conversely. Where the industrial managers do not make use of this approach problems persist for years, complications arise, or they are not fully successful in winning over the working people to the given objective. Regrettably, such approach is often manifested also in relationship to young people and in cooperation with the youth federation.

Thus, without an active approach of all managers, without their close cooperation with party agencies and organizations, without an open attitude toward their subordinates, to the working people, it is not possible to achieve the necessary results. Only in mutual cooperation can we fulfill the plans which we set for ourselves for the future. It is no longer possible to wait with our hands folded. Even today, these poet's words are valid: who stood still for a while, is already standing at some distance.

On the journey forward there can be no spectators. People cannot remain neutral. Even after 40 years, since February 1948, the words of Klement Gottwald have a full, topical and urgent ring—face the masses. Thus, face real life.

12605

Details About Controversial Priest's Murder Revealed
23000057 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 16 Mar 88 p 3

[Article: "Who Murdered Father Polak?"]

[Text] The Czechoslovak police seem to be having trouble determining the cause of death of several Catholic priests or bringing the perpetrators to justice in the case of obvious crimes. On 17 July 1974, the parish priest of the St Franz Xaver Church in Trenčín, Father Ludovít Alojz Senasi, was found dead in his apartment. Jaroslav Rusnák, parish priest in Bratislava-Trnavka, died of gas poisoning on 1 March 1977. In late June 1979, Milan Gono, a secretly ordained priest, fell to his death from a scaffolding at a construction site where he was working as a prisoner; the public doubts the official version of

"work accident." On 24 February 1981, Premysl Coufal, also a secretly ordained priest and monk, was found dead in his apartment in Bratislava; his body, in particular his face, bore signs of torture, a circumstance which is not compatible with the official statement of "suicide." On 24 July 1983, the parish priest of Pata, Alojz Schmiester, was shot to death by a visitor in the doorway of his parish house.

More precise details were of the latest case were made known. The parish priest of Borovce, Stefan Polak, was murdered on the night of 7 October 1987. Polak had visited his friend Rudolf Vasko, parish priest of Velke Kostolany, on 7 October. He checked several times to see whether he would be picked up by the secret police. The background of this fear: Polak had been in Rome as a tourist the year before and had been able to speak with Pope John Paul II. People noticed a change in his behavior after his return: Polak broke off his contacts with the "Pacem in terris" priests' organization, which is friendly to the regime, and dedicated his parish to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. From then on he received a number of death threats by telephone.

A red car, a Skoda, with PX (Povazska Bistrica district) on the license plate was seen on the outskirts of Borovce on the evening of 7 October. Five men got out and observed the town throughout the night. Other men forced their way into the parish house and were later sighted in the attic. Around 11 pm Polak was accompanied home by acquaintances; his sister, who ran the household, was not there that evening. Perhaps he had already been beaten to the ground in the yard, for the next day an old couple who took care of his chickens found a pool of blood there. When Father Polak did not appear either for a day of meditation at the deanery or in the afternoon at a funeral in Trebatice on 8 October, the sexton and another priest broke open the door to the parish house in Borovce. They found the priest's body; it was tied to a hot radiator with a thin wire. His mouth was covered with a carpet adhesive tape and stuffed full of paper. His face was mutilated beyond recognition. His entire body showed traces of severe maltreatment. Later, an autopsy revealed that the priest had been stabbed eight times with a knife. Spleen and liver were torn by blows and kicks. His eyes were gouged out and the sockets covered with an adhesive tape. In the opinion of the physicians, the priest's suffering could have lasted four to five hours.

The police started a widespread search immediately after the discovery of the murder. They questioned several hundred citizens. On the basis of the questions and assertions, those interrogated got the impression that the parish house must have been observed by the police for several days before the murder and all persons who entered and left jotted down. People were astonished that the investigating officials were searching for a green Skoda, although a red one had parked on the outskirts of the village that evening. People were also astounded by the statement which district party secretary Nehaj made

before the party secretaries of Trnava district's larger enterprises and institutions on 8 October: Polak's murderers were cheated husbands. But that was inconsistent with the display of the corpse as the murderers had arranged it. Some priests were also made to feel insecure by the warnings of the police that something similar, like what befell Polak, could happen to them if they went to any meetings in the evening, for instance with youth. Several priests also received anonymous telephone threats.

On 13 November 1987, 34-year old Michal Strizenec, parish priest of Bab in the southern Slovak district of Galanta, got an anonymous call saying that it was now his turn after Polak. A half hour later, a car stopped in front of the parish house; two unknown men got out and started to pound on the door with their fists. The parish priest notified the police, and the men disappeared. In mid-December, two men broke into the parish house of Neslusa in northern Slovakia at night; the housekeeper alerted parish priest Jan Tarabek, who lived on the second floor, by house telephone. He turned on the church bells, which started to chime, whereupon the men fled. (F.A.Z.)

13084

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Summaries of Major EINHEIT Articles, March 1988

23000063 East Berlin EINHEIT in German
Vol 43 No 3, Mar 88 (signed to press
12 Feb 88) pp 194, 288

[Summary of article by Dr Klaus Gaebler, member of and department manager in the SED Central Committee; pp 210-216]

Socialist Values and the Ideological Content of Effective Political-Ideological Work

[Text] A task of political-ideological work and the duty of each communist is to propagate socialist values aggressively. This aims at the practical activities of the people toward consolidating and augmenting these values and serves everyone's personality development and clear orientation in the class conflict of our day. Why must we then devote the greatest attention to the unity of experience and insight? Why must we, in particular, make everyone aware of the class character of the socialist values? Instilling our values as a high demand placed on differentiated ideological work.

[Summary of article by Ernst Timm, graduate social scientist, member of the SED Central Committee and first secretary of Rostock SED Bezirk Management; pp 217-223]

Creative Work for the Good of All and One's Own Benefit

[Text] As everywhere else in our country, it is also becoming apparent in Rostock Bezirk by way of persuasive facts how much importance is attached to this

accomplishment of socialism in the life of individuals as in society at large. What does it mean to purposefully shape this value further in conformity with the 11th party congress resolutions, whereby to make the requisite contribution to the further solidification of socialism and peace? What are the central tasks for the political leadership on the enterprise and the territorial levels?

[Summary of article by Prof Dr Erich Hahn, member of the SED Central Committee, director of the Institute for Marxists-Leninist Philosophy in the SED Central Committee's Social Sciences Academy, chairman of the science council for Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and member of the GDR Academy of Sciences; and Prof Dr Reinhold Miller, research area manager at the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Philosophy in the SED Central Committee's Social Sciences Academy; pp 224-229]

Values and Action

[Text] What are socialist values? What function do socialist value orientations, ideas, and criteria have for further shaping the humanistic character of our society in accordance with the 11th party congress resolutions and in the life of each individual, particularly in coping with the scientific-technical revolution? How do values function as motivators for action, and what tasks result for management activity in tapping the potential motivating power of socialist values?

[Summary of article by Prof Dr Dieter Kirchhoefer, vice president of the Pedagogical Sciences Academy of the GDR; and Prof Dr Gerhart Neuner, president of that academy and member of the GDR Academy of Sciences; pp 230-235]

Values in Youth Education

[Text] What are the typical values among GDR youth? Why does the appropriation of socialist values, the formation of a consciousness of socialist values, play a key role within the overall process of socialist education of the young generation? What demands arise for the work of teachers and educators from the realization that the accomplishments and values of socialism are not internalized automatically nor are they becoming impulses for action by themselves? This is being illuminated by way of the example of the value of the "socialist fatherland."

[Summary of article by Prof Dr Karlheinz Jentsch, general director of the VEB Wilhelm Pieck Combine, Mansfeld; pp 236-239]

Rational Energy Use—Experiences and Results

[Text] Rational energy use is the decisive source for covering our economy's growing energy demands. How are large-scale energy savings being organized—pursuant to clear strategic managerial guidelines—in the Wilhelm

Pieck Combine, Mansfeld? What initiatives are being developed to reach production targets with a smaller energy output? What forms of recognition are used for good energy performance?

[Summary of article by Dr Klaus Ahrends, research area manager at the Institute for the Political Economy of Socialism in the SED Central Committee's Social Sciences Academy; pp 240-246]

Effective Accountancy in Our Agriculture

[Text] What characterizes the application of effective accounting in our agriculture, and how does it improve the comprehensive intensification, the introduction of scientific-technical progress, and a more effective use of funds and capacities for economic growth? How does it take account of income rates, and what provides incentives for the cooperative farmers and rural workers? What induces them to achieve quality production?

[Summary of article by Dr Gerhard Banse, vice president of Urania; and Prof Dr Herbert Hoerz, deputy director and area manager of the Central Institute for Philosophy in the GDR Academy of Sciences and member of that Academy; pp 247-253]

On the Meaning of Science and Technology

[Text] Today, science and technology are the object of ideological debate worldwide. The article addresses questions concerning the meaning of their further development, man's responsibility to use them solely for humane ends, the relationship between humanity and efficacy, and the controllability of scientific-technical progress for the good of today's and future generations; In particular, it treats the social prerequisites and requirements for the humanistic mastery of the scientific-technical revolution.

[Summary of article by Prof Dr Gerhard Becker, editor in chief of the ZEITSCHRIFT FUER GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT; pp 254-260]

The March 1848 Revolution and the German Workers Class

[Text] The workers class, which had just begun to emerge as an independent class, proved the most consistent force in the March clashes. The author treats in particular the communists' program for carrying on the revolution and its position on setting up a broad working class alliance with the other democratic forces and on "forming the proletarian party."

[Summary of article by Maj Gen Werner Huebner, Ph.D., sector chief in the SED Central Committee; pp 261-264]

"Differentiated Deterrence"—Old Ideas Repackaged

[Text] Produced by influential U.S. politicians and officers on orders from the Pentagon and presented to the U.S. president, the January 1988 report by the commission for an integrated long-term strategy is an alarming document; it attests to the mode of thinking by those forces which, on behalf of the U.S. military-industrial complex, are seeking ways to continue militarily enforcing global imperialist supremacy designs even under the changed international conditions.

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HUNGARY

Democratic Centralism Misunderstood, Misapplied Over Time

25000143 Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian
No 3, Mar 1988 pp 21-25

[Article by Tomaj Barsi, first secretary of the Budapest 6th district party committee: "Democratic Centralism in Practice"]

[Text] In the course of searching for opportunities of renewal, issues pertaining to the party's leadership role, to the development of the party's internal life, and to the critical analysis of the workings of the party had been placed on the agenda. The extent to which our work-style, our methods, and even our organizational structure enhances the fulfillment of the party's historic mission and the realization of its policies must be examined.

I am confident that the related analyses will bring to the surface the places where weaknesses may be found, as well as the regressive forces and the causes that encourage such forces; the manner in which the principle of democratic centralism prevails in various detailed aspects of party work; whether the principles had been transcended by life, or if inconsistencies in the implementation of principles are the cause of our concerns in party life; etc. For purposes of clarification I jotted down specific observations deemed to be important from the viewpoint of making democratic centralism prevail. These are based on experiences gained in Budapest and in districts within Budapest.

Despite the fact that during the past period conditions for local autonomy have improved with respect to numerous issues, and the opportunities for practicing party democracy have broadened, this improvement and broadening was insufficient to truly invigorate the internal life of the party. Local party activities continue to be constrained by various commitments, and this certainly plays a role in the low level of initiative at the "bottom."

Since rank and file members have little to say in regards to the formulation of decisions, their level of identification with resolutions is insufficient, and so is their preparedness to implement those resolutions. Related to this is the fact that formalism and the semblance of activity frequently exists in the course of fulfilling party resolutions. On occasion one finds that implementation is being circumvented. Party organizations in charge of direction react to the dissimilar implementation of decisions and to the failure of achieving the anticipated effect by issuing new resolutions. At what point and in what manner would it be possible to break out of this circle?

Placing on the agenda topics which by now have become traditional, as those topics are prescribed or recommended from the top down, creates a great burden on both the basic organizational units as well as on party committees. All of these topics contain a number of necessary pieces of information of course, but most of them do not require the adoption of a collective stance. Frequently certain proposals (e.g. the plan for a meeting function) are presented to the collective only because one or another member of the apparatus is ill-prepared or lacks the preparedness to accept responsibility, or because a council or the managers of some enterprise view the political reinforcement of their actions necessary.

This situation should be changed. Increasingly, higher level party organs should issue operational resolutions only with respect to the internal life of the party, while tasks related to social, economic and cultural life should be defined in principle only. I view this as the direction to be followed.

Development of the political sensitivity of basic organizational units and of collectives could be enhanced, and their capability to react could be accelerated by relaxing constraints related to the agenda, thus stimulating self-inspired work and independent decisions relative to topics that are politically significant and timely in a given place. Generally speaking, it would be useful if basic organizational units themselves could designate topics in regards to which membership meetings should formulate political positions. Such designations should be made on the basis of the basic organizational units' interests—perhaps conflicts—at the workplace. Party organizations should indeed be motivated by embodying their decisions and recommendations into political tasks and party assignments.

It is not easy to make this idea prevail. In the manner we are accustomed to, party collectives debate local (district, plant, institutional) issues on the basis of proposals prepared by various apparatuses (council, enterprise, institutional). Thus, whenever an enterprise council, a trade union committee and a party committee discuss the same matter, such as the annual plan, it is the heading that changes at most, while the content remains the same.

Despite all expectations, specialists pay less attention to political considerations, and thus it happens that on the basis of good specialized materials, following some apparently adequate decisions, there emerge some unexpected conflicts which affect many. All this requires an increase in the role and political influence of collective and basic organizational unit members in the course of preparing for decisions.

Members of the collectives could perform more substantive work if party members were to be informed of newly emerging conceptions and debated issues, if there were an exchange of information between members of the collectives and party members, and if members of collectives could formulate positions based on experiences thus gained. In this manner policy and the role of interest relationships would gain strength, and the frequently experienced filtering, pre-selective effect that flows from the specialists' situation would be diminished. It would also be useful to present several alternative proposals, indicating which interests are favored and disfavored by the various alternatives.

Most certainly, it is also necessary to develop the intra-party decision-making system. I feel that the interest of democracy would be served within regional party organizations if from among essential political matters affecting the entire region more issues would be delegated to party committees rather than to executive committees.

Insofar as basic organizational units are concerned, many party members feel that they have little to do with the merits of decisions. They define this situation by saying that "actually, basic organizational units have little opportunity to exercise the party's leadership role." This undesirable feeling is reinforced by the fact that as of today, basic organizational units seldom find real opportunities for decision-making, their resolutions most often reinforce perceptions that have already taken shape in regards to issues already closed by enterprise management or by higher level party organs having authority to direct.

For this reason we should continue the delegation of legal and cadre jurisdictions, thus synchronizing these jurisdictions with the strengthening of enterprise, cooperative, institutional and council autonomy. In theory, at certain points of leadership certain interests (which appear and can be made to prevail at such points), certain resources (which represent the material backing for the prevalence of recognized interests), and certain pieces of information (which enable the review, evaluation and management of conflicts) must coincide. Party collectives should receive sufficient authority to permit the political harmonization of the above-mentioned factors.

In addition, it would be necessary that party organizations, basic organizational units and party members obtain greater roles in the formulation of party decisions

pertaining to their jurisdictions (municipal, city, etc.), and also that they acquire a noticeable degree of influence with respect to main policy issues of a national scope. Initiatives pertaining to important political issues which merit debate within the party should be developed further, as necessary.

Increased autonomy and the increased need for policy development requires that party organizations obtain locally as well as from directing party organizations several types of information which would place these organizations into "position," so to speak. Basic organizational unit membership meetings should constantly have on their agenda the leadership's work that transpired between two membership meetings; the political elements of local events and processes; and information concerning political developments at the national level, in Budapest and in the district, but in a manner so that the membership is able to express its opinion, and if needed, to subject everything to debate. Moreover, the membership should be able to make proposals and initiate matters. The reactions of directing party organs to thus emerged initiatives should be strictly demanded. This could be one of those processes by which we could incorporate grassroots input into the formulation of policy details. It could be made the responsibility of party committees to better integrate and to more firmly represent political impulses received from basic organizational units. The above-mentioned steps could strengthen the independence of party organizations, membership initiative and the members' sense of responsibility for implementation.

Most of the time, well-founded initiatives come about as a result of substantive debate, yet in this aspect of work one finds restraint in many places. At collective meetings the majority principle is distorted so that it is governed by a demand for consensus. During the past decades endeavors to reach agreements, or, better said, the appearance of agreements turned into a kind of "rule of conduct within the movement." Accordingly, any pronouncedly different perception lost its edge and determination in the course of collective sessions, and in the end "everyone agreed with everything."

This thought leads to the issue of equal rights for party members and for the members of collectives. This equality has been declared by our organizational rules, but it is to a lesser extent that this rule prevails in practical party life. In this instance we are not dealing with a spectacular violation of rights, of course. Positions held at state, economic, cultural or political workplaces frequently determine the weight of opinions expressed by party members, while the bias of opinions expressed is frequently determined by personal relationships. This problem is topped by the fact that members of collectives do not depend at all, or depend only slightly on their constituent party members who elected them.

Could equal rights among party members be enforced in a more effective manner? Would it improve the situation if collective work became more open to party members,

if the authority of collectives would increase, if personal intertwining stemming from workplace hierarchies would be liquidated, and if the expansion of the principle of rotation, applicable to certain leadership functions would be expanded, as that was already expressed by the CC? I think it would be worthwhile to consider the idea of limited terms of office for independent party secretaries to a maximum of two cycles, irrespective of the level they are working at, moreover, this should apply to the associate workers of the political apparatus also.

Also in regards to members of collectives, in the context of decisions, the equal rights principle aims for the integration of represented interests and endeavors, rather than for the dominance of personal positions. In the event that for objective or subjective reasons reconciliation is incomplete, decisions should be based on a majority vote, meaning that someone or some persons would remain in the minority. According to our party's standards, decisions must be implemented and must be represented in forums outside of the party despite the opinion of the minority, even if that minority continues to sustain its opposition. A party member has the right to hold a separate opinion, but by virtue of our rules of conduct promulgated in our capacity as a movement, the defense of separate opinions within our forums is unusual, and sustaining separate opinions following a decision, even within party-like forms is considered as heresy (while, at the same time, the un-party-like expression of separate opinions in the corridors, or even at speakers' lectures happens every day). There is, of course no guaranty that the majority decision of one or another collective is by all means correct, therefore, in agreement with published theses concerning the party's leadership role, we should establish an opportunity for the further weighing of minority views and opinions within intra-party exchanges of view.

This could become one way by which our critical, self-critical, renewal preparedness could be developed, and could serve as an assurance that as the leading "single party" we could become our own opposition. On such occasions, as a matter of natural reflex, this idea emerges: what is going to happen to party unity? I am convinced that even without reaching a consensus, open debate at party forums would produce better party unity, than the semblance of unity within debateless party forums, followed by the proliferation of some irresponsible talk and comment on the "outside."

A substantial development in the democratic character of intra-party elections is an important element for the strengthening of the creative, critical spirit. I believe that in order to accomplish this in cases of intra-party elections, we should diminish the extent to which we are being directed from the top, and reduce the selection made by the apparatus. The nominees recommended by the nominating committee, the membership meeting, the meeting of delegates and the participants of the political committee session should be accorded equal rank. I would find it appropriate if members of the collective

elected directly from party organizations would be present in the ranks of the Budapest, county and district committees, as well as within the ranks of the CC. I believe that it ought to be considered that in the future, party committee secretaries be elected, recalled or relieved by the meeting of delegates. I feel friendly toward an obligation of running multiple nominees, supplementing this with the idea that each nominee should be required to express his views concerning the local implementation of party policies, concerning the efforts of the party organization to implement party policies, and his idea of how he could represent the political will of his constituency. Such statements should be made to the membership and to the delegates. At the same time, with their decision party members (delegates) would accept, (perhaps with corrections,) the nominee's program and the implementation of that program.

Delegates elected by organizations should also receive specific assignments as to what they should represent at the party conference. Their mandate should include the local, collective opinion concerning documents produced by the meeting of delegates on the one hand, and the delegate's viewpoint and recommendation based on conditions of local political life, on the other. The requirement that delegates report to their electorate concerning representation of their mandate, and about decisions made by the meeting of delegates should be enforced. The issue of whether the delegate mandate should continue as valid until the end of the cycle should be examined. Thus the continued control over, reporting by, and direction of elected collectives could become a reality. This solution could well result in a continued, close relationship between officials and the membership, even if that relationship would be indirect.

The same goal could be achieved by the mandatory consultation of party committee members prior to meetings. In preparing for collective meetings, members of party committees should meet with the officers of their receive a directed mandate from his own party organization concerning the expression of one or another political viewpoint on a given subject in the course of debate.

In agreement with many, also I consider it necessary that control and accountability within the party be strengthened. I do not recommend a simple multiplication of disciplinary actions, even though this should not be ruled out as a possible related consequence. Instead, I recommend that collectives be held accountable more frequently. It would be beneficial if communist leaders would periodically report on important subjects and the implementation of earlier party decisions not by providing mountains of data, but instead reports which highlight the political essence. This kind of reporting should be made by communist leaders to party collectives, and by smaller collectives to larger ones, (e.g. the executive committee to the party committee, the party committee to the meeting of delegates, the delegates to the electors, etc.). This kind of rapport could reveal that persons or collectives fulfill their assignments only in an incomplete

manner or not at all, and that therefore the recall of some persons may be necessary. The conceptual statement concerning recall, as contained in our organizational rules should be worked out in more detail (but in a simple form, nevertheless). It should be based on the consideration that in a given situation not only "malfeasance" may serve as cause for the recall of office holders, but also the failure to appropriately fulfill political assignments.

The way we practice democratic centralism in party work attests to the manner in which the principle of democratic centralism is misinterpreted, moreover distorted. We have equated the meaning of centralism to, for example the mechanical, frequently undifferentiated adoption of the contents of higher resolutions, and to the copying of the CC organizational order, functional method and political discussion technique. And we have also equated centralism to resolving adaptation by providing to the directed organs directives extending to procedural matters, instead of providing local political analyses and the definition of tasks. I do not find it appropriate that at various levels of party work, within the activities of the apparatus and of collectives the weight of certain specialized areas of party life is almost identical. In my opinion the ratio of these should be different at various levels of leadership. I am certain that within party basic organizational units, and in the workings of committees that direct these basic organizational units, a changed style is needed: instead of approaches of a specialized character we need political approaches; instead of analyzing situation examinations we need synthetized reviews; instead of scope statements we need the complex perception and handling of social and political issues; instead of the repeated definition of tasks we need more operational, problem-solving activities.

I am convinced that with the growth of the autonomy of party organizations also the character of internal direction within the organization must change in the direction of lively political debate. I believe that party organizations should hear unequivocal points of view, clearly defined political objectives, and the direction of activities, and that they enjoy confidence, based on the assumption that strength and preparedness for working out details, forms and methods exists in a majority of the organizations. Holding these organizations accountable should focus not on the details of work, but on political results. A far larger share of the strength of our collectives, our apparatuses should be directed to help the organizations, to inform and study their problems, respond to their ideas, or to the conveyance of their ideas—much more attention than has been paid thus far. Meetings of the collective are also important, but the upside-down world of party life must be turned around and "placed on its feet": the collectives exists for the sake of the organizations and of the party membership, and not in the reverse!

CC Secretary Fejti Supports Party, Political Reform, Sets Limits

25000137 Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian
No 3, Mar 1988 pp 3-10

[Article by Gyorgy Fejti, Central Committee Secretary:
"Party, State, Citizen"]

[Text] The party's leadership role, the further development of the political institutional system are the subjects of broad-based and passionate debate within the party, as well as among the population. This is fully understandable. After all, recognition of the fact that lasting economic stability, and more importantly, dynamic development cannot be perceived without comprehensive institutional reforms is becoming increasingly apparent. Renewal is hastened by accumulated social and political tensions, by the known economic difficulties, as well as by certain functional disturbances of the political institutional system. External, international conditions for accomplishing the necessary changes are now better than ever. Even though marked with differences in pace and depths, a wave of reform is in the offing within a majority of the socialist countries. This provides valuable and useful lessons for us also. Of special significance are those comprehensive and deep-rooted changes, those courageous steps, which characterize new Soviet political thought and practice.

Ever since its inception, the MSZMP has followed the path of reform and of the evolution of socialist democracy, even though that path was not free from abuses. An important station along this path was the defense of power, and the placement of power upon new and broader foundations, the development of association democracy, the reform of economic management, the broadening of council self-government, the modification of the electoral system, the introduction of new forms in enterprise management, the system of competition and the acceptance of the idea of making limited-time assignments. These measures represent solid foundations for further development. Based on these foundations the planned changes can become organic and continuous, and can assume an evolutionary character. At the same time, however, the changes we have decided to embark upon must reach a certain order of magnitude, a so-called "critical mass," on the basis of which the intent and orientation of the changes becomes clear and unequivocal.

We must stress all of this because one hears some dissonant voices in the course of societal debate. And the planned reform of the political institutional system is accompanied by manipulative endeavors. Certain groups believe that the party, or to use their favorite expression, the "power" is not willing to exercise any self-restraint at all, and that it surrenders only what is forcefully taken away. Thus, so they say, the party must be kept under constant pressure, and must be excluded from an increasing number of areas.

I do not believe that I need to comment on these views, and on the intentions that support these views. It would not hurt, however, to make clear that the party does not permit the expropriation and the manipulation of the reform of the institutional system. We are convinced that even though quite naturally, reform conceptions may take shape also outside of the party, comprehensive social and institutional reforms can be implemented only under the party's leadership and direction. Based on the socialist platform, the party is prepared to cooperate with all sober and helpful forces that act responsibly in the interest of the country's future. The party is open to hearing constructive critique of the present institutional system, and learning of conceptions that transcend that system. At the same time, however, the party does not wish to leave doubt about the fact that it views consolidation of socialism as the purpose of political institutional reform. We want more socialism, more democracy, a higher level of economic efficiency, greater material and spiritual wealth, and better balanced, more humane community relations. It is for these purposes, and for no other purpose, that we wish to renew the structure and functioning of the political institutional system.

Further development of the political institutional system decisively depends on the extent to which the party itself is capable of renewing its activities, of developing its political sensitivity, of increasing democracy within the party, and of improving the spirit to debate. In this area also we have some proven, although not always consistently followed basic principles which are in need of reinforcement. Most important among these are the following:

—The party views its leadership role as service; it directs but it does not reign. It starts out from the fact that the enforcement of its leadership role depends primarily on the propriety of political assessments made by the party, as well as on the extent to which the party is capable of convincing, winning over and mobilizing society.

—As the ruling party it does not endeavor to assume a monopolistic role in the exercise of power, instead it follows the path of self-restraint. The party endeavors an appropriate level of division of labor between party and state organs. It draws social and mass organizations into policy formulation, implementation and control.

—The party starts out from facts, from reality, and consciously avoids subjectivism and voluntarism.

—The party endeavors to strengthen the policy of alliances, and to sustain the consensus. It does not sharpen social conflicts; it avoids such conflicts whenever possible.

—It recognizes the pluralism of ideologies, values and interests.

Doubtless, significant changes need to be made with respect to the party's work while preserving the basic principles. Above all there is a need for a more dynamic and more catalytic attitude, because only in this way can the party spearhead the changes that have matured within society. To accomplish this we must formulate healthier proportions between continuity and change. We must proceed deliberately, but at a faster pace and with more courage. We must put an end to the so called "infallibility complex," while experimenting more courageously, and if necessary, adjusting our determinations in the process. We must be more open and more tolerant with respect to recommendations made from outside of the party. We must also learn to be favorably disposed to accepting criticism. We will always need to have a critical view of matters both within and outside of the party. Not everyone is our ally, not even those who praise us. On the other hand, not everyone who criticizes us is our enemy.

Regarding the future, however, the most important issue pertains to a more accurate definition of the party's leadership role. In our judgment, the essence of the leadership role is the definition of the main trends of social development, the designation of socio-political goals based on the reconciliation of interests, the understanding of those goals, the making of those goals accepted through persuasion, the organization for the realization of goals through means available to the movement, and political control over the achievement of goals. This definition suggests that we endeavor to accomplish a more clear-cut, more apparent division of labor in the relationship between the party and the state organs, a more unequivocal delineation of the decision-making and accountability functions, and a radical reduction in superfluous parallel functions. Party organizations at the national, regional as well as local levels must primarily attend to the development of theoretical and strategic issues, the synthetizing of political processes, the revelation of conflicts of interest, and the resolution of conflicts in a manner so as to best reflect the public interest. In somewhat simple terms: our "case-handling" party must become a real politicians' party which recognizes and influences political processes in a timely fashion.

We must broaden democracy within the party, expanding party members' personal participation in decision-making. At the same time this is also a requisite for making prevail in a more consistent manner the principles of democratic centralism and of party unity. Regarding the more significant proposals, we must make it our systematic practice to hold preliminary debates with, and to seek advance opinions from regional and local party organizations, and with respect to major issues, from the entire party membership.

We must reconsider the relationship between debate and unity. Unfortunately, substantive debates are increasingly removed from party forums, while sharply focused, passionate debate continues regarding the most diverse

issues in the "corridors." Party membership meeting and party forum agenda must include substantive issues, the ones that preoccupy people day after day. On the other hand, political unity must be forged and reforged in the course of passionate debate. Only this can serve as a foundation for unity in organization and action. At the same time, debate must not be self-serving, debate must not take the place of action and work. For this reason we must be able to close debate at the appropriate time. This is an elementary condition of the party's ability to act.

Cadre work has an outstanding significance in enforcing the party's leadership role. It is indispensable that we judge leaders by the yardstick of the fruits of their labor, their actual achievements. Along with cadre selection, the natural selection of leaders should increasingly surge to the forefront. We must significantly improve the democratic features, the openness of cadre work, while broadening the direct electoral base, the system of competition, and the practice of limited term assignments. All these are elementary conditions for abandoning the practice of counter-selection—a not-so-rare phenomenon.

In thinking of the party's leadership role we must divorce ourselves from suggestions which are not exactly devoid of anterior motives and which seek to limit party activities by law. We must make clear that the party's jurisdiction, in its capacity as a political movement, cannot be restricted through legal means. At the same time the party's place is not above society, it functions strictly within constitutional limitations, in full respect of laws. Put differently: if there are limits to party decisions—and there are—those limits cannot be expressed in legal terms. These are political limitations tied to the pluralism of interests that exists in society, and to the compromises forged within this pluralism of interests. In this sense then, the means to "limit" the party is not regulation by law, not somekind of a law that deals with the party. Instead, "limitation" of the party can be accomplished by increasing the sphere of activity of state organs, mass organizations and mass movements, and by increasing the decision-making autonomy of these organs and organizations.

We do not find a single ruling party in modern societies which would surrender the opportunity to influence state and popular representative organs as a means to realize its own political endeavors. The cabinet composition and the general principles of government policies is determined in every society by the ruling party (or the ruling coalition of parties). There may be, and there are, however, significant differences in the way party policies are made to prevail, and in the proportions of the application of direct and indirect means.

Our party is determined to increase the role of state, popular representative and self-governing organs, and to assure that these bodies become the forums of open

political discussion, for the surfacing of interest relationships, and for harmonizing these relationships in the public interest. This must take place to an extent larger than what it is today.

Among the state organs, popular representative bodies have a distinguished constitutional role. These are the National Assembly and the various councils. Stimulating the resolution of contradictions between the authority and jurisdiction of popular representative bodies on the one hand, and their actual role on the other, is a logical part of a political program which proclaims the broadening of openness, the better harmonization of interests, and the broadening of the power base. This idea also reflects the fact that the party does not view popular representative bodies as rivals. Instead, it views them as forums which surface interest relationships and harmonize those with their own means.

The legislative work of the National Assembly, parliamentary debate over issues related to social development, the exercise of control over the cabinet and governmental organs by the highest popular representative body is an organic component of socialist statehood—one for which there can be no substitute. Our party views as necessary, and therefore encourages the increased legislative role of the National Assembly and of parliamentary committees in holding accountable and controlling the Council of Ministers and the organs of government. The party approves of the idea that the National Assembly have exclusive authority to legislate in the area of social conditions, as that authority is defined in the constitution and in other law. This purpose is served by the recently adopted law concerning legislation, and by the limitation of the Presidium's authority to make general substitutions for legislation.

The increased political weight of popular representative bodies which can be felt already, and hopefully will continue to increase in the future, as well as the closer ties of representatives and council members to their respective constituencies present a new situation for the party. We must stimulate the activities of, and the spirit of debate in these bodies on the one hand, we cannot surrender, however, the idea of enforcing party policies through open debate, supported by appropriate arguments—in other words, by way of persuasion, on the other. Quite naturally, political orientation requires the application of different methods in matters involving the National Assembly and the councils. Systematic consultation with the communist members of such bodies, however, should be viewed as a basic, paramount principle. In the course of developing their own position party organizations should rely on their opinions and experiences. Party organizations should make clear what the party supports, and what it considers contrary to its political objectives.

The communist members of these bodies should discharge their duties in the framework of a "dual commitment." Contrary to what our opponents say, this duality

does not necessarily lead to conflict. After all, the party itself participates in the integration of interests, and therefore, provided that the party follows appropriate political considerations, its positions should reflect the public interest. And further, precisely because we endeavor to achieve a more clear-cut division of labor between party and state organs, we do not consider as desirable that party organizations specifically prescribe in every instance the conduct to be followed. If, however, with respect to important issues of principle, or to strategic matters it is necessary to show a united communist front, then a reasoned resolution should be provided by the body of communists.

The Council of Ministers serves as the central point for government administration and coordination. Political direction of the various ministries and of national organs must follow central direction. The issue of the independent decision-making responsibility of the government on the one hand, and the fundamental issues that are politically important on the other, must be unequivocally delineated. In regards to the latter, the central party organs having jurisdiction must take a stand prior to governmental action.

We feel that it is necessary for the coordinative role of the Council of Ministers to gain strength. In this respect also it is necessary to clearly and unequivocally delineate decision-making authorities. This is the preliminary condition for the simultaneous evolution of the collective character of governmental work, of substantive control over the activities of central administrative organs, while at the same time significantly increasing ministerial autonomy. The most recent structural reorganization of government—the elimination of intermediate levels of decision-making between the Council of Ministers and the various ministers, alternatively, the radical limitation of such intermediate levels—has already served this purpose.

We must continue with the modernization of central administration. It would be inappropriate, however, to construe this exclusively as the "organization of the organization." Just as it is indispensable in central party organizations to carefully select issues that become subjects of debate, so is it in the case of the Council of Ministers. Justified organizational changes should be linked to the critical analysis of earlier activities, to the examination of functions, to a necessary cleansing of the profile, to the implementation of decentralization, and to the formulation of a new work-style in ministries. In other words, also in the management practices of ministries, "hands-on" management, having an operative character should be increasingly abandoned, while strategic planning, the influencing of processes through standard means gains greater significance.

The most significant changes which pertain to the development of socialist democracy, and which are to be realized in the functioning of the government took place at the council level. The significant stepping stones of

this process were the delegation of regulatory authority to local councils, the establishment of prefectorates, and the initial steps taken in the direction of the economic and financial independence of autonomous governmental bodies. It is our purpose to strengthen the qualitative features of democracy, and to complement the handling of cases at the local level with the actual "proprietary role" of councils and of the populace. It would be desirable to further increase city and municipal autonomy primarily by changing the methods of management. Problems pertaining to [financial] management safeguards within political subdivisions must be resolved. It would be justified to formulate the councils' order of functioning in a manner so as to ensure conditions for the continuous control of the specialized apparatus, for the selection of leaders and for the evaluation of their work. It would appear as desirable to establish legal provisions for more complete local autonomy in the framework of a new law pertaining to councils.

In the course of further developing the state organization it is our important endeavor to more consistently separate the three branches of government: the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches. We are assigning a greater role to the judiciary in ensuring the constitutional functioning of the government organization, and in observing the rights of citizens. The agenda includes the review of the functioning of the Constitutional Council. This serves the purpose of finding an appropriate form for the adjudication of issues related to possible violations of the constitution. We are examining the framework of an institutional system which protects the rights of citizens against the authorities—the framework of administrative adjudication.

Concerning the role of the state, the relationship between state organs and the citizens, it is our long-range goal to find institutional forms which are most appropriate to permit the exercise of power by all the people. Stated differently: the power exercised in the interest, and by the authority of the people will have to transform into power exercised directly by the people. Within this process the decentralization of the decision-making system, and the further broadening and strengthening of self-regulation and self-governance must remain a lasting trend. Paralleling this trend, evaluation and control exercised "from above" must be increasingly supplemented by upward control from the lowest levels. Along with hierarchical relations and relationships of dependence, cooperative relations and mutual interdependence relationships must assume an increasingly important role. In other words, in the context of the debate as to whether our social structure should be built from the "top down" or from the "bottom up," I believe in a model that accommodates both directions. We should structure as much self-regulation and self-governance as possible, but this concept cannot become the exclusive principle for the organization of society. In many areas, such as in the area of defense, energy supplies and other important public services, it is the concept of centralization that acts as a determinant. In yet some other areas,

such as organizations with complex structures which cannot be understood easily, or in cases involving huge capital concentrations, the opportunity to comment and to participate, rather than self-regulation appears to be the rational approach.

The extent to which the socialist state should assume a share in matters affecting the living conditions of the citizenry is also subject to some passionate debate. There are some, who advocate retreat from the care-taker, "paternalistic" state concept on grounds that in the long run the state always accepts responsibility for more tasks than what it can fulfill. For this reason, so they say, even though the state experiences a permanent condition of "over-distribution," it is incapable of delivering on its declared endeavors, thus evoking increased dissatisfaction among the citizenry. In contrast to this conception, others argue that the moderation and reduction of growing social inequities in our days requires a larger, rather than a smaller state role.

I believe that both, seemingly contradictory approaches contain elements of truth. We must recognize that at the given level of our social and economic development the opportunities available to the state are limited on the one hand, and that on the other hand, utilization of the limited means available to the state is not always rational. [State intervention] frequently reproduces those social tensions which it was supposed to eliminate. Based on these experiences and on broad-based societal debate we must repeatedly reconsider the role of the state and of councils in the shaping of the citizenry's living conditions and social circumstances, nevertheless keeping in mind the need to reduce differences in opportunities within society and to guarantee elementary existential security. Preferably the state should accept less responsibility, and should accept responsibility only for problems the resolution of which appears as rational in the framework of government administration. But the state should consistently fulfill commitments for which it has accepted responsibility. At the same time we must significantly increase the area of involvement, the scope of responsibility, and the opportunity for direct participation by citizens and citizen volunteer groups in which they can resolve their own cases and problems. And equally, we must significantly increase the role and organizational strength of councils to see to it that increasing action by the citizenry may evolve to the fullest extent.

The party professes that there is a place in our public life for any and all communities which acknowledge our socialist system, and respect our constitution and laws. For this reason the party stimulates and supports the establishment of associations, circles and clubs whose objectives coincide with our societal goals. Beyond that, we must make clear that we view the citizens' so called constructive dissatisfaction also as an important moving force. This is so because we must stem processes in

which attempts are made to shift "upwards" the responsibility for unresolved concerns that emerge in workplaces and in residential areas which could have been resolved internally, and in which local incompetence, irresponsibility and lack of initiative is veiled by references to the difficult situation of the country.

We must view with confidence all citizen initiatives whose objectives coincide with the norms of socialist society. We must set aside our reservations and lack of confidence vis-a-vis organizational activities that take place outside of the present framework. It is not necessary to endeavor to integrate at any price such organizational activities into existing organizations and movements. We must recognize the existence of variety, of deviations from the forms and patterns we have been accustomed to. Our interest rests with cooperation, not in opposition. These organizational activities can activate presently latent local forces and enlist those in the service of beneficial causes—they may introduce new dimensions and a healthy effervescence into the public life of settlements. They can fulfill tasks which cannot be fulfilled by way of government administration. Our starting point should be this: it is not the spontaneous citizen initiative that presents danger. To the contrary: it is the lack of spontaneous citizen initiative, it is indifference manifested by the citizenry, passivity, and the prevalence of a helpless feeling that presents danger. It is on the basis of these considerations that we wish to accelerate work pertaining to the re-thinking and comprehensive regulation of the right to freedom—foremost of all the right to assembly and the right of association. Consistent with international agreements and practice, within this process, along with the rights and duties of citizens and related safeguards, we wish to pay appropriate attention to legal guarantees which assure the protection of the order of the state, public order and public safety.

Relative to the support and encouragement of spontaneous citizen initiatives the question arises whether such support and encouragement may turn into a theater in which anti-socialist destabilization efforts become legalized. This danger undoubtedly exists. Moreover, in these days one experiences increasingly purposeful and aggressive endeavors to merge the platform of those who advocate changes within the socialist framework, and others who profess hostile views, and to obscure the borderline between what is legal and what is illegal. This is a dangerous and undesirable phenomenon against which we must erect barriers.

We view it as natural that under today's complex, contradictory conditions which are laden with tensions there emerge opinions and reservations contrary to the conceptions of the party and of the government. We are interested in and receptive to the expression of such views and to the development of alternative conceptions within legitimate forums. We judge those on their merits. We wish to engage in open, patient, theoretical debate with representatives of such views. We intend to

establish such consultative forums and advisory bodies which provide an appropriate framework for the objective discussion of alternative conceptions, and for the sober evaluation of such conceptions. Such forums and bodies would provide an opportunity to incorporate all rational and constructive recommendations into the program that serves economic stabilization and evolution. To accomplish this, however, there is a need for mutual—and I emphasize: mutual!—good intentions and good will, and for the elimination of attempts to induce a certain public mood.

Undoubtedly there exist persons and groups which by virtue of their views and mainly of their actions exclude themselves from dialog, even though their statements emphasize something different from what their views and actions appear to be. In earlier days they proclaimed the principle of "the worse, the better." Having recognized that this view was untenable, in the recent past they changed tactics and tried to emerge as spokesmen for issues pertaining to the national fate. In reality, however, their views are characterized by anti-communism, anti-Soviet attitudes, the fetishism of bourgeois democracy and mainly of a multi-party system, and revisionist endeavors regarding the events of 1956. Their chief endeavor is to discredit the party and socialism. They want to accomplish this primarily by strengthening the crisis atmosphere. They endeavor to magnify the real problems of society and to attribute to themselves an exclusive ability to resolve those problems. They are trying to attack and destruct at every possible point, but their chief efforts are focused on discrediting the political institutional system, on diminishing the party's role, on dividing the party, and more recently, on manipulating parliamentary representatives.

For a long time, our party has followed the practice of resolving problems through political means. This will continue to be our practice in the future. We are not endeavoring to test our strengths, we are not looking for confrontation. We must make clear, however, that using all legitimate means, we will defend socialism and our social order.

These are times of difficult decisions and transformations. On a global scale, socialism has reached a turning point in terms of further development. Many things will be transformed, reorganized. The emergence of anything new is necessarily accompanied by pains and by the loss of illusions, and on occasion demands personal sacrifice and the surrender of things of the past. But it also contains the excitement and joy of renewal, of pathfinding, of choice.

We view socialism as a long, collective educational process, in which we depart with increasing consistency from the initial messianistic illusions. We want to learn from the successes, errors, and perhaps the grave mistakes of the rest of the socialist countries. But we also have things to learn from the social and economic practices of countries that have a different social order.

In principle, we have no objections to a socialist-type multi-party system. Such a system, however, is not on the agenda in Hungary today. We perceive the single-party system as a political reality, and it is within this single-party system that we seek opportunities for the further development of the political institutional system. We perceive the expression and integration of interests not in the competition of parties, but in the increased functional sphere of social organs, of organs representative of interests, and of autonomous governing bodies ["autonomies"], in the significant broadening of citizen rights and initiatives, as well as in the continuous expansion of the necessarily related legal and institutional guarantees.

We are aware of the fact that there is no "perfect" model for the direction of society. As Hungarians, we must find our own national solution, and there is no doubt that consistent with the will of our people, the solution we find will be based on socialism, on the power of the people.

12995

'Key' Party Leaders To Be Limited to 2 Terms
25000134 Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian
12 Feb 88 p 25

[Article by Ferenc Varnai, deputy chief of MAGYARORSZAG: "To Two Terms"]

[Text] It is unusual for MAGYARORSZAG to report on a party document slated for internal use. In this instance we are doing so nevertheless because the issue concerns the entire country and society, and because leading bodies of the MSZMP attribute importance to the fact that familiarity with, and comment on the proposed thesis not be the monopoly of the party membership. The proposal concerns the party's leadership role and the further development of the political institutional system.

A Maximum of 10 Years

On the basis of a political resolution passed by the 13th congress, the MSZMP CC decided already in 1985 to examine and to place on its agenda the issues pertaining to the prevalence of the party's leadership role and to the further development of the political institutional system. The material presently submitted for debate is the product of preparatory work conducted by a broadly based group of experts and political leaders. It views the modernization of the functioning of the political institutional system, including the party's activity, as the indispensable condition for the development of socialist democracy. "Since our party is the leading force of our society," the thesis stresses, "further development of the political institutional system decisively hinges upon the extent to which the party itself is capable of renewing its activities, its work style and functional forms ... on democracy within the party."

Theses which serve as a basis for debate contain a number of reform conceptions. But even more convincing than proposals is the fact that a practice consistent with these proposals is increasingly becoming the practice within the party. By now, nominating committees are being established virtually at every level prior to filling leadership positions. These nominating committees conduct consultation with broad groups of the party membership, and even with politically active persons outside of the party. They have begun to submit multiple nominations for party offices (for example in the cases of county party committee first secretaries) and in elections they ensure that the appropriate local organizations make independent, secret decisions, with no pressure from the top.

Based on guidelines provided by the 13th congress, the MSZMP CC rendered a major decision concerning cadre work already on 18 March 1986. The resolution once again affirmed that if leaders meet the three compliance criteria for leadership (political and moral fitness, professional expertise, and aptitude for leadership) persons outside of the party may also fill any of the leadership posts, party functions being the obvious exceptions. And the resolution also stated that all elected party leaders can work in their posts only as long as they fulfill their missions successfully and as long as they enjoy the confidence of those who elected them. If any one of these two conditions does not exist, the official must be relieved from his duties.

But the resolution concerning cadre policies goes even further: it also prescribes mandatory rotation in various levels of leadership bodies. According to this statement, at congresses and party conferences at least one third of the CC members and of the various party committees must be changed, and the holding of particularly important offices was limited to a maximum of two terms ["election cycles"] (a maximum of ten years). (This decision was reported in its days by the daily newspapers, the full text of the resolution was published in PARTELET April 1986, and MAGYARORSZAG called attention to it in its No 18, 1986 issue.) It is true though that at that time the resolution did not provide details concerning the exact reach of the two-term limitation, nevertheless it established that "the order and time of introduction, and the affected levels will be prescribed by a separate CC resolution." This took place in November 1986.

The complexity of the subject is indicated by the fact that the Political Committee discussed the issue in four of its sessions before a consensus was reached on the basis of thorough debate, and before the Political Committee submitted its proposal to the CC. According to the CC's decision, a person may fill a post for a maximum of two terms only in the following functions: all members of the Political Committee, the secretaries of the CC, the chairman and the secretary of the Central Control Committee [KEB], the department heads of the CC, the editors-in-chief of the central party newspaper

and of party periodicals, the rector of the political academy, and the first secretaries of the Budapest and county party committees, and of the party committees of jurisdictions having the legal scope of counties. (Any deviation from this rule can be made only on the basis of a separate resolution by the CC.)

Institutional Guarantee

The rule was not applied to persons working in functions lower than those listed, even though the spirit of the resolution will be enforced. This was not done because in their cases the resolution requiring a minimum rotation of one-third of the leadership body settles the problem in a satisfactory manner. In other words, serious consideration was given to neither excessively limit the affected group, (i.e. not to render the resolution ineffective), nor to make it too broad (i.e. in order not to endanger political continuity).

The decision has been in effect since the 13th congress (March 1985).

(During the past decade personnel changes took place in 80 percent of the party positions for which central records are maintained. Seven first secretaries of the Budapest and the 19 county party committees assumed their posts since the 13th congress, six took their posts just before the congress.)

Aided by the resolution pertaining to the two term limitation, they wish to provide an institutional barrier to the development of a sense of infallibility and subjectivism among persons in key posts, and to commitments to persons holding posts for too long a period of time. Instead the limitation should encourage commitment to the cause between elected members of bodies and the workers of the apparatus.

The view reflected in these resolutions is an organic continuation of policies that liquidated personal cult in the post-1956 decades. At the same time it is a response to charges according to which the MSZMP is incapable of renewing itself, of enhancing the modernization of the political institutional system, and of leading the reform movement. Even though recognition was delayed due to lack of experiences, and a not small amount of insecurity made and continues to make progress difficult, the decision was made at the will of the party membership, and in the service of the entire Hungarian society.

The practice that evolved as a result of the MSZMP CC resolution is a pioneer initiative within the international communist movement. So far as it is known, for the time being no such resolution has been brought by any communist party in socialist or capitalist countries. (A similar resolution was passed by the CPSU following the 20th congress, but it was in force for a short time only. According to information received from Moscow the CPSU's upcoming conference in June is likely to revert to this subject. Although not too long ago a similar

resolution was passed by the CPC, so far as we know it was limited to a tighter group of people—only to those in the highest leadership positions. Annual rotation is enforced with respect to the president of the presidium of the SAWPY. At a BCP conference the other day it was stated that a two term limitation for elective offices will be proposed at the next party congress.)

As a result of the exchange of membership documents and of debates concerning the political institutional system, many persons in party organizations express a need for the party leadership to more forcefully enforce its resolution concerning cadre policies, and to undergo rejuvenation, refreshment, particularly the CC should have more members who work in everyday life and who well understand the daily concerns of simple people. Leadership posts should be held by those who want to be familiar with a broad range of views, and are also capable of synthetizing those.

The party leadership reacts positively to these needs. This consideration also played a role last July when the program for consolidation and evolution was worked out—the program which served as the foundation for the workplan approved by the government last fall. This view was taken into consideration when they exchanged cadres in order to establish the personal conditions in the party and in government for the realization of the program. The exchange of cadres is far from being complete. It will continue during and after the party conference scheduled during this semester.

With the Strength of Example

The MSZMP CC recommended that in due consideration of the democratic principles formulated within the party, the order by which trade union and state leaders are elected should also be regulated. Since then (by virtue of its February 1987 resolution) the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT] has brought a similar resolutions limiting certain posts to two terms. These are the president, the vice presidents, the executive secretary, the secretaries, as well as the presidents, vice presidents and executive secretaries of unions specialized by trades.

Insofar as state organs are concerned, at present there is no rule in force which, for example, would limit the tenure of the cabinet head and the members of the cabinet. A settlement of this matter can be accomplished by Parliament only, in the framework of a constitutional amendment and of its endeavor to modernize. As it is known, personal changes among cabinet members have begun. At the same time they want to ensure that as any leader in a responsible position, the government managers also should have the benefit of time and confidence needed to accomplish the tasks assigned to them in the government program.

Management of Sports Based on Illegal Premises Since 1948

25000100 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian
5 Dec 87 p 13

[Interview with Lajos Szamel, professor of state administration and jurisprudence, by Robert Zsolt: "Illegal Situation of Sports Management"]

[Text] In a study over 200 pages long, Lajos Szamel, professor of state administration and jurisprudence, examined the legal regulation of sports management. The subject touches on the entire system of Hungarian sports and is an answer to the various debates which are being conducted by the public.

[Question] Professor Szamel, your study is a review of the problems of state administration and legal regulation over sports from the beginning of the period of nationalization to the present day. If I understand correctly the substance of your work, I will put it in these terms: an illegal situation has developed in the management of sports. Is this statement correct?

[Answer] In essence, yes. I examined this subject up to the point of the establishment of the AISH [State Sports Management Office] and was compelled to conclude that the management of sports was conducted on the basis of illegally formed rules. In 1948 a dictatorial sports organization was established and this continued in the subsequent organizations whatever they were called: OSH [National Sports Office], OTSB [National Committee for Sports and Physical Culture], MTS [Hungarian Physical Education and Sports Movement], or OTSH [National Office for Sports and Physical Education]. It operated with little efficiency and regulated everything whether it was in its area of concern or not. Its operational capability was assured by the fact that it appointed all the officials, and these functionaries carried out their instructions to the letter. For elections it was the prevailing sports office which designated the candidate and only this person could be elected. In this way it was able to maintain control of sports management regulated by means of decisions and instructions although the legal relations of the citizen are not allowed to be regulated by instructions. They also employed capriciously invented terms, and carried out legal regulations by means of guides, directives, official announcements, and circular letters. These are nonexistent legal forms. There were even secret statutory provisions. In the official sports journal only an address appeared with the notation that those interested could receive the rule directly. That is, with the complete exclusion of the public. The legal system does not recognize anything like this.

[Question] On Monday, when the study came under scientific discussion, Dr Istvan Hajdu, department head of the AISH, said that the books were full of obsolete, unintelligible and unnecessary regulators. The clearing of the jungle has begun, but the work is difficult, for up to now 377 statutory provisions have been counted, only

a fraction of which are in use. Not only because they are unknown but also because they are wholly unintelligible. Is the situation really as confused as all this?

[Answer] Even more so. In preparing the study, we asked the basic sports authorities to prepare an index of those statutory provisions which in their view are still valid, and point out those which they themselves still use. We did not find two organs which chose the same provisions as being still in effect. There was a basic sports authority which claimed to use nearly 30 statutory provisions, while another claimed only 7. That is, when the survey was made in 1986, the sports organs did not know, from the viewpoint of their own operations, what provisions constituted the body of law. Of course, it would be impossible to use all 377 statutory provisions, without mentioning that the 377 do not include so-called directives, circular letters, ordinances, information and other curiosities. Obviously they do not regard these as rules, although in fact they were or are used as regulators. Overregulation—this was present in sports as well—restricts all kinds of activities, or gives rise to rules that are cast aside without any selectivity because they cannot be observed as a whole.

Overregulation

[Question] From my experience I know that overregulation impedes the activity of the associations, paralyzes the performance of certain of their tasks, and renders their operation bureaucratic. Is it necessary to regulate in such a detailed way the work of the associations?

[Answer] Not at all. Only by way of example let me mention that there are about 200 statutory provisions for their management alone. For this reason a high level apparatus with a significant number of personnel must be employed in the sports organizations in order to carry out the innumerable economic regulators. Irreconcilable contradictions exist between observing the rules and goals of the association. The financial and economic experts in the club are primarily engaged in the effort to see that the frequent audits will find the formal order of management appropriate. Therefore, various sums of money may not be shown in the budget and the book-keeping. Of course, overregulation is evident not only in the economic but also in the personnel and organizational areas. The basic bylaws bind the association and inhibit its right of free decision in many areas. To give an example, according to the basic bylaws the association's management leadership, the president and the vice-president are elected by the general assembly (assembly of delegates) through an open vote which guarantees that the official candidates of the sports management will be chosen to the given functions.

[Question] Are these regulators still in effect?

[Answer] Let me emphasize that my studies extended only up to the time of the formation of the AISH. The valid decree of the Presidential Council regarding the

establishment of the State Youth and Sports Committee to a new organization, and thus it was necessary to deal also with the question of legal continuity. The valid decree, therefore, provided that where the statutory provision deals with the OTSH or the AIB [State Youth Committee] secretariat the AISH should be understood. That is to say, legal materials remain valid which were not placed outside its jurisdiction in the OTSH period or at the present.

[Question] This means that the sports management may continue to intervene in the most detailed way in the life of the associations. It seems rather strange to me that the rules of a sports office should regulate how many forints may be spent on the provincial travel of a competitor, how many players may be contracted for by a soccer team, and how much a basic organization may give a soccer player. A thousand such limitations inhibit the activities of the associations. Is that right?

[Answer] I have not studied the orders put out in recent times, but I know that the valid statutory provisions clearly invest the president of the AISH only with supervisory and not with management powers.

Without Subordination

[Question] What should be the role of supervision?

[Answer] Supervision should extend to the legality of the operation of the association and to the control of management according to the bylaws. In order for supervision to be effective there is no need either for basic bylaws or the myriad regulations of operations. The sports federations also ought to operate in alliance with the associations and not in subordination to the highest sports authorities and administrative organs. The sports authorities should withdraw from the legal regulation of the associations and the sports federations. The primary legitimacy of sports is self-organization, which may and must be promoted by state means as well, but cannot be "nationalized," or bureaucratized by officials who are designated or placed into their functions through pseudo-elections and who put sports on a forced track of state regulation. It is the task of the highest sports authorities to work out a concept of sports policy, raise the elements of it to the level of government decisions, and organize and guide their execution. If the highest sports authority were to withdraw from the organizational and operational regulation of associations, the legal materials which have encumbered the latter for decades would become invalid and the state administrative legal regulation would be replaced by basic laws and other association rules developed in the framework of association law.

[Question] Professor Szamel, according to what you have said you do not at all regard it as correct for the highest sports authority to interfere directly in the life of the associations and sports federations. Why could this method be harmful?

[Answer] I can reply only at a philosophical level. Every organization which is built on self-organization—such as the sports association and sports federation—becomes dysfunctional if they are bureaucratized. This dysfunction is most evident in the fact that the sports authority concerned itself exclusively with competitive sports because it gained its credentials on the basis of international results and under these conditions it sought at the most to produce spectacular displays placing in the show window such mass movements which had everything behind them except the masses, but there were plenty of false appearances. In practice, however, it nullified the major sports base, namely, student sports. Meanwhile, God knows how great a percentage of the children developed spinal curvature because they lacked adequate opportunity for physical training, not to mention sports opportunities. The prevailing sports office was not the office of sports but of competitive sports, and particularly the leading ones.

In conversations accompanying the preparation of the interview, Professor Szamel remarked a bit humorously that if in the past decades someone had turned to the courts because of injuries received in a sport organization he may presumably have won his suit because a judge may make a judgment only on the basis of general law and may not take into account the instructions of the various sports offices because these are not existing legal forms. When, for example, they introduced the rule that as an Olympic contribution they would raise the price of admission fees by a certain sum, an attractive suit could have been brought against the action since it was not appropriately supported by law. Of course a large number of people would have had to join together because a 1 or 2 forint case could not be the basis of a suit. One final word regarding the subject matter of the study. When on Monday Lajos Szamel's findings came up for a scientific discussion, Dr Antal Pongracz, general vice-president of the AISH, completely agreed with the substance of the work, aside from minor exceptions, although the study included—even if with different words—everything which was said in the interview.

6691/12232

POLAND

Readers Respond to Referendum, Question Sincerity, Reform Efforts

26000128 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
9 Dec 87 p 4

Referendum 'Gesture' Acknowledged

[Editorial letter by Andrzej Z. Baraniecki, Poznan: "For Everyone"]

[Text] I think that every hour that we put off reform is lost time. What kind of reform are we supposed to have? I do not know but with what I do know about the subject,

I can only state my good wishes which are not enough to make any difference. It is my belief and I think that the reform must succeed if we are to survive as a nation.

I always thought the referendum was not a good idea. I think it was more of a gesture than something we really needed. However, the referendum was held and I continue to support both proposals because there is no other way out for myself, my children, my neighbors and all of my fellow citizens. It is also the only way out for those who are pleased with everything and those who are pleased with nothing.

My support for the referendum's two proposals is something that I regard as, on the one hand, the government's obligation to organize life in our country in such a way as to create only profitable and modern mechanisms, and on the other hand, as my own obligation to function in a modern and disciplined manner under the new mechanisms because the situation is a really serious one.

'Smoke Screens' Prevent Action

[Editorial letter from Stanislaw Ropaczewski, Slupca: "Screens"]

[Text] People are tired of various assurances, guarantees and promises and that is why they are reserved about the premises for the second stage of economic reform. The first stage did not meet everyone's expectations. Inflation has climbed and there are shortages of cleaning agents, items of personal hygiene, medicine, clothes, especially winter clothes and shoes. Worker self-management and the new authority given factory managers have not helped promote rational employment and eliminate unnecessary jobs, reduce the number of directors or put engineers to better use.

We also have directors that specialize in public complaining. We have a shortage of wash powder because of the lack of foreign currency, packaging, workers to manufacture it and machinery. Directors are appointed to run a factory rather than complain and use their factories' real problems as a smoke screen for their own shortcomings. It is not complaining that will bring in the second stage of economic reform or give us a balanced market. If we continue to tolerate such smoke screens, it will be hard to do anything concrete or to convince the public that reform is our only way out.

For me, it is quite understandable for the head of state to make speeches referring to increases in employment and the number of telephones and company vehicles.

I am offended when the mass media use various circumstances such as price increases to argue that "housing is much more expensive in the West" or that "it costs more to live in the West". Why say that since life is expensive in capitalism, it must be so in Poland? After all, these are two entirely different and incomparable social systems so why do all this juggling?

The second stage of economic reform must change our way of thinking. However, if we are to achieve the desired results, everyone must pitch in and help.

I read a lot, always watch the television news and observe the things around me and current savings-account statement book. I learned that a new one would be out in two weeks. I asked why it would take so long and was told I would have to wait 14 days because the data on thrift must be checked in the voivodship computer register. When a large amount of data has to be checked, it is then duly verified. This reminds me of the old joke about the farmer after World War II who received his first tractor and rode it only in first gear as long as it lasted because he thought this was a more economical use of the machine. I always thought that computerization was supposed to speed up work rather than slow it down.

We have already had our referendum. I support reform but I fear the results of the willfulness of worker self-management and the tendency to manipulate reform. Viewing socialism only in terms of material means makes a director set prices that are not always honestly calculated. Economic anti-incentives are no longer enough because they only have an effect when a dishonestly-priced article is on the market and succeeds in taking money from customers' pockets. Therefore, administrative and legal incentives are needed that can effectively prevent such abuses.

'False' Economic Statistics Decried

[Anonymous editorial letter: "Doubts Played a Part"]

[Text] I was an ardent supporter of the second stage of economic reform and would have definitely answered yes to both of the referendum's questions but the 17 November television appearance of the vice-minister of finances gave me and many other people serious doubts about the sincerity of the government's plans and a fear that there will be another sharp drop in our standard of living. To be exact, the vice-minister's estimate of the coming new prices and their associated compensations are not in any way suitable to our real living conditions. I was especially alarmed at part of a statement in which he arbitrarily said that despite the fact that the prices of fuel, electrical energy and natural gas will rise 200 percent, everything will be refunded through recompensation since that part of the average family budget amounts to barely 3.1 percent of the total. That is untrue.

In my three-person family, we spend 11 percent of our budget on fuel and energy. This exceeds the vice-minister's estimate by almost 4 times. Can it be that my family is an exception and that we make excessive use of electrical power and fuel? Nothing of the kind is true. My neighbors in single-family dwellings (and who have 50-70 percent more income) use an average of 7-8 tons of coal per year. I use half that amount because I live in half of a duplex and have a very economical central heating system. A great number of families in our city live in

communal apartment buildings without central heating (coal-fired) and also use bottled gas. They spend as much as 7 percent of their family budget on heating.

The estimated percentage of expenditures on food is also untrue and too conservative. Generally speaking, the costs of rent, fuel, electrical energy and food come up to about 70 percent of the total expenses in poor and middle-income families.

I ask myself who is responsible for preparing and giving the government such false statistics that form the basis for bad decisions.

12261

Sociologist on 'Citizens Society' Possibility, Needs, Obligations
26000123 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
11 Dec 87 p 3

[Interview with Professor Jerzy Wiatr, sociologist, University of Warsaw, by Janina Paradowska: "Towards a Citizen's Society"]

[Text] [Question] Recently, the term of "reconstruction of a citizen's society" has been frequently used in public discussions and journalism. In general terms, this reconstruction means all enterprises aimed at making our country more democratic and a long catalogue of these activities was included in a report to the 6th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. For starts, can we more sharply specify what we mean by a citizen's society?

[Answer] This is a term which has found its way from the realm of theory to public discussion. It was first used by Hegel and later by Marx. Unfortunately, later versions of Marxism rejected this concept although some like Antonio Gramsci still considered it important. In the simplest terms, a citizen's society is the construction of social ties that exist independently of the presence of a state.

the state?

[Answer] No. A citizen's society does not exist totally independent of or in isolation from the state. These are social and economic relations that are not established by the state but are the spontaneous product of the public will. State regulations see to it that these relations fulfill certain legal standards. A citizen's society is thus a certain organizational model for social and economic order, the opposite of which is absolute state control of society where every economic, political or cultural initiative comes into being at the will of the government and the state apparatus.

[Question] Reconstruction means rebuilding. In order for such a society to be rebuilt, would it not have to have already been created? Many generations have already been raised in a system that is under almost total state control.

[Answer] We had a citizen's society when we began to build a socialist society and it has never disappeared entirely. In Poland, total state control of society has never been established but much was done (especially at the beginning of the 1950's) to achieve that.

[Question] For example, private farming was never liquidated.

[Answer] Not only did private farming continue but also private ownership of property in the cities. Elements of cooperative economy survived although in very distorted and limited form. Independent public initiatives were to a certain extent preserved from state control and thanks to this, regional and scholarly associations, clubs and associations of people with common interests were formed and still exist. Therefore, we have many different elements that can be components in reconstructing a citizen's society so that we do not have to build one from the bottom up.

[Question] Reconstruction is usually a lengthy process.

[Answer] This already is and will be a lengthy process. Reconstruction is already visible in the economy. Worker self-management, socialized state ownership of property, in other words, more effective public control, stronger regional government, more authentic cooperatives in place of the old form of state enterprises called cooperatives and increased private ownership which is an uncommonly important alternative to people with the type of ambition and ability that cannot easily fit into the state economy are all part of the economic structure of a citizen's society. But we are only at the beginning of this process.

[Question] In contrast to economic problems, when we think of a citizen's society, we are concerned with issues outside the realm of economics and these include civil rights and the democratic system.

[Answer] That is the other part of reconstruction, namely, the release and liberation of spontaneous human activity. This is an area of many different activities. However, I think the new law on associations is most important. This law will give significantly greater opportunities for the grass-roots creation of various associations without too much state interference. The process of rebuilding therefore has two faces, the economic and the sociopolitical. The main problem today is to accelerate the process enough to stimulate and promote the creation of autonomous economic and social structures. Up to now, we have mostly had to deal with a package of proposals and plans for the future. We are now talking about programs so we can already see certain elements of change.

[Question] Is this package of proposals for noneconomic areas of life and the things that have already been done like the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal and the office of the civil rights ombudsman already enough to restore a citizen's society?

[Answer] We cannot say that anything that has been done so far is enough. There are certain stages of social life that we have to go through. I think that the material in the report to the 6th Central Committee Plenum constitutes a very ambitious program that gives us what we need for now. It will take several years to realize that program and people will then ask where we can go from there.

[Question] Of the economic and noneconomic spheres of social life that you distinguished, which is most important to a genuine restoration of the citizen's society?

[Answer] That is a difficult question. I do think that in spite of the great importance of the superstructure, it is the changes in the economy that are most significant. This is not only because they are necessary for an acceleration in economic growth but also because the growth and consolidation of various forms of social activity are not possible in the long term (but somewhat more so on a short-term basis) without a multisector economy and real socialization of state property. If the economy did not become socialized in the deeper sense of the word, then the entire sphere of noneconomic social activity would lack a solid foundation and therefore be dependent on the good will of the government. Even if one assumes that good will alone is enough, it cannot in itself serve as a strong basis for anything lasting.

[Question] Therefore, without financial independence, the people's councils would be nothing more than a decoration?

[Answer] Yes and the lack of communal property would also weaken them. Generally speaking, when there are many independent, self-managing and strong economic entities, various public initiatives will not have to rely on state funds although such possibilities will still exist. There will be subsidies in cooperatives, consumer unions and various economic enterprises. The conditions for independence from state control would, therefore, have a good economic foundation. This emphasizes economic concerns but another important consideration is what I would call a change in our philosophy about noneconomic issues. We must change our philosophy so that the state will no longer exercise detailed control over public behavior but instead give a free rein to all public initiatives allowed by our constitutions. We must make full use of all public energies that we have neglected up to now.

[Question] Is there so much energy? For years, you have conducted a big scientific program to study our system of values and the public's changing attitudes and behavior. From everything we have heard (your own research included), there is a large amount of public inertia that is hard to overcome.

[Answer] That is a very important concern. Such inertia and its associated pessimism about being able to accomplish anything constructive are very widespread attitudes. We cannot overcome this passive attitude by making evermore artificial and better-worded appeals to people not to give up and to be more active. We must create the right conditions for sensible action. I try to avoid being too Utopian and I know that even if we do create such conditions, it will not mean that we will automatically free all of this public energy. Many people will be suspicious of the first initiatives and of anyone with courage enough to do something. But there will also be trailblazers. As long as a broad-enough legal framework is established, public energy will gradually begin to be put to use.

[Question] Even in the situation we face in which the chief problem for most Poles is their material situation?

[Answer] Considering the reconstruction of a citizen's society in the economic sphere, the generally-bad economic situation and families' material difficulties will tend to promote activity. As long as it does not become distorted, the economic reform should fairly quickly bear fruit in new initiatives. At the same time, the situation in noneconomic areas is indeed more complicated. However, we are so painfully aware of the various inconveniences in social life and at the same time, the myth of the all-powerful state that can do everything for us has already become a thing of the past. This knowledge and awareness gives a fairly good field for public initiatives in health care, culture and education, initiatives that can improve everyday life and reduce its burdens.

[Question] Can you describe at least a minimum such program?

[Answer] It would at least address local problems, the unbearable ones. I do not think that such action will attract everyone. It would not in any society but every society does have its own percentage of people who are more dynamic and have a stronger will to do something for the benefit of others. It is the energy of people such as these that is our unexploited capital.

[Question] Have these more dynamic people who have already begun to act not seen the warning signals that words and promises are one thing and action another? Let me use an example that would be familiar to you and that is the fruitless efforts of Warsaw University to create the Society of Friends of the University whose goal would be to provide material and other support to a

school that is suffering from enormous problems. In spite of the improved climate, there are really a great number of such cases in which authentic public initiatives are dashed.

[Answer] There is no question in cases like the one you mentioned that the social energy does exist and cannot find an outlet. The society was never formed because the government did not grant it permission. This particular case makes it quite clear that we need a new law on associations. In the present bill for that law, the deciding organ must show how such an association might possibly be harmful to society. If this bill had already been made law, the Friends of the University would not have been rejected. A report made at the 6th Central Committee Plenum was very correct in pointing out that if an association is unnecessary, it will die a natural death and the authorities should not have to prevent an association from being formed simply because someone thinks it is unnecessary.

[Question] Or because its members are not approved by the government.

[Answer] The problem of state interests is a complicated one and the very concept is abused. That is why it is important for the courts to be able to investigate a refusal for permission to form a society. It is necessary for any such decisions to be as objective as possible and a more flexible approach toward people is needed so that their pasts will not hound them into obscurity. Obviously, anyone can see that there may be attempts by some to "get even" so some limits to this freedom are understandable. However, I see these limits as a necessary minimum rather than a set maximum.

[Question] Returning to the subject of your research program, I would like to ask you if the reconstruction of a citizen's society is still an important issue in the system of values recognized by Polish society. Have there been changes in the value system in recent years? Have our material aspirations not been pushed into the shadow of other values?

[Answer] All of our noneconomic problems remain important. Of course, there are certain fluctuations, changes in public moods and a shift to more material values. Nevertheless, people need to feel that they have control and that they have a creative rather than an instrumental role in life. This need is felt very strongly, especially among young people and better-educated people and, therefore, among those who should give reform its greatest support. I think it is very dangerous to think that the public's aspirations are only material ones. Of course, people do want an improvement in their economic situation in the not too distant future but what they want above all is social enfranchisement and personal dignity. For a person to have this personal dignity, he must have the feeling that he can if he wishes undertake any social or economic activity that he wants.

ROMANIA

Appointment of Peoples Councils Officials in Sibiu

27000072a

Bucharest *BULETINUL OFICIAL* in Romanian Part I No 10, 15 Feb

[Text] On the basis of Article 97 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Sole article—The following comrades are delegated to be deputy chairmen of the executive committee of the Sibiu County Peoples Council:

—Vasile Visan —Lazar Luca

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 13 February 1988 No 15

/06662

New Commander for Port of Constanta

27000072c Bucharest *BULETINUL OFICIAL* in Romanian Part I No 15, 5 Mar 88 p 2

[Text] The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1 — Comrade Captain I Rank Ioan Pasidea is relieved of his position as sole commander of the Port of Constanta.

Article 2 — Comrade Captain II Rank Teofil Pop is appointed sole commander of the Port of Constanta.

Nicolae Ceausescu President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Bucharest, 4 March 1988 No 25

/06662

French Press Reports on Persecution of Dissidents

Writer Arrested in Iasi

29000004 Paris *L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI* in French 11-17 Feb 88 p 51

[Text] "Our regime is barbarous.... Some of our leaders hate the people," the Romanian writer Dan Petrescu disclosed to *LIBERATION*. In Romania, they do not take lightly those who dare to say what they think of Ceausescu. At the end of last week, Petrescu was arrested in Iasi, the capital of Moldavia.

Cornea, Cangeopol Condemn Regime
29000004 Paris LIBERATION in French 5 Apr 88 p 21

[Article by Gilles Schiller: "Romanian Intellectuals Raise Their Voices"]

[Text] Since the disturbances in Brasov last November, several intellectuals have been expressing their dissidence openly. Doinea Cornea, already interviewed by Antenne 2, and Liviu Cangeopol have sent to the West texts in which they condemn the Ceausescu regime.

"We must break through the isolation in which they want to enclose us, we must raise our voices all together. All together, because, although we are sometimes different in regard to our age and our approaches, we are struggling for our basic right to think freely, to express ourselves freely, to create freely and to live freely." Doinea Cornea persists and keeps signing. She was arrested in November for having received the special correspondents of Antenne 2 at her home in Cluj, Transylvania and has been under house arrest ever since. Her visitors have been followed, her telephone has been disconnected and her correspondence has been intercepted by the Securitate, the omnipresent political police of Nicolae Ceausescu. However, in a short statement which was sent to the West clandestinely, she has defied the Romanian regime once again. "Everything has been put into operation to isolate me, to isolate all those who try to raise their voices in the disaster which engulfs us," Doinea Cornea says.

If Romanian intellectuals are willing to sing the praises of the "Genius of the Carpathians," of his wife Elena and of the Romanian Communist Party, they are members of the most recent privileged classes in the eyes of the regime. To write a poem to the glory of Ceausescu in an official review allows a person to have published a work which has been obstructed by the censor or to obtain permission for a trip to the West or even to Hungary—a breath of fresh air for intellectuals cut off from Western culture, and from the culture of the brother countries. When there is no hard currency, no more works are translated, no more films are imported, and Romanian television, which presents only 2 hours of programming each day, limits itself, on the cultural level, to the endless exaltation of the folklore traditions of Romanian, revised and corrected in light of the "immortal work" of the "most brilliant being who ever existed on the planet," Ceausescu himself.

Surprised by the extent of the workers' demonstrations in Brasov, on 15 November of last year, and by the reaction, which was expressed, mainly, in writings which have been circulating throughout the country (LIBERATION, 27 January 1988), several Romanian intellectuals decided to become open dissidents. Along with Radu Filipescu, Mihai Botez, Dan Petrescu, Doinea Cornea is one of those Romanian intellectuals who are refusing,

from now on, to compromise with a regime which, in their opinion, has been responsible for an economic and moral bankruptcy which is unprecedented, even in Eastern Europe.

Liviu Cangeopol, 33 years old, has just joined them, stating his "incompatibility of temperament with socialist society." Cangeopol lives in Iasi, the capital of Moldavia in northeastern Romania, which is also the main university city in the country. He published some articles, mainly in the review DIALOGUES. But his collection of poems, LITERA, was rejected by the Romanian censor with the comment "not enough tonic notes." He also condemns the "unbelievable nightmare" in which his country has been plunged, in a long text which he transmitted to us secretly. "What is clear today in Romania," Liviu Cangeopol explains, "is that everybody wants a change. The only ones who do not recognize their errors and who prefer that there be no changes are the ones who are heading the country at the present time."

Liviu Cangeopol explains, with cynicism, how several intellectuals became dissidents: "Most of the ones who call themselves dissidents came alive abruptly when they were asking for something big because they had never even been given anything small. But, let us understand: there is a pressure which leads to opposition and which floats above all of us. One could call this a force which defies good sense. There is another pressure, directed by the Securitate. They choose their victims in the crowd of malcontents. Let me stress that I am a dissident by choice. The Securitate cannot take credit for it."

Then Cangeopol analyzes the personal responsibilities of Ceausescu whom he denounces violently: "They say that he is already beyond all punishment. Whatever he might be, he is an old man. How long could he be in prison? He could not compensate for all the damage which he has done to those whose houses he has demolished in Bucharest. And what does he deserve as a punishment for the fact that an entire people has forgotten what it is to laugh? How could he pay for the genetic mutations resulting from deprivations of all sorts? How could he wipe away the shame with which the very name Romanian will be covered for scores of years? How could he atone for the crime which he has committed by joining lies to madness?"

"A worker wrote on the walls of the city hall in Brasov: 'We are not afraid of death!'" Cangeopol says in conclusion. "With all which has been lost, what does it matter to us? The evil which they have done to us is the irreparable point and today their sanctions have become powerless."

After he wrote this text, Cangeopol's personal situation worsened. The Securitate which controls Romania with formidable effectiveness, is looking for him to put him in a military hospital. Cangeopol was exempt from military service because of a "liver ailment."

YUGOSLAVIA

Possibility of Joining European Community Examined

28000087 Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian
6 Feb 88 pp 58-61

[Article by Ljubomir Cucic: "Yugoslavia in the European Community?"]

[Text] In the end we will be voting on who is in favor of Yugoslavia entering the European Community! A few weeks ago Miroslav Jovanovic, a doctoral candidate at Queen's University in the Canadian city of Kingston, Ontario, offered this kind of game to students in the School of Economics at Zagreb University. Jovanovic, who says of himself that he is the same age as the EEC (which puts him in his 31st year), put the question at the beginning of a lecture on the "advantages and shortcomings of Yugoslavia's joining the EEC." The future economists were joined in the lecture hall by certain Zagreb economists who are already well-known (Horvat, Cicin-Sain, Nikic, Korosic). Although the scholarly treatment perhaps was not to the taste of the choice names in the Zagreb economic lobby, their very presence was confirmation enough of the interests in the topic's content and relevance.

After a one-hour monologue by the Canadian from Novi Sad a somewhat more interesting discussion began in which the students would ask something, propose something, and even find things to reproach, not indeed in the lecturer, but in "those up above." Thus one was to hear that "Yugoslavia has no chance of getting closer to Western Europe until it finds itself," "everything we say here is in vain if in future the decisions continue to be made under political pressure," but also "that Yugoslavia would become an economic colony by joining the EEC," "that a step of that kind would probably intensify the departure of our experts for Europe," and so on. After many pros and cons Jovanovic proposed that a vote be taken. Practically all of the approximately 50 university students and professors voted "for" Yugoslavia's hypothetical entry into the EEC. The only hands not raised by those five who said that it is at present nonsensical to put such questions, since "Yugoslavia is not yet even a market economy, much less a West European economy." Nevertheless, they had nothing against it in principle. Thus, at least as far as Zagreb students and their professors are concerned, the European idea has received popular support.

The awakened interest in a "European" Yugoslavia can, of course, be explained in terms of the long-lasting economic and political crisis, which still, however, has not extinguished the awareness that here within a stone's

throw of our door everything is much easier and better. The EEC has neither debts nor inflation, nor "Agrokomerc," nor constitutional amendments, but it also does not include Yugoslavia.

People who are already a bit sick of everything see all kinds of things and ask all kinds of questions. This past year, 1987, which was in any case a difficult year for Yugoslavia, but also a "European year," has given wings to their curiosity and their hopes. That is, so many such things have happened over the last 12 months that even to the reluctant observer the questions spring forth one after the other. Why was Jacques Delors, chief of the EEC, in Belgrade? Why did the EEC grant us a credit of \$630 million under the most favorable terms and conditions? What were the European parliamentarians actually doing in Yugoslavia? Why has the EEC concluded a unique trade arrangement with Yugoslavia, and that after negotiations lasting almost 2 years that at times seemed hopeless? How is it that the same people who after Chernobyl and the "irradiated Yugoslav lettuce" gave us a slap in the face are now stretching out their hand? Is all of this really accidental?

In high-level politics, of course, nothing is accidental. Yugoslavia last year did in fact manage to accomplish in the field of European cooperation what it has not managed to do so long as the Community has been in existence. The chronicle of last year's rapprochement between the EEC and Yugoslavia was closed out only 2 weeks before the end of the year in a meeting of the Council for Cooperation Between the EEC and Yugoslavia at the ministerial level. Milos Milosavljevic, vice chairman, and Dr Oskar Kovac, member of the FEC, held talks with the foreign affairs ministers of "the 12." At the time of that meeting in Brussels I also happened to be there as a reporter for a daily newspaper. My impressions and bits of information were gathered a bit outside the formal sessions subject to protocol. They need not, of course, be identical to those official ones. The talks with some of those I spoke with on the rapprochement of the EEC and Yugoslavia, although intellectually interesting, still cannot be set down definitively. In other words, the conversations which I now had in Brussels and elsewhere, just as on previous occasions, show that all the conditions have not yet matured for Yugoslav-European rapprochement, which is in a way an indication that the smaller group of Zagreb students were right. But as far as the meeting of the ministerial council is concerned, it is the undivided opinion that it is the beginning of a new stage in relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia and is at the same time the culmination of everything that has been done over the last year or two.

Francoise Le Bail, official press representative of Claude Cheysson, a high commissar of the EEC responsible for the Community's relations with Mediterranean and developing countries, and it was he who headed the ministers of "the 12" in the talks with the Yugoslav delegation, is one of those spokespersons who strictly respect the basic principles of their job: to say what she

has been told to say! Madame Le Bail, however, does not think that this is a handicap, and in response to queries on which perhaps she has not yet been given instructions she coolly responds: "Next question, please." However, because of the nature of her work she attends all the meetings of her boss, and she also attended the meeting of the joint Council for Cooperation Between the EEC and Yugoslavia, which is closed to journalists, as is customary in Berlaymout, headquarters of the EEC.

"That meeting was not like the others," she told me a few hours after the ministers had again come together for an informal dinner, "either in the atmosphere or in the conclusions. It did not turn into a 'routine exercise' like the previous ones. The discussion took place in an atmosphere of openness and cordiality. Why? First, because the meeting was being held after a very fruitful year, and second, because it is clear to the EEC that all Yugoslavia's thoughts are now turned toward changes in European economic space. We know that you look upon rapprochement between CEMA and the EEC, between the EEC and the EFTA, and creation of a single European market from a particular point of view. Yugoslavia certainly wants to know what our future relations will be, since it does not want to be excluded from the processes of integration in Europe. Incidentally, this has been stated quite clearly by your deputy prime minister. For its part the EEC has been issuing clear political signals making it evident that we would also like to improve cooperation with Yugoslavia. That accounts for the very unusual and, I would say, unique end to the meeting. The EEC and Yugoslavia signed a joint resolution on cooperation, the only document of its kind, and this should be taken as confirmation of mutual interest in continuing the process that has already begun. Only now," Françoise Le Bail adds, "is the job beginning of defining close cooperation in the future."

What the Diplomacy Is Concealing

There was no attempt, then, to conceal the optimism. If one is to grasp the essence of these words and correctly evaluate future moves that are made between Belgrade and Brussels, we need to do a bit of decoding of the diplomatic phraseology and take a peak at the chronology and motives for the mutual rapprochement. Relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia have passed through various trials and tribulations since the nonpreferential agreement signed in 1970 and the 1976 Belgrade Declaration. There have been "disagreements," "chills," which were explained by each side in its own way depending on the political and economic situation at the moment. The phase of "stagnation and slump," as Milos Milosavljevic evaluated relations to date in the speech he delivered to the ministers of the EEC, has been turned around toward a "new stage of cooperation." There is really no need to doubt that any longer.

Yugoslavia's importance to the EEC is out of proportion to economic cooperation between them. Yugoslavia's exports to the EEC represent 0.28 percent of its total

imports. Yugoslavia does not represent even 1 percent of the EEC's total trade with the rest of the world. With its population of 22 million Yugoslavia is not a negligible market for the EEC, but nor is it, quite certainly, such a market as to justify departure from or alteration of basic lines of foreign trade policy. Our market is relatively small and rather cut off. From the financial viewpoint Yugoslavia is not of particular interest to the Community and its capital; perhaps only as a direct debtor. Big capital, except in the form of controlled joint ventures, has no opportunity of investing in Yugoslav enterprises and securities, since there is no capital market. For the present, the EEC and West European capital are only Yugoslavia's creditors. The EEC does employ about 1 million of our people, but it could not be said that they represent one of its urgent needs. The reverse is more likely the case. It would be difficult, then, to agree with those who believe that the EEC's interest in Yugoslavia is above all an economic interest.

On the contrary, when the integration of European space, the completion of the common or unified market, is viewed from Brussels, Yugoslavia is important above all in the geopolitical and geostrategic sense. Eberhard Rhein, chief of the EEC Directorate for the Mediterranean and Near East, seemed to be surprised at my question: "What were the EEC's motives in granting Yugoslavia preferential trade treatment and favorable financial treatment?"

"Yugoslavia is nonaligned, European, Mediterranean, and an underdeveloped country, but it is also a country, just like Austria and Switzerland, that is located in the middle of the EEC," Mr Rhein said.

When one looks at a map of Europe, it is easy to see what he means. Yugoslavia divides the Community into two parts. Greece and, in future, Turkey are dislocated members of the EEC because of Yugoslavia. Their sole connection to the main body of the EEC is by sea or through Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia also has geostrategic importance, since East and West meet at its borders. Any instability in Yugoslavia is a possible danger to cohesion of the EEC. There are reasons, then, why the joint communique of the meeting of the Council for Cooperation Between the EEC and Yugoslavia stated that "cooperation between the two sides is in the interest of stability in Europe and the Mediterranean basin."

These considerations make it clear why Yugoslavia is looked on favorably in Brussels, why many of the documents signed between the two countries are the first of their kind in EEC relations with third countries.

In an interesting doctoral dissertation entitled "The EEC and Yugoslavia," one of the rare political-economic studies of this kind, Dr Dusko Lopandic, Belgrade lawyer, notes several "coincidences." Yugoslavia was the first socialist country with which the EEC signed a trade agreement (1970). Lopandic notes that negotiations on that matter began not long after intervention of the

Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Belgrade declaration, which has remained the basis of cooperation to this day, was signed, Lopandic says, not long after the important visit which Leonid Brezhnev made to Yugoslavia in 1976. Negotiations about the new 4-year preferential *sui generis* trade regime were concluded in 1980, just 2 months after intervention of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and during President Tito's lengthy illness. Lopandic wrote his dissertation all of 4 years ago, so that he could not have known what we know today. Following the prolonged negotiations, it was only in early 1987, 2 years late, that the agreement was concluded on the trade regime and the second financial protocol between the EEC and Yugoslavia (for a value threefold greater than the first). Following Dr Lopandic's logic of "the case," we can note that the agreement was reached at a time of an impressive offensive by the new Soviet leadership, at the time, that is, of Gorbachev's policy of openness. It is putting it mildly when we say that the West, following Gorbachev's meteoric emergence, saw Soviet tentacles everywhere around it, including in Yugoslavia, which incidentally has been increasing its economic trade with the East. It is a still more interesting datum that Yugoslavia is the first user of the resources of the European Investment Bank both in the amount and in the conditions for credit financing. The sum of 550 million ecus (\$630 million), for which the last loan was concluded, should be compared to the 1.4 billion ecus which the same bank is setting aside for the credit financing of the strategic Channel Tunnel, which perhaps is the most important European project to date.

Is a subtle battle still being waged through Yugoslavia for a new domination on the old continent which this time would also be economic? I am reminded at this point of the words of Dr Yuriy Shirayev, director of the CEMA International Institute in Moscow, with whom I talked a few months ago in Zagreb. To my question of how the East views Yugoslavia's efforts to establish more economic ties and become part of the process of integration in western Europe, Shirayev responded: "I am not exactly convinced that the West wants to include Yugoslavia in its integration. Your best proof of that is that you found the door closed when you asked to be included in the 'Eureka' Program. I agree that expansion to the West, especially trade expansion, is necessary, but Yugoslavia would be greatly helped in those efforts if it were part of the CEMA Comprehensive Program for Technical Progress. Here there would be no restrictions on you whatsoever."

It is in the space between these "desires and support" that we should look for the reasons of the West's ever greater inclination toward Yugoslavia. It is no accident that Brussels has adopted a new policy toward Yugoslavia. Here are a few more pieces of evidence to support that assertion. The people in the EEC say without beating about the bush that if Yugoslavia is willing, it can always be granted the status of the EFTA countries,

which are *de facto* the second line of European integration and with which (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland) the EEC is creating the unified market of "the 18." They also talk in Brussels about how "in the future the EEC will from the economic standpoint have even more than 12 members, including certain countries of eastern Europe." In the meeting of the Council for Cooperation the members of the Yugoslav Government were told in unambiguous terms that we can count on the certain support of the EEC countries in efforts to consolidate our foreign debt. Perhaps the most concrete support of all is that which was given to the Yugoslav economy in the new trade agreement signed last year and covering a period of 4 years.

A Discrete Opening Up

Although some people in the country will not be altogether happy with that agreement, it really is a step forward in opening up the market of the EEC to Yugoslav goods. Those who are dissatisfied seem to be forgetting that Yugoslavia is still not a member of the EEC and cannot count on all those privileges which EEC countries have. This most recent trade agreement is based on the principles of nonreciprocity in trade; that is, Yugoslavia is being granted advantages, but favors are not being requested in return. Not a single third country has such an agreement with the EEC. Although Yugoslavia is the largest Mediterranean exporter of industrial products to the EEC, the new concessions are still larger. The EEC has moderated the "customs ceilings" (the limit beyond which duty is paid on exports) for 34 so-called "sensitive products." Those ceilings have been raised between 5 and 30 percent. It is an unwritten rule of the EEC that the obligation of paying duty has not been introduced on Yugoslav exports even after the ceiling has been exceeded. Among the sensitive products are tires, highway trailers, electric motors, and clothing, that is, important export articles of the Yugoslav economy. The EEC has also raised the ceiling for exports of wine, and the tariff will be altogether discontinued by the year 1993. Even imports of the notorious "baby beef" have been liberalized (from 25,000 to 50,000 tons). As is well-known, Yugoslav exports of baby beef to the EEC were practically decimated after Greece joined.

It would, of course, be far from reality for us to assert that the conditions of exports to the EEC are favorable for Yugoslavia, i.e., the kind of conditions the economy would like, but they are beyond doubt much more favorable than before. To be sure, matters can in fact be viewed the way they were posited by Dr Oskar Kovac at the meeting in Brussels, i.e., to the effect that the "raising of the ceilings is not in proportion to the Yugoslav obligation to achieve a surplus in balance of payments by means of larger exports" and "that Yugoslavia, if it is unable to export, will also have to put limits on imports." Dr Kovac criticized "the 12" for the now frequent practice of antidumping proceedings in cases when Yugoslav exporters sell to the EEC at a price below internal prices and the "self-imposed restrictions" which

our heavy industry has been forced to adopt, for example. As an expert and official representative of the delegation Dr Kovac certainly knows quite well how to defend the interests of the economy. Nevertheless, being realistic, Yugoslavia is getting from the EEC what other countries are not getting, at least not to such an extent. At the same time, we should be aware that in many sectors of its economy the EEC is also in a chronic state of exploration for solutions of Solomon: food production (and imports) have to be restricted without threatening the European peasant; steel production (and imports) have to be reduced without increasing the number of unemployed; the market has to be opened up to new members from the south of Europe (Portugal and Spain) whose exports are in many respects similar in structure to Yugoslav exports. The Community, then, also has its own predispositions, and in that context what Yugoslavia has now gotten in the new trade regime is perhaps the most that could have been gotten at this moment.

It is in any case indisputable that the EEC is opening the door to Yugoslavia a bit discretely, but clearly enough for the desire to be understood. The resolution signed in the meeting of the Council for Cooperation also envisaged other areas of cooperation between the two sides, from scientific and technological cooperation to environmental protection.

Perhaps the only blot not so far erased in their mutual relations remains Yugoslavia's inclusion in the "Eureka" scientific and technological program, which is being developed in the West as an alternative to technological challenges from the Far East and the United States. Back when France put forward the idea of a joint technological program, Yugoslavia expressed a desire to take part in certain joint projects. However, Yugoslavia was told in no uncertain terms that "Eureka" has strategic and indeed even defensive importance and is only open to countries of the same system. Yugoslavia cannot be involved in all its programs, but there could be talk about cooperation. When, of course, it suits western Europe to do so.

Today, 2 years after those first contacts and chilly reception, Yugoslavia is still far from "Eureka." The balance sheet of cooperation to date is less than modest. Of the some 170 different projects, Yugoslavia has been officially involved in 2, and perhaps an agreement will soon be concluded on a third. And that is all. Our firms interested in being involved in specific programs often come up against a "wall of silence," and the rejections are usually formal in nature. The procedure in effect for possible acceptance of Yugoslav initiatives is very complicated and certainly discouraging. Yugoslavia became involved in the two projects mainly thanks to the support of West Germany ("Eurotrac"—a project for environmental protection against "acid rain," and "cosin," a project for linking up data transmission systems). Incidentally, Yugoslavia might also become part of the project "Euromar" (protection of coastal waters) and

"Medicine and Biological Material" (artificial substitutes for human organs). All of this is truly little, especially in view of the ambitions of our economy, which wants to jump into the 21st century. Why does western Europe respond constrainedly to timid Yugoslav queries? This is perhaps a topic for one of the future meetings of Yugoslav negotiators with those from Brussels. Perhaps on this matter one should in the end be optimistic, since one can assume that in the foreseeable future, following the orientation of strengthening ties with Yugoslavia, Brussels will be opening the door wider to technological and specialized cooperation as well. Should that actually happen, then Yugoslavia will certainly be faced with a new problem: money and the level at which our firms are technically and technologically equipped or unequipped. What else is drawing Yugoslavia toward the Community? We should first of all take note of the political decision which has been topical in our country for some 30 years now. The end of the fifties and beginning of the sixties were the time for Yugoslavia to turn outward, to open borders and the market and the economy in general. The reform in the early sixties was the first attempt to make the transition from the extensive to the intensive mode of economic activity. It is interesting that that period coincides with the beginning of formation of the common market. During the second economic reform tariffs on imports were dropped an average of 50 percent, domestic prices were raised, i.e., adapted to world prices, the dinar was devalued, and the principle of minimal administrative intervention in economic life was proclaimed. Although neither the first nor the second reforms were carried through to the end, it was clear that there was full awareness in Yugoslavia that the international market would be one of the main points of orientation and support in conduct of economic activity. We will see further on that those realizations were transformed into decisions that were decisive to creation of Yugoslavia's economic, technological, and financial dependence upon foreign countries.

At just about the same time Yugoslavia also was officially becoming a charter member or associate member of several international organizations: GATT in 1959 and 1966, the OECD in 1961, CEMA in 1963, EFTA in 1967, and the EEC in 1962 (this was the first step toward future cooperation). One might explain the beginning of that opening up in terms of the fear that the markets of some of those groupings could be closed to the Yugoslav economy after the groupings were formed (EEC, CEMA, and EFTA). From those times to this very day Yugoslavia has taken pains to achieve as much presence on those markets as it could.

The EEC was and has remained Yugoslavia's most important economic partner. The main characteristic of mutual trade is the chronic Yugoslav trade deficit. According to EEC figures, it amounts to about 1 billion ecus a year. Almost 60 percent of Yugoslavia's imports from the convertible area come from western Europe, and the structure of trade indicates that these are mostly

imports of equipment, technology, and production supplies. Trade with those markets is mainly concentrated with the traditional trading partners of West Germany, Italy, and France. The equipping of Yugoslav factories with West European technology is a logical continuation of prewar industrialization, when virtually all equipment in Yugoslav industry, as has been stated by Mijo Mirkovic, member of the academy, was from West Germany or Italy. Yugoslavia's financial dependence upon the countries of western Europe is still more obvious. That is, Yugoslavia owes two-thirds of its international obligations to private banks or governments of the countries of the EEC. It is also in the countries of the EEC that most of our people abroad are working, and they are at the same time the most important source of our tourists, since 80 percent of the inflow of foreign exchange comes from those countries. Yugoslavia's ties with the EEC are the basis of its economic orientation toward foreign countries.

This direction of international economic activity is certainly a logical choice, since these are the markets which are closest to Yugoslavia. The institutional framework of that cooperation is the agreement signed in 1980, aside from Israel the only one of its kind which the EEC has ever signed with any third country. Pursuing its own interests, the EEC in that agreement removed tariffs on imports of industrial products from Yugoslavia, but the quantitative restrictions remained on certain goods. Two years after that our exports to the EEC increased 25 percent. Restrictions in the sector of agriculture are much greater because of the joint agricultural policy of the EEC. That same year, the first 5-year financial protocol was concluded in the amount of 200 million ecus (slightly more in dollars) whereby the EEC was financing construction of long-distance power transmission lines in Yugoslavia and its highway and rail networks. In periods when the EEC has been expanding, economic relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia have been in a state of stagnation, and certain sectors, such as the meat industry following Greece's entry, were seriously disturbed. When the two countries of the Iberian Peninsula joined the EEC, negotiations concerning a new trade arrangement dragged out all of 2 years beyond the scheduled date of completion.

Strategic Reasons

The Yugoslav economy is connected to the market of the 12—if we might put it figuratively—by an umbilical cord. All the Yugoslav talk about the growth of exports, modernization of the economy, joint ventures with foreigners, have so far been based, and they will be in the future, on ties with western Europe. On both the import and export side. The orientation of Yugoslav exports cannot be regarded as some isolated long-range goal, since its achievement depends most of all on events taking place precisely in its traditional markets, i.e., the market of the Common Market and western Europe in general. Up to now Yugoslavia has reasonably favorable trade agreements with that grouping, and it probably will

have them in future, but we should not harbor illusions. It is in Yugoslavia's vital interest to have closer ties to the markets of the EEC. In 5 years that market will have new standardized rules of behavior which Yugoslavia will have to follow if it is still present at that time. Up to now the Yugoslavs have mainly complained that the EEC market is pretty much closed to them, but a neutral researcher at the Institute of Economics in Zagreb, the American Marc Ellis, argues in his paper that the access of Yugoslav products to the market of the EEC has up to now mainly been favorable. Can this one-sided benevolence last forever?

There are similar uncertainties on the import side, that is, concerning Yugoslavia's dependence upon the West for imports and technology. Yugoslavia's economic growth in the postwar period has been fastest precisely when the growth rates of imports were highest, and lowest in the early eighties, when imports were reduced because international liquidity had been disrupted. It is difficult to believe that in future Yugoslavia can count on larger purchases abroad that would be based on expansion of its own exports, i.e., on an ever larger inflow of foreign exchange. One should be realistic and realize that Yugoslav exports will grow with this kind of economy (if they grow at all) at a very slow rate on the assumption that Western markets are open. It will be possible to update the Yugoslav technological and production base, i.e., to achieve high growth rates, only after fundamental reforms in the economic system and, this is equally important, with the abundant assistance of international capital. There can hardly be any question of any resources of our own, since the economy is exhausted. Yugoslavia should even now base its plans for development on the importation of capital and direct investments by foreigners or joint investments with them. Western Europe would be the first trading partner in such transactions since in view of the proximity of the Yugoslav market, (inexpensive) manpower, and comparative advantages (tourism, for example) it certainly will have an interest in investing in Yugoslavia. For European capital to come, however, there are some things that need to be changed at home, the economy has to be set to rights, the rate of inflation has to be reduced, restrictive enactments have to be amended, and so on, but the institutional framework of cooperation with the EEC will also have to be changed sooner or later. Aside from the fact that such a move would bring Yugoslavia even formally closer to the EEC, it could signify a growing confidence of Western capital precisely in the way this occurred in Portugal and Spain, which, after joining the EEC, have been experiencing a true investment renaissance, have been reducing unemployment, and have been recording high growth rates.

These, then, are those strategic reasons why Yugoslavia is oriented toward getting closer to the EEC. They refute the assertions of the Western observer who immediately after Delors' visit said that "at this moment the EEC has a greater interest in integration than Belgrade does." Opening up the western European market to Yugoslavia,

which, incidentally, is taking place, will at some point have to put the opening up of Yugoslavia to European exporters on the agenda as well. That opening up may only at first glance and in the early going be an excessively great burden on domestic industry, which is still weak. But if things are regarded in a longer view, it would still gain, since elements of competitiveness and propulsive Western *management* are instilled in the economy. Institutional rapprochement would probably be speeded up by Yugoslavia's inclusion in "Eureka." There should be no doubt that opening up of Yugoslavia to the European Community and changes in the institutional framework of cooperation would signify for the country a complete economic and social transformation over the long run, a move out of the kind of isolationism that has been inevitable during the crisis. This kind of metamorphosis, assuming that the many domestic dilemmas are overcome, is a first condition for coming closer to present-day developments in the world.

However, we need to be realistic. Yugoslavia's direct joining of the 12 is at present only an idea to think about. The conditions have not yet matured for this, but it is still being talked about, somewhat more in our country, to be sure, than in official Brussels. Yugoslavia's first preoccupation in this phase of rapprochement, as Françoise Le Bail put it, should really be formation of the large market without borders in 1992 and Yugoslavia's adaptation to those changes.

In recent days, Dr Davor Savin, Zagreb economist, has probably described most pithily what the final definition of western European economic space signifies. In Savin's interpretation, formation of a unified market signifies removal of the physical (inspection of goods and control of travelers at borders), technical (mobility of manpower and capital), and fiscal barriers (mutual adjustment of the added value tax). After 1992 the EEC will function from the economic standpoint as a single state, although it will still not have a single currency. But work is being done even on that. Dr Savin says that when the mechanisms of the unified market begin to operate, Yugoslav competitiveness will all of a sudden drop by 20 to 25 percent, since as nonmembers, as he says, we will not be able to participate in an economy of scale, i.e., we will not derive benefit from the drop in production and R&D costs per unit output. And the mastodon organization of the large market, which Yugoslavia will hardly be able to approximate, will surpass us even in connection with less important economic tasks, Savin adds.

Yugoslav diplomacy, but not the economic policy of the federal government, has also in part been turned to such reflections over the past year. Last year Yugoslav politicians ran this way and that all over Europe probing the disposition of the West. Mikulic went first to Bonn, and after him another member of the FEC (Radovan Makic) also traveled to West Germany. Not long ago the prime minister was in Italy, Raif Dizdarevic was in Brussels, and Lazar Mojsov in Paris. From all sides words of support and encouragement and of a fundamental if not

always obligatory sympathy concretized at the headquarters of the EEC Council of Ministers toward the end of the year in the meeting of the joint Council for Cooperation. There the central topic was the political and economic situation in Yugoslavia. The ministers of "the 12" asked Milos Milosavljevic and Dr Oskar Kovac about the constitutional amendments, Kosovo, the anti-inflation program, and so on. If one is to judge from the joint resolution signed 14 December 1987, the meeting was more than successful. It emphasizes that both sides will be working "on the run" to bring Yugoslav economic mechanisms into conformity with changes in the EEC (trade documentation, statistics, standards, and so on) and that Yugoslavia will not find itself not ready in 1992. This task will be overseen by a working group headed by Claude Cheysson and Dr Oskar Kovac. They will in fact be meeting early this year. In the meantime, operational staffs are to be working on specific questions. All of this means that at the political level analysis will quickly be undertaken of all the effects which formation of the unified market has for the Yugoslav economy. So far, however, no change in the institutional framework of cooperation has been envisaged.

Insoluble Problems

As Dr Oskar Kovac said in a conversation with Yugoslav correspondents in Brussels after the dinner meeting with ministers of the EEC, "the signing of the Resolution is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for institutional rapprochement." The Yugoslav economy must first work on changes in the system so that it would in general be capable of operating according to the norms and standards of the unified market. Only when that is achieved can there be talk about Yugoslavia's fuller inclusion in the western European process of integration. It is another matter, however, of whether Yugoslavia will be ready for such an undertaking by 1992. At present, the EEC has no intention to call upon Yugoslavia to make any sort of economic concessions, since it is clearly aware of Yugoslavia's situation. To all of this we should add yet another detail: our people were reportedly made aware of the possibility that Yugoslavia might even use a loan from the budget resources of the Community, which up to now, in view of the financial situation of the EEC, has been outright heresy for certain members. Hopes in this connection should not be exaggerated, but even the signal itself is sufficiently indicative.

When the day after the meeting with the Yugoslav guests I put the direct question to Mr Eberhard Rhein of how at that time, after the big job that had been done, he saw Yugoslavia's hypothetical inclusion in the EEC, he answered that my question did not surprise him at all, since on several occasions he had himself talked about this with his colleagues on the Commission as well as with certain Yugoslav friends. He also told me that the EEC is open to all democratic European states which have a market economy and he added that he sees the process of completion of the unified market, that is, of the process of European integration, as 4 concentric

circles: the 12 EEC countries in the first, the EFTA countries in the second, the European Mediterranean countries in the third (Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey), and the countries of eastern Europe in the fourth.

Reality itself is the best indication of what he was talking about. The EFTA countries are for all practical purposes already integrated in the EEC, although formally they are not yet members. Norway, Austria, and Switzerland are reflecting about formal membership very much out loud. In the third group of countries, Turkey has submitted an official application for acceptance into the EEC; Malta will probably do this soon; Cyprus is already working on creation of a customs union with the EEC. In the first three groups of countries Eberhard Rhein spoke about, it is only in Yugoslavia that there is not reflection about institutional rapprochement to the EEC, although, to tell the truth, what has been done so far, that is, over the last year, is not so little. It is not difficult to see that the line of pan-European thinking being offered lies in the destiny of the European countries sooner or later.

Meanwhile there are many obstacles on the road of Yugoslavia's merger with advanced Europe which will not be easy to cross. As we have seen, the EEC has a political interest in "not losing Yugoslavia," but it also knows under what conditions a country can be one of its members. Speaking about the democratic system and market economy, Eberhard Rhein was sufficiently clear. Practice is after all demonstrating this in the example of Turkey, which even today, following the parliamentary elections, is still being reproached for reprisals carried out against the Communists. As far as we know, along with its economic underdevelopment, this is one of the most serious obstacles to the Turkish application for acceptance as a member. Second, if the EEC has political determinants in the context we have been talking about, so does Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's domestic orientation and orientation in foreign policy is not compatible with European pluralism of political parties and membership in the Western defensive alliance (except for Ireland). Yugoslavia is a nonaligned country with a one-party system, and at the same time it is a country of worker self-management regardless of the more or less justified disputation of that attribute. Might these specific features be an uncrossable barrier to Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the EEC?

They might and they might not, it all depends on the angle from which things are viewed. Jacques Delors said in an interview that "the Community needs a strong and independent Yugoslavia which will continue to have a role on the international scene" and that "Yugoslavia has a unique place in Europe as a factor of balance between East and West." In official statements and documents, Yugoslavia is talked about in Brussels as a "European nonaligned country" and, although opinions differ on this, as do the reservations, one gets the impression that Yugoslavia's nonalignment is not after all a key problem. What is more, Yugoslavia would bring

its influence and prestige with the countries of the so-called Third World into the EEC as a dowry. Of course, at present this cannot yet be spoken of as one of the immediate options, but in a hypothetical scenario Yugoslav nonalignment really ought not to be the biggest problem.

The situation is somewhat more sensitive with Yugoslavia's internal political system. Although it is often said in the West that any instability in Yugoslavia or around it means at the same time instability in Europe, we should nevertheless realize that western Europe is not overly sympathetic to a communist regime regardless of what kind it is. It is not gratifying at all to foresee how in case of a supposed Yugoslav entry into the EEC Brussels would accept the facts against which the entire system of life and thinking there is bent. It is no secret that until recently and indeed even today (because of the newspapermen fired in Belgrade editorial offices) newspapers in the West have been saying that human rights are not respected in Yugoslavia and that reprisals are being carried out against the intelligentsia. Would Europe, then, be ready to back off from some of its present principles in the case of Yugoslavia? One can hardly suppose so, just as it is difficult to suppose that any change in Yugoslav policy is expected in the West. It is still more difficult to imagine that in Yugoslavia there might be such changes out of a desire to catch the European train. Finally, the big question is whether formal changes are necessary at all when at present the process of democratization of domestic political life, so far still undefined and not spelled out, but nevertheless initiated, were to be carried through to the end. Perhaps content is still more important than form. That that is the case is perhaps indicated by the example of Turkey, where, to be sure, elections have been held, but the public in the West is still vociferating that human rights are not respected, even in the case when such rights have been denied to Communists.

The third and equally insoluble problem is the economic system and economic situation in Yugoslavia. It is an indisputable truth that Yugoslavia, because of its specific features, achieves economic contacts with the West only through direct trade, direct borrowing, or the export of manpower. In Yugoslavia, that is, there is neither a commodity market nor a market for capital, nor indeed a labor market, and it is difficult to suppose that any sort of enthusiasm or pan-European vision could be stronger than the economic interests of what in this case is aversion. In other words, at present, equally because of the chaos in the economy and because of obstacles built into the system, one can hardly assume that Western businessmen or capital will gladly enter into a more long-term and massive rapprochement with the Yugoslav economy, though that is the very purport of European integration and formation of the unified market. In a country where almost everything, from the transfer of profit to interest on invested capital, is subject to political voluntarism (which even has a decisive influence on economic legislation), an investor is hardly likely to

come with a clear conscience. There are an abundance of much better opportunities in the world for investment of uncommitted money, and this is also true within Europe, from Portugal to Turkey. Why would it have to be Yugoslavia at all? In the final analysis, the spirit of administrative interventionism still holds sway over the Yugoslav economy, while economic processes in western Europe are moving in the direction of liberalization and privatization. As far as Yugoslav economic reality, then, is concerned, the merging of Yugoslavia with the EEC is still just a fiction at present.

Following these pros and cons we come back to the beginning, but the question now goes like this: "Can Yugoslavia enter the EEC?" In general it seems that there is no dispute that a majority of the educated urban population wants this or at least believes in it. Yugoslav economic and political reality at present, however, is such that they have nothing left except belief and hope. To those who are truly sober-minded, perhaps, not even that. Viewed realistically, because of the geopolitical interests of the EEC and Yugoslavia's economic interests, mutual rapprochement, although there is no alternative, will take place in careful doses for at least another decade. Just as much on one side as on the other. As Mr Rhein puts it, membership "cannot be talked about in this century," but later...it is difficult to believe that the EEC could change the conditions for membership. Finally, even for Yugoslavia—although this would be a historical step forward in terms in civilization—being in the EEC or not is not the most important thing for Yugoslavia.

To be sure, it is important that a process of internal integration be initiated in the country and a process of changes in the economic system and political changes in order to free the pent-up energy and enterprise both in the economy and also in the 22 million Yugoslavs. For decades now, politics in our country has truly been violating the economy. The sooner that unnatural position is changed, the better. Once that turn has been negotiated, rapprochement with the world, with Europe, and with the EEC is just a matter of time.

07045

Heavy-Handed Use of Power by Party Deplored
28000088a Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
16 Feb 88 pp 20, 21

[Article by Milan Jajcinovic: "Compatriots and Maharajahs"]

[Text] The fall of Dragisa Pavlovic in the Serbian "dynastic" struggles is one more confirmation that politics is bad luck. A person who very rapidly traveled the road from "a promising young man" to the party's inner circle was politically eliminated for good. From the legacy cryptically entitled "Vojko and Savle"—we still do not know who actually bequeathed it and who donated it—Pavlovic suffered for his "use of the method of creating

dossiers," his use of them "for the struggle against people," and his "attempt to reaffirm Stalinism." Leaving aside Pavlovic's moral and political undesirability (which was completely beyond question until just half a year ago!), we usually dig around in archives in order to make an "Encyclopedia of the Dead" out of the living. Who can do this? Only the powerful! But "where powerful individuals exist, and the state is impotent, the freedoms and rights of men and citizens are threatened." Pulling out dossiers therefore raises once again the question of a law-abiding state.

It was believed for years in Yugoslavia that the state would not be a good one unless it controlled everything and everyone. Even today, such an attitude has not been reduced to mere residues, to the remnants of skin and bones (there are claims that some states are guarded by a "dog on a leash" and others by a "tiger"). Specifically, as early as 1945, as Dr Slobodan Ivanic claims, it was believed that the party form of the state was the motivating force behind social development. Then the party became the state, and society was considered an appendage to it. That concept of the state and society has not been surmounted even today. Although Tito, at the Sixth Congress, still saw the LCY as having "ideological and educational responsibility for guidance and vigilance over the development of the socialist spirit in the people and the working class," political leaderships have still not renounced a pervasive monopoly over administration even today (in reality). The party did not want to surrender its exclusive claim to wisdom. In fact, it still maintains that it is the only one that knows and possesses social truth. It therefore feels—since this follows from such a logic—that it is quite natural for it to have a cadre monopoly, and for it to be able to behave as it pleases; and it is a short distance from that to usurping the right to interfere in everything and not be answerable for anything.

State for Society

The party's narrow-minded behavior has been justified in doctrinaire positions, according to which "our class enemy cannot benefit from the process of democratization," and "social democracy must adapt its forms for all citizens, but not all citizens support socialism." Society has suffered the most from such ideas.

The introduction of self-management legitimized society ("the working people") as the natural foundation of the state. The domination of the state by society never really came about, however. Although today society is showing more and more signs of surmounting its own outsider status, the state is still extremely strong. The stories about its weakness and virtual collapse are unfounded. It has never been weak and impotent, even now. Now it is only hiding behind its own formal absence, and there has not even been any real divorce between the party and the state. As long as that is the case, society will not gain the position that it should have in a law-abiding state. Through the creation of sociopolitical councils [DPVs],

the LCY is beginning "to participate directly in government" (Dr Josip Zupanov), while not using the DPV in the assembly for the activity of its own delegation in it, "but rather using it as a basis for the formation of a cadre base in the sociopolitical communities" (Dr Ivan Siber).

Dr Slobodan Inic talks about the existence of a "physical limit" in the functioning of the party state, and claims that it has finally "exhausted itself for the cause of social and economic prosperity," and that in the near future it should "disavow its party basis." What would this mean?

"To put it simply," Inic states, "this would mean a state for society, instead of a state for the party. The most important thing is to understand that a party state cannot become a good state (...). We need a state that is a synthesis of the government and society, a law-abiding state. Simply stated, it is state administration that is based on the law. It is a state that does not govern too much, but when it governs, it governs! Finally, it is freed from all any excessive 'governmentalism.' Such a state judges itself if it violates the legal system. It does not produce either normative or monetary inflation. When it does produce them, then someone in the state is held responsible for it. It has money that is not a swindle and norms that everyone respects. Such a state is dominated by legality and not political voluntarism. The state and government are not anyone's private property, but rather public property. The state thus serves society, and not itself by any means."

Seigniors and Vassals

Judging by what a law-abiding state should be, or is, only an embryo of it can be seen in Yugoslavia. Why is that? Undoubtedly, at least part of the answer lies behind the residue of history, and even behind the veil of the collective unconscious. The march of civilization in this region has left a specific and almost genetic code in the psychological make-up of the Yugoslav. As we have not yet reached the level of a developed bourgeois society, what happens is that clan ties keep putting up new shoots, and destroy both laws and morals, since "the main thing is that the person is 'ours.'" Thus understood, tribal, fraternal, and national solidarity believes that its actions are not open to question. And why should they be, when at one time, according to Dr Vladimir Dvornikovic, it was a sacred obligation to assist and defend one's fellow clan member in all things, regardless of whether he was right or wrong. But when that is the case, a law-abiding state is irrelevant. Another reason for its nonexistence or irrelevance is also associated with traditionalism, but of a different type. Specifically, "the worn-out official verbalism has for a long time retained traditional and hackneyed slogans: about the revolution in progress, about the rule of the working class, self-management of working people and citizens, freedom and equality, fraternity and unity, the withering away of the state, the socialization of politics, the vanguard nature of the LCY, etc." Little of that is left, however:

"revolutionary processes have stagnated, self-management has maintained itself on the thin thread of institutionalism, polycentric etatism has become the dominant force and has led to the crisis of society as a whole, and the leadership of the LCY has been blinded with power."

Almost nothing needs to be added to the words of Dr Mica Carevic, except, perhaps, what Slobodan Inic says: "The state, in the Yugoslav meaning of the word, does not have a political people or the value of a public authority. The basic danger to it is not the restoration of capitalism, as most of the 'red doctrinaires' after all think, but rather the restoration of feudalism, provincialization from within." That is truly the case. The fief of Fikret Abdic has vividly illustrated it. Fikret Abdic and Jole Musa, however, are not the only lords of the manor in this country. We found out about them. We do not know about the others, even though they exist completely in the open. Just as the above-mentioned pair had their protectors, the latter do as well. A parallel underground system of rule functions in that way: seigniors and vassals. It has been known for years that many political leaders are the patrons of individual regions. Having patronage over their areas of birth, they protect the little deities there as compatriots, and run things together with them. Frequently an ordinary telephone call from an "important comrade" is enough to have the entire system suspended and pushed aside. Such a person, however, is always fawned upon and "toadied" to, because he is an "important comrade" and "our man," and because he has "promised to push our case through up there" (or perhaps has already done so). His compatriots help "their man" by supporting him when elections are held and soliciting votes for him, while he tries to put them in his debt by creating a lobby for their demands. Sometimes he has been able to give them a factory almost by himself. That is why we have so many of those mausoleums.

Mentioning all of the "compatriots"—who have had or have great influence—would require the greater part of this article. The seigniors are still operating today. They no longer distribute factories; now they designate who will get which job, who will be a director and who will be a committee chairman... Fikret Abdic is thus by no means a political freak, but rather a quite natural product of a system which, with lamb and beer, promotes and fires, gives and takes away. Feeling safe in the shadow of their influential compatriots, protected in their comfortable positions, the vassals go about their business. Counting on family relationships, they "do their work" and do not care about legality and the law, because what is involved here is also a mental structure that always seeks loopholes in the law, and is ready to get around everything and boast about it (and be praised). "In the mountainous Balkans," it has never been a sin to cheat the state. It is now finally time for the state to stop clinging to its past, and truly become what it ought to be, i.e., a law-abiding state, and not pride itself on its empty verbal optimism. Even Marx, in his "Communist Manifesto," writes that through its revolutions the bourgeoisie "compressed" the people together into one law, and

created a law-abiding state that "compressed" the bourgeoisie itself into it. "Socialist revolutions," Mico Carevic says, "did not do this—they did not make the privileged part of the ruling political stratum subject to the law. Those who began to rule remained outside and above the law." Fikret Abdic, Jole Musa, and everything happening in Kosovo are therefore not only a problem of awareness, but also a problem of the law-abiding state.

Alibi for Power

It is easy to agree with Aleksandar Firo and his assertion that the dilemma of whether Yugoslavia needs a weak or a strong state is a false one. "Yugoslavia needs a state, or a state authority, which does its job, and when it does it, it has to do it as the strongest authority in society, and consequently with the maximum social authority, which cannot, however, be reduced solely to a monopoly of physical coercion." If that "maximum social authority" existed, there would certainly be fewer Abdices and Musas and "compatriots," and what has been and still is going on in Kosovo would not exist, because if the government acts independent of the patronage of political maharajahs, and if the enforcement of the law and its consistency do not depend on anyone's standing, bank account, influential uncle, or nationality, or on anyone's telephone call, then the state is doing its real job. If there is moreover a mature public as a necessary corrective for the decisions of the political authorities (something that is still in its "puberty" in our country, except in Slovenia), then one can speak of a civil society, and the kind of state that is needed. Without that, it is "only a cover for some forms of autocracy, despotism, and lawlessness," according to Dr Jovan Miric.

The relationship between the state and society is undoubtedly one of the fundamental sources of the Yugoslav crisis. All revolutionary movements come with the intention of changing everything. Our revolution also had such a "total nature." Since it creates its own institutions and organization, however, it still retains the features of a party state, i.e., monolithism, authoritarianism, and monopolism. By inventing enemies, it has given itself an alibi for remaining in power and not allowing society to escape its control. Ceasing to be the party of a movement and remaining a party in power, the LCY is still in its own ideological quandary today. Desiring the role of the vanguard and initiator of all changes, while simultaneously not renouncing (except formally) even a bit of its power, the LCY today has gotten into a contradictory position. Consequently, as soon as it feels that the loss of power—which it verbally supports—has reached a level at which it could jeopardize the LCY's ruling position, it stops it. Everyone suffers from that contradiction.

Self-Managing Pluralism

It has been shown that Marx was right when he stated that reality could not be changed through political voluntarism, programs, declarations, statements, and sincere

or insincere desires (and that historical epochs could not thus be skipped over). This is also part of the answer as to why a law-abiding state is not functioning in Yugoslavia. Jovan Miric says, "A state in which the law of power is in effect, instead of the power of law, is not a law-abiding one. A state in which the public prosecutor and the court inform the public that it has been disturbed by some article, drawing, or sketch is not a law-abiding one. A state in which those elected and paid to protect legality can say that someone is guilty regardless of the law is not a law-abiding one (...). A state in which present rights and freedoms are suspended in the name of future ones is not a law-abiding state. A state in which 'the number of laws is approaching the number of inhabitants' is not a law-abiding one." Naturally, a law-abiding state is also not one in which any third-rate politician, without giving reasons, can declare that someone's position is ideologically and politically undesirable, and where a committee chairman can dig around in police dossiers. A law-abiding state and a civil society are therefore a democratic imperative. Here is what Dr Adolf Bibic says about this:

"The idea of self-managing pluralism, in fact, requires a clear analytical distinction between society and the state. It encourages the political state to form and give recognition to relatively autonomous self-managing entities; it initiates the creation of new relationships among socio-political organizations, which will supersede the unidirectional transmission of directives from the party, with other sociopolitical organizations passively carrying out these directives; above all, it requires that the LC stop clinging to the current state-oriented policy and continually create a leading role for itself among the public on the basis of arguments and persuasion. Self-managing pluralism likewise implies the development of specific forms of political pluralism, which should be implemented especially through the Socialist Alliance; in practice, we are lagging very far behind in this. Self-managing pluralism, in principle, acknowledges the new significance of the spontaneous initiatives of working people, and thus also "respect" for those values covered by terms such as the "rule of law" and a (socialist) law-abiding state.

Pulling out private dossiers is really a problem of the (law-abiding) state. Dragisa Pavlovic was dubbed a Stalinist because of this. If his side had not suffered a shipwreck during the "differentiation process," probably no one would ever have learned about his shady activities. Indeed—let us be realistic here—Dragisa Pavlovic is not the only one who has done something like that. Have we not also witnessed the facts about Fadilj Hoxha that were dug out of the police archives? It is just that one time, dusting off private dossiers is proclaimed a political and moral disgrace, while at another time it is praised. The immorality and illegality of both acts are the same, however. What Pavlovic did is nothing new. The main problem is that it can be done by almost any committee chairman. Since "no state," as Dr Jovan

Miric hopefully assumes, "can avoid being a real law-abiding state at a given stage of maturation," one should hope that the Yugoslav state will also enter such a stage. We will see, however.

9909

**Nonparticipation at Human Rights Forum
Deployed**

28000088b Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
16 Feb 88 pp 54, 55

[Article by Zvonimir Separovic: "Between Satiety and Freedom"]

[Text] International conferences on human rights are still controversial, as soon as representatives of the two blocs meet. Rivalry is the method of discussion. At the international conference on human rights and religious freedom held last week in Venice—organized by the Venetian district—universities there, the Italian Foreign Ministry, and the diplomatic corps of the countries that signed the Helsinki Final Act, the discussion took place in a way that was inconceivable 10 or more years ago. People listened to the arguments of the opposing side and presented their own, and on some matters there was a synthesis. The way in which they managed to be inoffensive can be seen from this shot fired from the West: Two dogs met at the Polish-Czechoslovak border. The well-fed dog on the Czechoslovak side asks the gaunt and exhausted dog on the other side, "Why are you going to Czechoslovakia?" "To eat," and the other continues, "Why are you going to Poland?" "To bark."

Satiety on one side and freedom on the other: dilemmas and differences of opinion known even at the Belgrade and Madrid conferences on security. The Soviets responded in a moderate manner, and referred to cooperation, but not to the conference. The Russians acknowledge mistakes in the past and depict the progress in "perestroika." One wants to believe that they are doing and thinking well, and that they are abandoning an uncomfortable past.

The hosts at this meeting invited three groups of participants: 1) prominent philosophers, humanists, academics, jurists, sociologists, and others from the top of the intellectual cream of Europe, the United States, and Canada, 2) representatives of prominent international organizations dealing with human rights, like Amnesty International, the human rights commission, etc., and 3) ambassadors and other very high-level representatives of the countries that signed the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki conference. As we know, Helsinki and its Final Act symbolize guarantees of the human rights contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the 1966 pacts on human rights which the heads of government of the European countries, the United States, and Canada agreed upon, mutually committing themselves to respect them and implement them in their countries.

The conference dealt with human rights in general, and then with freedom of religion, while sections discussed the right to strike and the rights of minorities. The first two topics were dominant.

Yugoslavia was not officially present! Individuals invited from Yugoslavia were present: Archbishop A. Sustar from Ljubljana, Cyril Zlobec, a writer, Dr Drago Klemencic and Silvo Devetak from Ljubljana, Prof V. Bajsic, and Z. Separovic from Zagreb. The organizers also invited Milovan Djilas, to whom they gave the particularly prominent position of the principal speaker on the first day of the session on human rights. The others present included official representatives, but there were also emigrants and "dissidents" from Eastern Europe, such as A. Ginzburg, J. Pelikan, etc. Nobel prizewinner Sakharov, however, did not come, although he had been announced, and we did not learn the reasons. The "official delegates," in addition to ambassadors and ministers, also included prominent individuals from religious, cultural, and political circles.

What did the meeting contribute? Everyone showed genuine interest in human rights as a problem of the modern world. The West behaved arrogantly, proceeding from its own situation, which is allegedly completely satisfactory, and pointing to the East, where human rights supposedly have yet to be achieved. On the other hand, the representatives of the countries of "real socialism" retaliated polemically, pointing out the West's shortcomings in the area of social and economic rights (the rights to work, to an apartment, to social security), but at the same time acknowledged their own shortcomings in the past, which they are trying to eliminate and renounce today, especially in the USSR.

"Perestroika" was the word most frequently uttered on the island of San Giorgio, where the meeting was held. Those from the West spoke with more or less sympathy, but everyone realized that this was a process that deserved discussion. It was emphasized that this kind of dialogue would have been impossible even 10 years earlier. Some people expressed suspicion of the true value of these new trends in the USSR. On the other hand, the representatives of the USSR emphasized that the time of the Cold War had passed, and sought cooperation instead of confrontation—a respite; they acknowledged that they had dealt insufficiently with human rights, but stated, according to the logic that "no one is perfect," that human rights were not respected in the West either, that there were gross violations, etc.

The belief prevailed that human rights were universal, that all human rights needed protection, and that pointing out violations of human rights in individual countries did not mean interference in the internal affairs of that country. This means that human rights have gained a high priority, superseding the well-known principle of sovereignty, used to conceal individual countries' selfish interests, when they arbitrarily settle the matter of

human rights. The opinion was expressed that there was a paradox: where human rights are most in jeopardy, there are the least guarantees for their protection, and vice versa.

The West was on the offensive, accusing the East of violating human rights, especially in the freedoms of conscience, gathering, information, and movement. Cases of imprisonment for verbal and political crimes of opinion ("prisoners of conscience") were mentioned, along with the misuse of psychiatry for political and other repressive purposes. It was emphasized that human rights belong to man and that the state has nothing to add to them, and that it should only ensure them under equal conditions, without discrimination. Warnings were given about gross violations of human rights in Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, but also in the East. The accusation was made that "perestroika" could not be achieved while a monopolistic one-party system existed. The Pole J. Wiatr proposed that changes be sought gradually, and not by revolutionary and violent means. The struggle against discrimination has lasted for more than 100 years in the United States, and so people in the East should also be given time. The American Indians were sacrificed and almost completely destroyed.

Milovan Djilas, who was presented as a professor, with the topic of "Human Rights and Modern Politics," was relatively moderate. He pleaded for pluralism, pointed out the consequences of the application of modern technology and a totalitarian ideology, emphasized that violations of human rights were present everywhere in the world, and that the USSR had a great responsibility for everything that happened in the East, stressed the brutal violation of human rights in Albania and Romania, and pointed out the differences in Poland and Czechoslovakia. He concluded that human rights had become a vital political force. It was only at a press conference that he stated, in response to a separate question, that there were more than 1,000 political prisoners in Yugoslav jails, mostly intellectuals and primarily from Kosovo, with more of them in the eastern part of the country.

Religious freedoms were a separate subject in the discussion. There were also significant confrontations here. Nevertheless, everyone agreed that secularization and pluralism had occurred in society, that religion was becoming a private matter for citizens, separate from the state; marriage was a civil and not a religious institution almost everywhere; all religions should probably be equated in a pluralistic concept. The problem was certain rare and unusual sects. It was pointed out that the religions themselves were more tolerant, even those which at one time were militant. The process of rationalization is leading to the curbing of the supernatural element in religious belief. Religion is drawing away from the state. It is left up to the individual to choose whether to believe or not, and that does not depend on the church. The right to refuse something that is against one's conscience (the conscience clause) would have to

exist in the case of those who are against bearing arms, or the right to refuse an oath, or not to permit some step (such as a blood transfusion) for religious reasons, etc. Freedom from coercion against one's conscience, true pluralism, is essential.

Archbishop Alojzije Sustar from Ljubljana chaired a panel of different religions on religious freedom. He opened it by stating his own concept, stressing that the church had to resist the state's restrictions on religion. Ciril Zlobec pointed out the relations between the state and the (Catholic) Church in Yugoslavia (in Slovenia, since that was all he was familiar with, as he stated himself); he was listened to with great attention.

The countries of the Eastern bloc also brought high-level dignitaries of the Orthodox Church as part of their large delegations (the Russians and the Bulgarians). The Czechs had their Protestant pastor, who only examined what was going on (they did not bring Catholic clergy, and neither did the Poles).

The Bulgarian metropolitan spoke with enthusiasm about the religious freedoms flourishing in his country, the tradition of Orthodoxy, social justice for everyone in socialism in accordance with the Bulgarian constitution, according to which all are equal and there is no religious discrimination, about the "spirituality of Bulgarian man," the support given to religion by the authorities, the 1,000 years of the Russian Orthodox Church, the spiritual educator, the "beacon that illuminates everyone, thanks to the Russian Orthodox spirit," etc. That was the panegyric justifying his travel orders and his inclusion in the official delegation.

Archbishop Vladimir of Pskov and Porhovsk, a member of the Soviet official delegation, acted similarly; he praised "perestroika," and defended himself against the criticisms of the so-called Uniate Greek Catholics, saying that they were imposed by an aggressive foreign power. A Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest who had recently fled from the USSR answered him, saying that his church still existed in the Ukraine, with more than 5 million believers, who because of oppression had to live in catacombs, underground, like the first Christians.

Many others spoke on the issues of religious freedoms: Norberto Bobbio and V. Strada, F. Rigaux, Venetian Patriarch M. Ce, Russian dissident A. Ginzburg, Reagan's former UN Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, former Czech and now Italian deputy J. Pelikan, Jerzy Wiatr, and others.

In the discussion of the right to a trade union and the right to strike, the speech by J. Milewski, a representative of the Polish Solidarity trade unions now in Brussels, was particularly noteworthy. He supported the establishment of trade unions even without permission, pushing the limits of the possible, and negotiating on anything except one's own existence, i.e., not consenting to the elimination of trade unions. One of the human rights is the right

to organize trade unions and to the freedom to strike, and it should be recognized. Repression is harshest at the factory level, but it is necessary to struggle, as they emphasize.

A separate section dealt with minorities: the right of self-determination, rights within a federation, or autonomy. Nationalism in Europe, the creation of national states, had also created national minorities. The question was how to prevent discrimination and ensure the rights of minorities.

There was also a confrontation during the discussion of minorities. The Turks sharply condemned the Bulgarians for turning the Turkish national minority into Bulgarians by changing their names, overnight. The West German censured the "disappearance" of Germans in Poland, but also added parenthetically the disappearance of the Polish minority in the USSR. The Hungarians sharply attacked the Romanian (F. Fojto) for crude discrimination against Hungarians in Transylvania. The problems of the Irish in Northern Ireland were mentioned. One irredentist from Trieste attacked Yugoslavia because of the position of the Italian minority in Yugoslavia, and he was answered.

We pointed out the problem of the position of the victims of the abuse of power as a new human right, which followed from violations of human rights. We pointed out collective victims and victims of the abuse of power ("power" understood as a person's ability or opportunity to rule over others). Particularly striking are abuses of power that mean the violation of internationally recognized norms concerning human rights. The abuse of power which follows from power because of status also covers the victims of violence within the family. A particular problem is extremely innocent victims—unborn children, who suffer from irresponsible parents or careless abortionists. This is of course a significant area, with still nonexistent protection of still insufficiently formulated human rights.

Finally, it is worth noting that the international meeting in Vienna took place without official representatives from the SFRY; along with Romania, we were the only ones missing. How is that possible? If I had my delegate in the Federal Assembly here (I live in the area of the Zrinjevac Local Community, in the Centar opstina in Zagreb), I would ask him to pose the question to the Federal Executive Council: how is it possible that Yugoslavia, which is one of the founding countries of the UN, which has followed a policy of international cooperation, which is (or was) the leading nonaligned country, the host of the Belgrade nonaligned conference and of the first post-Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] in Belgrade, was not officially present at the Venice international conference on human rights? If it was because of M. Djilas, it should be stated that the Russians were not bothered by dissidents like Ginzburg and Terelj, because they joined in a dialogue with them and scored points. Was it because of the cost?

Or because there are no safaris in Italy? Or because we are afraid of a discussion of human rights? There is reason for fear, but we cannot avoid a discussion, nor can we avoid implementation of what we formally signed in Helsinki.

9909

Rudi Supek Warns of Nuclear Power Risks

28000085 Zagreb *VJESNIK (SEDAM DANAS Supplement)* in Serbo-Croatian 20 Feb 88 pp 2, 33

[Article by Rudi Supek: "What Chernobyl Has Taught Us"]

[Text] Social consciousness seems to have two driving forces: social shocks are one, and the other is the slow maturing of a rational awareness of the world in which we live. The former encourages the latter, but it can also operate one-sidedly. People are inclined to quickly forget earthquakes, floods, epidemics, and wars: as though they have built-in mechanisms for forgetting catastrophic situations. A good sign of human vitality! But there is also something else that is deeper: awareness of those conditions of life which are essential to survival. And that is what ecological awareness is about.

The environmentalist movements are those which are striving to create ecological awareness, and that means people's awareness of themselves as the human species on this planet: the conditions for man's survival as a species and as man, since without the quality of life life is not worth living!

However, the explosion of the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl, whose radiation extended to all of Europe, created in the broadest ranks of the public first fright and then accentuated a number of issues concerning safety and in general man's behavior in the age of nuclear power plants and highly developed technology. Although government administrations and nuclear lobbies in many countries tried to keep all the reports from reaching the public, everyone felt that every individual's life and health was involved and that the danger of an "invisible and quiet death" was being hidden from them. So the daily press and popular magazines were compelled to concern themselves with this catastrophe and to analyze its causes and consequences more than ever before had occurred with any similar ecological disaster. And that applies not only to those related to nuclear power plants, such as Three Mile Island, but also chemical pollution of the environment: the one at Bhopal in India or Seveso in Italy or the one when the tanker Amoco-Cadiz discharged 232,000 tons of petroleum just off the coast of Brittany and polluted more than 400 km of coastline. There have already been countless such tanker disasters, not counting the war being waged in the Persian Gulf. It is easy to guess what they mean to life in the sea when one realizes that even the thinnest layer of petroleum does not allow indispensable oxygen to pass through. Nevertheless, the greatest catastrophes are

those which do not have the appearance of a direct shock, but which are at work every day and occur over years: destruction of the forests—which are the lungs of life on earth—by acid rain, pollution of surface and underground fresh water, and pollution of the air and the soil which are indispensable to the life of every plant and animal. And it is well-known that that pollution has already destroyed a number of plant and animal species and is working toward a steady decline of the resources for life, even though humanity is spreading more and more rapidly.

There Is No Harmless Radiation

What has Chernobyl taught us?

It first of all reminded us of many things which we already knew but were not taking very seriously. For example, that there is no harmless nuclear radiation; that is, that there are no doses so small as not to be harmful. Thus a study which Mancuso, Stewart, and Kneale did back in 1977 at the Hanford Nuclear Plant in the United States showed that on the basis of regular measurement of the effect of the allowed radiation dose on 24,000 workers that there is no insignificant dose, that is, a lower threshold beneath which radiation is not carcinogenic.

Just as there is something good in every misfortune, so even Chernobyl had certain constructive effects. A number of countries halted further construction of nuclear power plants, such as the United States and Sweden, and some proclaimed a moratorium. But it is important that the European members of the International Agency for Atomic Energy, together with the Soviet Union, very quickly reached agreement that in future each of them must immediately give notice if there is any fault in a nuclear power plant (any "leakage"). The Soviet Union did this in the case of Chernobyl only after a 3-day interval. They assumed the obligation to come to each other's aid. (All the meetings of the AIEA were nevertheless held behind closed doors, and journalists were not allowed to participate, as is customary when the proceedings concern the nuclear sector and its policy! But the most important thing in all this is that these international treaties recognize the need for international control and restriction of what so far has been called in politics the "sovereignty of a state.")

This trend in politics has been best confirmed by the recent treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to dismantle medium-range nuclear missiles, a treaty that provides for on-site inspection by each side in the other state. We must say with satisfaction that the threat to the safety and life of the inhabitants of our country by pollution of the environment should become the concern of a world organization that would compel all governments to respect the same rules pertaining to preservation of the life and future of all citizens.

Borders Seen as an Illusion

Chernobyl demonstrated that political boundaries, which rely on armed forces and state secrets, are in reality pure fiction that have no real justification in contemporary civilization. At one time epidemics, plague, and cholera erased boundaries between peoples and cities and engendered the same fear and anxiety for survival as this time was evoked by the Chernobyl "cloud" which circulated all over Europe. Homer, Sophocles, Hippocrates, Thucydides, and others have since ancient times described the panic and chaos caused by "plague" and other beasts of the Apocalypse, and Thucydides warned of disorder, not only in man's relation to nature, but also in his relation to society. It is obvious that the Chernobyl radiation caused disorder even in social relations, and something among them has in fact changed. Let us recall only the way "military secrets" were shattered in certain countries, how measures were taken against importing and exporting the foodstuffs of countries, the way debates became heated over reactor design and necessary safety measures, the way attempts were made to prevent the spread of fear by publishing false data or even by halting any information about the degree of pollution of various products, which occurred here in our country! Chernobyl demonstrated that the borders set down in Yalta are only a political and ideological illusion, that the Berlin wall and border security with soldiers and dogs have as many holes as a sponge, that they are something that is simply ceasing to exist. Instead of the foreign citizen being prohibited access to a nuclear power plant or a soldier snatching the camera from his hand and throwing the film on the ground, now he would be welcome, precisely because he understands the things being hidden from him, because his knowledge is indispensable to the safety of all people within our own borders and the borders of others. Andre Gluksman has rightly written in "Lettre Internationale": "The Europe of nations and blocs is suddenly out-of-date, and the very concept of the order which over three centuries has structured relations between states, the concept of territorial sovereignty (*cuius est regio, illius est etiam religio*) has been called into question." The Chernobyl plague erased ideological barriers, since the danger was the same everywhere excepting the danger in the immediate vicinity; people felt that it was a question of "to be or not to be" regardless of whether they lived in capitalism or socialism, democracy or dictatorship, regardless of whether they belonged to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. The question of survival also surpassed that logic of outliving others that occurs in wartime, when people believe in victory. Here there was no longer any place for winners: there were only the defeated and threatened as member of the same species.

It is natural for the holders of power or leaders of the various states to feel responsible in their mutual obligations for maintaining the peace and life of their citizens, to feel still more responsible to their peoples in the encounter with Apocalypse, and for that kind of responsibility to strengthen democratic relations between those

who govern and those who are governed. It might be said that present-day industrial civilization or technology has in fact imposed a greater need for democracy and for democratic government of a people.

Informing the Public

Incidentally, what does democracy mean in an area in which capital invests immense resources, in which the army has a vital interest, and in which a certain conception of "permanent progress," erroneously analyzed of course, can always buy experts, even without dollars? Democracy in this area means simply this: informing citizens about the risk which that kind of production involves and asking them whether they accept that risk or not. It means only that and nothing more.

But that is precisely what people are trying to prevent by holding back information on the incidents which normally occur in that kind of production.

The figures on radiation and irradiation of the environment and foodstuffs have been kept from our citizens, as we know. Not only our citizens, since it has turned out that also in France, where the level of democracy with respect to informing the public is much higher, silence was also maintained, for example, on the fact that in recent years there have been several hundred incidents in nuclear power plants (France is the largest producer of nuclear power in the world). But the man responsible for that concealment has been the object of fierce attacks, and so new bodies have been created and new public obligations so that it does not happen again. Thus one of the principal inspectors for safety from nuclear radiation, Pierre Tanguy, has said in public that "an incident is always possible." Of course, now that Chernobyl has emitted 100 million curies into the atmosphere and spread it all over the earth! This obviously does not square with the calculations of those nuclear specialists who say that an accident is possible only once in a million years, and that according to "objective estimates."

Constant Assurances About Safety

There is no need to doubt the objectivity of those estimates, but the point is what has been established by the specialists of the European Commission (the Vienna Conference of the EIEA in 1986), the point is what they all agreed on. That is, that the cause of the accident lies in a lapse in "man-machine interaction," the relations between the technician and the technology.

So, the human factor! But can it ever be left out of any type of production? First of all, remove those technicians and specialists who say that the production is altogether safe and that an accident can occur only in a few million years?! In analyzing the causes of the explosion in Chernobyl Soviet specialists have for their part established that there were a number of technical lapses, since

the technicians constantly said: "There is no fear whatsoever!" "Everything is all right," "The technology is safe," "This is the highest degree of safety," and so on, thus creating a "safety culture"! This, then, is the other side of the accident at Chernobyl and all the similar incidents large and small: the safety culture, the constant assurances that the technology is absolutely safe. The Soviet experts admit that that psychology lulled them to sleep and that they were too convinced that everything was perfectly safe, that they began to allow a number of omissions which, when added together, can always cause a catastrophe. This is confirmed by the analysis of other incidents as well, where it would have taken only the addition of some additional factor to repeat the case with Three Mile Island or Chernobyl.

But since it is a question of the relation between man and the machine, and we cannot destroy that relation as some technologists say, what then is the point of this "safety culture"? Let us say at once that it is based equally on ignorance and knowledge.

People feel safe when they do not know the consequences of the danger that threatens them: Why should a colorless cloud with no smell that passes borders without a passport or inspection be a danger when its consequences, fatal though they may be, will occur only in some 20 years or so and perhaps only after 100 years? This ignorance, of course, borders on stupidity and we should not dwell on it. However, what does the feeling of safety mean to those who know precisely the consequences of radiation? Either irresponsibility or drowsiness because the same job has been routinely repeated.

The Zagreb Nuclear Sandwich

Can we attribute it to ordinary civic irresponsibility that Zagreb has no plan whatsoever for defense against a nuclear accident involving Krsko nor the Krsko-Prevlaka nuclear sandwich which the nuclear specialists' plan calls for in the near future? That there is not even any organization for defense, so that information about a possible accident at Krsko must come only from Ljubljana, and that would be through the Federation in Belgrade? Does anyone have any idea what it means to evacuate 1 million inhabitants? After all, was the Soviet Union, with its resources, able to handle those 70,000 inhabitants, the number evacuated in the case of Chernobyl, without major problems in view of its resources?

No one in our country has even been reflecting about problems of that kind, since the "greens," although very few in number, are silenced as "political commandoes" or "antimilitarist groups," and the drowsiness of the official authorities is compounded by the lulling voice of the nuclear lobby. After Chernobyl the latter went immediately on an offensive to create a "safety culture," unscrupulous as to its means. Although it is prohibited on our television to advertise cigarettes and alcohol, the nuclear lobby last year not only passed out pamphlets at the fair and in other places (even in the School of

Philosophy at the university!) that assured us that nuclear energy is advantageous and safe, but it even distributed comic strips for children so that children would realize even from the earliest age that that technology meant no risk for them at all! But doesn't this kind of commercial advertising of "little green men" coming to us from another world border on crime?!

As for the technology involving a risk to human health and the future of the human race, the problem of atomic waste has not yet been solved, since "short-term waste" requires containers for at least 300 years, and those for "long-term waste" containers for millions of years! It is indispensable to ask people to consciously assume that risk, and that also means to establish safety standards that make it acceptable to them. As we have seen from the Soviet case and many others, there is a need for

constant vigilance—not that political vigilance which necessarily turns into drowsiness!—on the part of citizens themselves, precisely so that the technicians working on this do not go to sleep. And that is why the nuclear lobby should be grateful to the "green" movement, since these are the people who actually are helping to maintain the necessary vigilance in a system based on the man-machine relation. No one can dispute the need for that kind of vigilance or that we ordinary citizens have the right to ask about our safety until we see that those forces have been mobilized in the people itself which voluntarily want to stand watch over our safety and over the healthy life of our progeny. It is only in that context that we can carry on public debates. Anything else is a deception.

07045

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

GDR Private-Sector Strength, Cooperation With State Noted

26000126 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
4 Dec 87 p 5

[Article by Jerzy Weber: "For the Public's Needs—The Private Sector in the GDR"]

[Text] Berlin, from our permanent correspondent. Every second roll sold in the German Democratic Republic [GDR] comes from a private bakery. About 60 percent of automobile repairs are done in private garages. Some 70 percent of repairs of home appliances, tailor work and barber and cosmetic services are provided by private and cooperative enterprises. Almost all construction repair work is done by private firms that also take part in the construction of new buildings and the renovation of old housing. About 12 percent of retail and restaurant sales are handled by private establishments and franchises.

In GDR today, there are more than 80,000 private craft shops employing about 250,000 persons. Private businesses and restaurants make up 12 percent of the total businesses in the GDR. Although that is a smaller percentage than before, there are many reasons for this drop and they include competition from state-owned and cooperative firms. Twelve percent is still however a large figure and in many cases exceeds that found in Poland or Hungary.

In many areas, private businesses are an irreplaceable supplement to state-owned firms and cooperatives. This is especially true in services, small towns and in the supply of some food items like bread and canned meats.

As they now say, there was no incentive for more private business in the 1950's and 1960's, the age of business owners at that time was rising, no adequate training was given to their successors and all of this had bad effects on services in business and gastronomy. There came a need for change. This was reflected in decisions to broaden the authority of regional government to grant concessions for private business and to give it financial preferences. Concessions are now granted if the local government feels there is a need for the given business, the person involved is qualified enough to conduct the business and if he or she already has at least one-third of the necessary capital.

Private craft shops, firms and restaurants can employ up to 10 persons. Small businesses and restaurants were allowed to operate as long as they were not involved in mass production. They could do custom work for clients or use customer materials to make furniture, clothing, leather goods, etc. In actual practice, this restriction was often ignored.

New business establishments receive a two-year exemption from taxes and low-interest credit for 8 years. Every year, the Planning Commission places a limit on the number of school children allowed to be trained for small business. In recent years, about 25,000 such students went into small businesses. Foremen studying a trade receive between 500 and 1000 marks from the state.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that efforts continue to draw private business into cooperation with state-owned firms and cooperatives. The most important role here is played by local groups of producers and service entrepreneurs which are organized by sector or type of business. The chief role in such a group is played by the strongest state-owned enterprise (such as the county service center). The task of such groups is to rationally divide work in their region, organize cooperation and transport and to exchange experiences with other producers.

In recent years, regional organs of state government have granted 17,000 new concessions for private business activity. However, an increase in the number of private businesses is not seen as the chief means of developing and strengthening services, trade and gastronomy in the GDR. Great emphasis continues to be placed on raising the level of productivity of existing establishments through the broadest possible introduction of scientific and technical progress.

Throughout the GDR, these activities are coordinated by the Ministry of Regional and Food Economy. Local governments carry out their own plans while using the above-named groups. At the same time, part of the responsibility also lies with guilds. Among other things, there is a catalogue of innovations for small businesses which includes information about new technical and technological ideas in various branches of small business. At the present time, the catalogue includes more than 3000 items. To a large extent, the bi-monthly journal SERVICES [title not given in German] is devoted to such modernization.

In recent years, the highest rate of growth has been seen in private construction firms and in automotive and home appliance repair shops.

The active policy toward the private sector in the GDR has had discernible results in recent years. Shortages in services have dropped and businessmen have more faith in this policy. The increased faith has been demonstrated by greater investment, especially in machinery, equipment and computers. The list of vocations in private business has increased.

There have also been changes in the Berlin neighborhoods of Weissensee where Deflef Regelin has had his own restaurant for the past 18 months. As he says, interest in his restaurant is growing. He has none of the flagrant problems one finds in state-owned restaurants

and the right personnel are available. He has a wide circle of regular diners. He earns more than he did as the assistant manager of the "Ratskeller" in Central Berlin.

The thirty-some year old owner of the restaurant "Bei Danni" in Weissensee is a member of the German Socialist Unity Party but he is not the only private businessman in Berlin who is also a party member.

12261

GDR Produces New Class of Container Ships
23000062a East Berlin SEEWIRTSCHAFT in German
Feb 88 pp 69-75

[Article by various authors, as listed: "Saturn Class Container Ship TEU-1166"]

[Text]

Container Ship Saturn 1200 TEU

This vessel unites the operational experience gained with 20 container ships of the successful Mercur I and II classes with capacities of 840/940 TEU and 7 ships of the Aequator class with a capacity of 946 TEU with technology reflecting the latest state of the art in the shipbuilding and shipping worlds. Its many outstanding features include:

- the use of an exhaust-gas driven alternator to convert waste heat of the main propulsion unit into electricity,
- the ability of the main propulsion plant to run on high-viscosity fuel of 460 cSt/50 degrees C,
- the ability of the main engine to work continuously and efficiently at outputs down to 50 percent of the mcr to economize on fuel,
- the use of electronic data acquisition systems and office computers to optimize the economics of engine operation: torque/output measuring system; fuel consumption measuring system; thrust measuring system,
- guide vanes to improve propulsive efficiency,
- new generation machinery monitoring systems based on the E 8100 16-bit micro-computer system,
- partially integrated navigation system for optimal routing and to reduce the work-load of the bridge personnel,
- impressed-current cathodic protection,
- 2d generation loading computer
- high-power steering gear with concave rudder blade and bow thruster to enhance manoeuvrability without tug assistance.

1. Saturn Class Container Ship—A Product of Cooperation Between Science and Production in Merchant Shipping

[By Wolfgang Mueller, VEB Rostock shipbuilding combine, engineering diplomate, member of Chamber of Technology]

On 27 May 1987, the MS Ernst Thaelmann, a container ship of the Saturn class, designed and built by VEB Warnowwerft, the first vessel of the "perspective ship" series of the science and production cooperation in merchant shipping, was turned over to the VEB Deutfracht shipping line in Rostock. By the end of last year, the Thaelmann had already made several trips to the Far East as part of the regularly scheduled container service to that part of the world. Meantime, the shipyard commissioned its sister ship, the MS Wilhelm Pieck, on 23 September 1987 and launched still another of the Saturn class vessels, the MS Otto Grotewohl, in January 1988.

The Saturn class vessels feature 25 major technical innovations based on 35 pending patents and another 18 already utilized on the ships themselves. On the strength of its above-average use-value and the quality of workmanship, the first ship of the new series received the ASMW's (Standardization, Measurement and Commodity Testing Office) "Q" seal of approval and the "outstanding design" award from the Office for Industrial Design.

By drawing on the potential of the cooperation between science and production in the shipbuilding industry in the course of the 5-year plans from now until the year 2000, the perspective ship research project aims to make significant contributions to scientific-technological progress and to the testing of advanced, high-efficiency ship models. The project was designed in socialist collaboration among the following institutions and organizations: the shipbuilding combine, the navigation and harbor combine, the fisheries combine, the merchant shipping office, the Deutfracht shipping line combine, Wilhelm Pieck University, the marine engineering college at Warnemuende/Wustrow and the engineering college at Wismar. The goals of the project are to be attained through long-term conceptual planning and rapid, objective-oriented application of findings to research and production, i.e. innovations which have proved useful in early models will rapidly be incorporated in subsequent models produced by the shipbuilding combine. The "perspective ship" research project is designed to contribute to greater efficiency in science and technology and to greater use of the interaction between theory and practice-oriented R&D in the education of students and the next generation of scientists.

As the actual builder, VEB Warnowwerft Warnemuende contributed to the development of the Saturn class vessels by drawing on its 10 years of experience in the development, construction and production analysis of 20 Mercury class container ships and six additional ships

of the Equator-WW class and on the productive collaboration with its primary cooperation partners. As against the most recently built and most immediately comparable ships of the Mercury II class, the efficiency of the newly developed Saturn class ships was increased by 46 percent. This is reflected in the increased container placement capacity from 941 to 1166 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units); an appreciable reduction in fuel consumption per container from 63 to 39.5 kilograms per TEU per day; and an increase in labor productivity in ocean shipping from 32 to 46 TEU per worker.

The commissioning of the Saturn class container ships inaugurated a decisively new stage of the "perspective ship" research project, i.e. the optimization of on-board operational technology through enhancement of existing technology and its more efficient use by crew members. Initial data gathered in this exercise have already been incorporated in the construction of ships awaiting delivery. More detailed and comprehensive data will be incorporated in future projects through the collaboration of the ship builder and the shipping line. As in the past, these will make it possible to build efficient products for export on the world market in the future.

2. Design, Technical Data and Construction

[By engineering diplomate and member of Chamber of Technology Heiner Zetzsche and engineering diplomate and member of Chamber of Technology Ekkehard Graf, VEB Warnowwerft Warnemuende]

2.1. Overall Planning

To satisfy the need of VEB Deutfracht, Rostock, for container ships to service the Far East, India and Pakistan as well as the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, VEB Warnowwerft developed the Saturn class of container ships. The plans were drawn up on the basis of an analysis of international trends in container ship construction. These findings were incorporated in the long-term "perspective ship" project of the GDR shipping industry's science and production cooperation and were tailored to the specific needs of the carrier. The primary object was to achieve maximum efficiency reflected in per TEU fuel consumption per nautical mile based on the ratio of load capacity to placement capacity and minimization of work on stowage and protection of containers and to determine the level of automated engine room operations with a view to reducing the number of crew members.


The following additional provisions were made at the request of the carrier: adjustment of the ship's speed to actual operating conditions, i.e. holding it to between 16 and 18 knots for economical operation, given the specified draft of 9.6 meters; fuel tanks sufficient for a range of 16,000 nautical miles and for lubricant storage tanks for a range of 32,000 nautical miles; maximum draft of 10.4 meters; container placement capacity of at least 1,000 and at most 1,200 TEUs, given a maximum of four

container layers on deck; also taking account of the increasing use of 40 by 8 1/2 foot containers as well as the transportation of 100 refrigerator containers with their own cooling plants; no on-board off-loading equipment; quarters for the permanent 24-man crew, including one-man cabins with separate sanitary facilities and sleeping quarters for ship's officers plus 13 additional beds for pilots, trainees and apprentice seamen; space for crew services all on one level, e.g. food storage, galley, mess and day room; collection of secondary raw materials for transfer in port.

The Saturn series represents an optimum synthesis of the carrier's needs and the capabilities of the builder, designed to achieve maximum stability of the ship in container transport. In this connection, particular attention was paid not only to ship design as such but also to the placement of supply lines from the engine room to the bow outside the inboard amidships between the container compartments. In place of the customary arrangement, using a dual pipeline, a flow duct is used as the ballast conduit while the main bilge line in the bow of the ship is part of the main conduit system atop the inboard. This has made it possible to increase the capacity of the inboard ballast water tank by 400 cubic meters and thereby to effect a substantial improvement in initial stability. This feature is one of the technical innovations developed and submitted for patent registration as part of the design, planning and construction of the Saturn series.

The design of the propulsion unit and the auxiliary systems as well as the selection of components paid special attention to economy of operation. To enhance overall engine output, waste heat was utilized in the following ways: an exhaust gas boiler for the main engine is used to produce steam to drive a 730-kilowatt turbo generator; waste heat of the diesel generators is turned into steam; high-viscosity fuel tanks as well as the fresh water plant are heated with the cooling water of the main propulsion unit.

The use of four diesel generators to produce electric energy from the waste heat of the main propulsion unit may seem excessive. The severe strain placed on the onboard electrical system during operation in moderate climates and in the tropics both with and without refrigerated containers, however, calls for great flexibility in electrical output to ensure optimum utilization of the turbo generator throughout the partial load spectrum of the main propulsion unit which only the four auxiliary diesel generators can provide. The mechanized and automated onboard equipment assures round-the-clock unattended operation both at sea and in port in accordance with DSRK regulations pertaining to the issuance of the "AUT 24" seal of approval. The ship can therefore be operated by a permanent crew of 24, since maintenance of the propulsion units proceeds according to plan, e.g. with the help of automatic lubrication and fuel filters, program-controlled, self-cleaning separators and automatic, cyclical dehydration of the compressed air



"Saturn" class container ship

system and with the help of rationalization measures in operation and the cost-saving lashing system for the containers on deck. In this connection we should also mention the engine diagnosis system for the main propulsion unit as well as the availability of clear and rapid data on the state of the ship's propulsion system at any given time with the help of a comprehensive machinery monitoring and registration system in the machinery monitoring room, if engine room personnel are present and with the help of the engineer alarm system on the bridge and/or in the engineer quarters during unattended operation at sea and in port.

In keeping with international custom, the deckhouse containing the quarters, the recreation area and the service facilities was conceived as an on-deck unit separate from the smokestack complex, which helped make for more efficient working conditions. Its position halfway down the stern was determined in large part by the location of the engine room.

2.2. Technical Data

The Saturn class container ship is a single-screw, double-hull motor ship with one main deck and additional decks below along both sides. It has a long forecastle which reaches out over cargo area I, a wide square stern, a bow bulge and a stern bulge. Four of the cargo bays are located ahead of the engine room and one behind it. The deckhouse is located above the engine room. The ship has excess freeboard; its effective range is unlimited.

The ship is equipped to carry 40-foot and 20-foot ISO containers exclusively. The containers may be 8 1/2 feet high and 9 1/2 feet in cargo bay I. The ship is capable of carrying up to 100 refrigerator containers with their own electric cooling plants on deck. Inside the holds, the containers are stowed in at most six layers and on deck in at most four layers. The cargo bays can accommodate 545 TEUs, i.e. there are spaces for 230 40-foot containers and 85 spaces for 20-foot containers only. The hatch covers of the cargo holds provide space for 621 TEUs, i.e. 292 40-foot containers and 37 20-foot containers. Total capacity, in other words, is 1,166 TEUs, i.e. 522 40-foot containers and 122 20-foot containers. Container transport capacity at the specified draft of 9.6 meters amounts to 926 TEUs, given even distribution of containers weighing 14 tons each. Given the same draft and full utilization of space, the ship is capable of

carrying 545 TEUs of 16 tons each in the cargo holds, 317 TEUs of 10 tons each in two layers on deck plus empty containers in the third and fourth layer on deck.

The ship has an effective range of 16,000 nautical miles. Fuel tank capacity is designed for this range of action. The lubricating oil tanks are capable of holding lubricants for 32,000 miles. Drinking water reserves will last about 50 days, given daily water consumption for drinking and washing of 200 liters per man. Fresh water (i.e. for drinking, cooling and boilers) is augmented by means of a vaporization plant. The ship can carry enough food for 120 days (see Table 2).

The propeller has been designed for optimal, cavitation-free, minimum vibration operation under the conditions specified in Table 3:

The ship's speed is tested on the GDR standard one-mile course in sea trials carrying ballast. Conditions deviating from the norms listed above are duly registered. Guaranteed speed at the specified draft of 9.6 meters is computed on the basis of actual results during trial runs. The results of the sea trials of the first ship of the series converted to 130 revolutions per minute were as described in Table 4.

The stability of the ship corresponds to the DSRK requirements for container ships with unlimited range. For all loading parameters tested, corrected metacentric initial height is always such that all criteria (e.g. for the static lever arms, the size of the lever arm curve, for the static list angle and lateral wind pressure) are met. In all cases, corrected minimal initial metacentric height is no less than 0.2 meters.

The ship has an onboard "LC 2 G" computer which provides the required structural and navigational data. The computer hardware is based on the 16-bit universal microcomputer system developed by VEB Electrical Equipment Combine Friedrich Ebert in East Berlin. To monitor metacentric height, a device is used which can produce a listing effect with the aid of a special list tank. Depending on draft, metacentric height can thereby be determined by the list angle appearing on the list gauge. To narrow the list angle in case of unevenly distributed loads and during unloading operations, the two lateral ballast water tanks are used as an anti-list device.

Table 1. Main Technical Data

Length overall	174.20 meters
Length between plumbs	163.85 meters
Frame width	25.40 meters
Height to main deck	15.90 meters
Height to second deck	11.90/12.90 meters
Freeboard draft from OKK	10.40 meters
Specified draft from OKK	9.60 meters
Maximum load (Draft=10.40/9.60 meters)	19,700 tons/16,760 tons
Container capacity	1,166 TEUs

Table 2. Tank Volumes

Heavy oil I	2,358 cubic meters
Heavy oil II	401 cubic meters
MDF and Gas oil	140 cubic meters
Lubricating oil supplies and circulation	93 cubic meters
Cylinder oil	40 cubic meters
Cooling and boiler water	97 cubic meters
Drinking water	328 cubic meters
Ballast water	5,970 cubic meters
Waste and bilge water	102 cubic meters

Table 3.

Draft	9.60 meters untrimmed
Engine output	90 % rated output
Rated speed	130 revolutions/minute
Supercharge temperature	45 degrees centigrade
Sea water temperature	32 degrees centigrade
Allowance for tank resistance	30.2 percent

Table 4.

Draft (in meters)	5.92	9.62	10.42		
Conditions	Trial	Trial	Regular trip	Trial	Regular trip
n (min -1)	130	130	130	130	130
P (kW)	10,095	10,335	10,895	10,755	11,245
Speed (in knots)	20.92	19.42	18.72	18.72	18.02

HUNGARY

Market Called "Motor of Development, of Civilization"

25000129 Budapest OTLET in Hungarian
7 Jan 88 pp 22-24

[Interview with Katalin Szabo, editor in chief of the economic monthly KOZGAZDASAGI SZEMLE of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, docent of the Economic Sciences University, and head of the Department of Political Economics, by Pal Emod]

[Text] [Question] We like "langos" [fried sour-dough] but we do not like the langos-maker that much. This saying of the 1960's reflects the extent to which our way of thinking, our perception of socialism is burdened by ideological schizophrenias. The dilemma implicit in this example is also relevant to the basic issue of our conversation.

[Answer] Before resolving the langos-maker dilemma, let me refer to the basic issue. In my view the basic issue is that perceptions concerning things against which we must guard socialism also reveal the things against which we must not guard socialism. We must not protect socialism from the langos-maker, and I will return to this subject later. Let's first discuss what gives cause for real concern. Socialist societies are confronted with two related problem clusters. One pertains to being squeezed to the peripheries, efficiency deterioration and crisis. The other pertains to shutting off ourselves, the shrinkage of collective and individual initiative, or put in more pathetic terms: the threat to freedom, to higher values.

[Question] In other words, is it the developing crisis that evoked our protective concern over socialism?

[Answer] This is obvious. Just as it is obvious that the two problem clusters we mentioned are closely related. Soon there will appear an article in KOZGAZDASAGI SZEMLE in which the author follows a deductive process which has its beginnings in the initial words of the National Anthem. This is how it goes: "God bless Hungarians with a good disposition and abundance." In other words, according to the National Anthem abundance flows from a good disposition.

Although I am not certain that this is so, I am quite certain that abundance (i.e. economic efficacy, economic rationality, the abundance of material goods) and spiritual values (i.e. higher level humanistic values) are related to each other. And although recognition of this relationship is commonplace, we still must call attention to it because on occasion people deal with these matters separately. Moreover, we have gone through an intellectual period during which the two concepts were contrasted: in other words, we thought that there may exist a favorable social disposition (good mood) without abundance, and vice-versa. Aside from that, Stalin already defined the fundamental economic law of socialism by

saying that the goal of socialism is the abundance of material goods, the satisfaction of the population's needs, and the fullest possible evolution of personalities.

Both factors became endangered in a crisis situation, however, and this is why the entire socialist camp is thinking of ways through which the dangerous situation could be avoided, by which we could protect both our good disposition and our abundance. And it is at this point that we may return to langos. Namely, at the outset we wanted to have material goods, which then resulted in the fact that we needed langos, in other words, we focused on langos.

[Question] Our doing so was an important manifestation of abundance.

[Answer] Undoubtedly, we endeavored to achieve the pleasant, material aspect of life, or more accurately, we wanted to acquire that pleasure. This represented no problem, but there was a problem in regards to our belief that the pleasure can be separated from the langos-maker. In other words, we thought that we could develop a great (or greater) material wealth without bringing about the societal framework for establishing wealth, without raising questions that pertain to values!

[Question] Are you saying that thus far these issues have not been dealt with?

[Answer] We have been probing these issues, but in a negative fashion, dealing with the issues individually. In other words, we said that we needed refrigerators, but that we did not need those societal forms, those institutions and organizational solutions which are attached to refrigerators. Accordingly, we envisioned refrigerators without motorization, peak technology, bonds, corporations, stock market—i.e. without the freedom of capital flow, without applying the so-called capitalist solutions. By now, however, it has become apparent that behind high level technology, such as refrigerators, there is a corporate organization. In other words, we had to awaken to the realization that in order to have a modern economy which is developed to today's level of productivity, we must also have certain forms.

One such form is the marketplace. We must emphasize this, because in earlier days we believed that the economy could evolve without a marketplace, as long as we had a good plan. We discovered later that this thesis was false.

[Question] Let me interrupt your line of thought here. Twenty years ago, at the time I was a university student studying economics, we learned that one of the fundamental laws of socialism was planned, proportionate development.

[Answer] Obviously, you learned this because that's what was taught. After all, for quite some time we believed that the plan was omnipotent. We believed that the

market is anarchic, instinctive, etc. That the plan provides a short-cut in the path of development, that is. It became apparent later that the opposite was true. It is the plan, the plan bureaucracy that prolongs the path. And that the greatest advantage the market provides is that its indicators prompt an instant response—one need not make efficacy and efficiency calculations. Accordingly, the shortest path leads through the marketplace. True, in the meantime we discovered that the marketplace did not represent a detour for yet another reason—by now it does not function as spontaneously as was imagined.

[Question] In other words: under conditions of classical capitalism, as I learned it, the marketplace is spontaneous and anarchic, and exerts only an after-the-fact regulatory effect. And yet, by now we no longer must guard socialism against the marketplace? In other words, is it that obvious that we must build on the foundations of the marketplace?

[Answer] I would not say this in such categoric terms. Namely, we are not talking about choice in this respect. The theory that pertains to planned, proportionate development has gone bankrupt in practice, at the same time, however, one cannot view the functioning of the marketplace as ideal, as problem-free.

But let's go step by step. Planned, proportionate development is not based on a real scientific law, because it cannot be supported by facts—it cannot be verified. In part our economy is disproportionate because none of the socialist countries were able to develop proportionately. There are some striking disproportions: let's just think about the backward infrastructure, and about agriculture in a number of socialist countries. And insofar as planned character (consciousness) is concerned, it is obvious that no one wanted to consciously (in a planned manner) create what we have in the economy today.

Accordingly, let's turn to the marketplace. My dissertation on this subject concludes as follows: the marketplace is not perfect, it does not create perfect harmony, it does not optimize the distribution of resources. Nevertheless it functions. The marketplace is the real motor of development, of civilization.

At the same time one must recognize the negative features of the marketplace also. Let's take competition, for instance. Competition may be a noble contest capable of releasing giant forces, but it also can be push-and-shove competition, i.e. at times the participants resort to methods unbecoming to sportsmen.

[Question] Do you have machine guns in mind perhaps—the preferred method of the Mafia for the elimination of competition?

[Answer] Yes, Lenin's thesis according to which the methods used in competition range from paying premiums all the way to dynamite holds true even today. Or,

we could say, this is how we distinguish between competition and the elimination of competition. This too may be perceived as "let the best prevail," one of the essential elements of competition, namely, that selection is accompanied by positive effects. The positive side of that is that those who excel can rise high above, they will not be beaten on the head as they are in a bureaucratic mechanism. At the same time those who lag behind will experience a cumulatively adverse situation, and then, after a certain point, the chances for a start do not exist either. Thus, quite often, not even a highly qualified person is capable of breaking out of a social stratum which lags behind.

By saying all this I wanted to demonstrate Janos Kornai's striking idea, according to which it is impossible to adopt only the positive aspects of a mechanism. We must emphasize this, because there are many illusions regarding the marketplace.

[Question] Perhaps this is so because earlier illusions related to perfectly implemented plans collapsed one after another. A new illusion is needed—at present it is the marketplace which nurtures our expectations for a perfect solution.

[Answer] For this reason the more sober economists view the marketplace as the second best solution. A "best" solution does not exist. The market mechanism provides significant advantages as compared to the bureaucratic planning system. Having said that, I would define the thesis to be taught as follows: we must develop a socialist market economy as soon as possible, a system on the basis of which we can plan in conformance with the market.

[Question] Accordingly, we no longer have to protect socialism from the marketplace. But what is the situation concerning various forms of capital, the capital marketplace—words that give us goosebumps. Because of these goosebumps we are using words such as "means," "resources" and other terms to avoid calling these things what they are. Not to mention the fact that stocks are tied to the capital market, and in our vocabulary the word "stockholder" is synonymous with the person who clips dividend coupons—one who not only earns a living without work, but is also an exploiter. Even though, the way I see it, the logical construction would be that the capital market is part of the market economy in which stock corporations function, which, in turn, are in the hands of stockholders. Of course, I do not have in mind stock corporations like IBUSZ Inc., which is a stock corporation in name only. What's your opinion in this respect?

[Answer] In my opinion the essence of stock corporations and of the related capital market is not that they are particularly shrewd and painless forms of capitalist exploitation. Perhaps they embody these manifestations also. More important is the fact that in a complex society stock corporations represent forms capable of quickly

responding to constant changes in the marketplace, and can easily rearrange capital [allocations]. The form of stock corporations yielded a tremendous boost to the development of productive forces and to technology. If for no other reason, because motivation is a massive part of stock corporations. At the same time the management of a stock corporation assumes greater risks than a family-owned private firm. This is so, because in stock corporations management does not place its own money at risk.

[Question] After all, stockholders as a group are not held accountable to the strength of all their assets for the results and losses produced by management, as is the case in today's Hungarian PJT's [civil law associations] ...

[Answer] ... which is an immeasurable value of stock corporations that function in modern economies. After all, business risks cannot be assessed, and thus no one likes to place at risk his entire private fortune.

[Question] If this is so—and the thought process does makes logical sense—why are we guarding socialism from stock corporations?

[Answer] The answer to this question has its roots in the theory concerning capitalism. We must add to this that by now, the theory concerning capitalism confuses more than it guides. Namely, flowing from the historical situation, we examine every so-called capitalist achievement (stock corporation, stock market, monopoly, etc.) in a critical manner, as outsiders, sharing the suffering caused by the negative aspects of capitalist achievements. We view these things through Lenin's periscope, from the standpoint of the interests of the proletariat. We did not see what good all these things produced, what their rationale is, what they can be used for. In other words, we did not view these from the standpoint of economic organization and the building of the economy.

[Question] Put simply: we wanted to throw the cold towel on capitalism, on imperialism (together with all of its institutions, solutions).

[Answer] That's right. And to top it off, references to the negative aspects also have foundations. Monopolistic capital is indeed aggressive, and frequently venture capital is indeed extremely risky. At the same time, however, we disregarded their inherent potential values, their creative forces. It is this kind of capital that brought about the railroads, built telephone networks, as well as the indispensable network of values in the economy. In other words, everything that makes a modern economy capable of functioning. In contrast, we viewed all this from the standpoint of the opposition, and recognized only the negative effects.

[Question] This is why we must rethink these matters today. We must rethink our ideas concerning stock corporations, stock and stockholders.

[Answer] Just as it was proven with respect to the marketplace that it amounts to more than something that cripples the weak: it is also a force that molds the world of the 20th century. And the same thing will be found—if it has not been discovered already—concerning stock corporations. That they are not merely monsters that devour the little people's money, but instead are ingenious institutions which pool the moneys of small savers.

[Question] Accordingly, you would not guard socialism against stock corporations, stockholders, and against the growing camp of coupon clippers. Would Hungary's problems be solved if enterprises were to transform into stock corporations?

[Answer] In and of itself this would mean very little. Even more so, because stock corporations are also accompanied by corruption and by securities fraud. Nevertheless it is absolutely true that the stock corporation form would stir up the numb members of our economy, and would attract those dormant funds belonging to the population, which are not being put to use otherwise. And insofar as the income of the coupon clippers is concerned, such income may be withdrawn by way of taxation, not to mention the fact that with respect to bonds there may emerge situations which produce negative income. Interest rates will be lower than the inflation rate. One may assume that income paid after shares would not be monumental either.

Needless to say, in order to make stock corporations function we would require broad publicity and democracy. In other words, this is where we find lineage with that frequently stressed line of thought according to which organizational forms adopted from modern economies will function in a satisfactory manner only if economic reform is followed by political reform, and by broadly-based openness.

Whenever we compare various alternatives we must not think that socialism was perfect in its starting condition, while at the same time, innovations, the broadening of the marketplace, and the form of stock corporations is accompanied by danger and negative effects.

The reality is that our society has never been free of exploitation. We just did not recognize, did not accept exploitation for what it was. According to strictly defined categories within political economics, exploitation means the acquisition of the labor of others without compensation. In our [socialist] voyage thus far this phenomenon was a daily occurrence. For example, one branch of industry systematically exploited the other. After all, the one who produces loss also contributes to paying for it. We withdrew resources from agriculture also—without compensation. But there are more prosaic examples: why don't we talk about exploitation when enterprise workers build their boss' vacation home for free, or at a price that is below cost? Don't we often find income for which no services were performed in the

omnipresent black economy? In brief: a perfect society which is free from exploitation proved to be an illusion. At best we can aim for achieving such a society.

The greatest menace socialism is facing—the one we must guard the system against—is public thinking which is not entirely clear, in which half-truths acquire the rank of absolute truths. And the following thought relates to this: the leadership bears tremendous responsibility with respect to the perceived and actual zig-zags and U-turns we are taking. Let me give you an example. Once upon a time we stated that the private sector person [“maszek”] is suspect. Then, a few years later, he became a useful member of society, and perhaps, later on, he will once again become suspect....

[Question] We should perhaps continue with the dilemma related to proprietary relationships by using this vantage point. Namely, I was taught that state property is of the highest order, followed by cooperative property, group property, and finally by individual (private) property. Still today, the latter type of property is limited. Private enterprise may functions with a maximum of 30 persons, and a boarding house cannot have more than 30 rooms.

[Answer] The proprietary hierarchy which has been suggested for decades—including the primacy of state property—is fundamentally flawed. Namely, by now we recognize that state property is not social property. An increasing number of people believe that state property represents social property to a lesser extent than does for example, cooperative property, which, at least until recently, functioned more efficiently and created a better human environment for its members than the one that prevailed in state enterprises. If a state enterprise produces and unsaleable product, if it runs a loss, if depressing human conditions prevail and there exists existential insecurity in such enterprise, then this enterprise by no means exists for the sake of society. At the same time, society certainly benefits from a (30 employee) private undertaking which produces saleable merchandise, does not seek subsidies, provides employment and pays sizeable taxes. In other words: it is possible for a private enterprise to serve the public good, the welfare of the people, while a large enterprise may not. And with this I wish to underscore that property conceptions which do not use the functional approach, conceptions which are removed from the ideas of utility and rationality are out of date and have expired. It is for this reason that our teachings today hold that social property, rather than the state form of property be viewed as having primacy.

[Question] In other words, students do not identify the meaning of social property with large state enterprises that were reorganized, or which are ripe for reorganization, the ones which devour society's money.

[Answer] I will repeat once again: we do not identify state property as social property. Social property means that an undertaking functions for the benefit of society,

along with the actual involvement, and under the control of society. The fact is, however, that this conception does not apply to Ganz-MAVAG, just as it does not apply to the small tradesman who goes to the market. After all, one is a loss operation, the other sells shoddy products. But it is possible that in five years both will serve the public good.

Insofar as numbers of personnel and physical sizes are concerned, my views may sound as unusual. I believe that in an economy (country) of Hungary's size and level of development a large part of the enterprises should be small in size. And there could be 10 or 20 major enterprises which are really major, which would be considered large on an international scale also, and then there would be a few hundred medium-sized enterprises. We should add to the idea of organizational form and number of personnel: the small ones could operate as PJT's, small cooperatives or as private enterprises as long as they have 1-50 employees.

[Question] Accordingly there is no need for personnel and other limitations?

[Answer] There is no need for limitations, because according to Western economic experience the lion share of small enterprises will never become large enterprises. Some people draw the upper limit for small enterprises at 20 employees, others at 50, and again others at the level of 200 persons. This is less important. Instead of setting limits to numbers of employees we should concentrate on finding a mechanism for those definitely exceptional cases in which companies that start out with a few employees become successful, and within a short period of time increase their number of employees to hundreds or a thousand—how could we pave the road for such companies toward becoming social property?

[Question] Accordingly, we have more or less found a common denominator regarding the fact that we must not guard socialism against the marketplace, the various forms of capital and against private enterprises employing more than 30 persons. Nevertheless we definitely must protect socialism from the withering away of the intellectual infrastructure, from the depreciation and indifference of the intelligentsia concerned with technology, economics and the humanities, from the fading of the arts—just to mention a few important processes that lose value.

[Answer] In my judgment these elements are in agreement with the problems we have discussed thus far. One must build on accumulated technical and cultural traditions. This is not debatable in terms of the arts, and therefore one should not doubt that it applies to the economy also.

Society will experience orientational disturbances if its members are told that bourgeois culture, bourgeois values should be rejected (together with the corporate form), and that we will produce huge technological

achievements by using our own values. And then it turns out that we turn to the Japanese and the Dutch to learn how to plan. It is at this point when collapse, a spiritual crisis takes place within society.

[Question] In my view this also suggests that we should think through what values we should preserve and continue.

[Answer] Not too long ago I read about a family in Pecs which makes organs. In the 1950's they had to manufacture caskets, and later they were sent to Sztalinvaros. This is only an example, nevertheless it suggests that our society functioned in a manner so as not to preserve, but to destroy values. By now, perhaps, we have begun to bring this process to a halt, nevertheless we have not yet succeeded in reversing the process.

One cannot produce values without preserving values. Accordingly, respect for traditions can mean more than conservatism.

I can accept the fact that the communist movement was not enthused about the imperialistic corporation, and that it pointed out the flaws of these corporations. While doing so, however, it was not necessary to throw out the baby together with the bathwater, and to be so biased as not to preserve the merits of corporations, and to learn from them. This took place, even though learning from

capitalists, and adopting their values is part of the essence of Leninist policies.... For this reason Lenin brought in organizers from the West, and made references to the fact that to an extent of 90 percent, stock corporations already represent socialism.

And finally there is yet another thesis that has toppled. It pertains to statements by which capitalistic production forces are more highly developed (i.e. technology is more modern), while our social-production conditions and our order of values is at higher levels. What we're saying here is that the technological miracles produced by developed countries are undisputable, while, on the other hand, those countries have crime, a Mafia and alienation. However, by now we know that moral values are not independent from material values. And since we are Marxists, we proclaim the material foundation to be the determinant. We were not sufficiently Marxists however, to perceive for a long time a society which is noble and high-flung, independent from its material foundations. The truth is that corruption will necessarily spread in societies which struggle with shortages, that envy will become a general phenomenon and that culture will always receive the short end of the stick. Accordingly, all historically proven forms and methods must be taken advantage of in order to put an end to this situation.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Slow Progress in Technical Education of Youth
24000074 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
1 Mar 88 p 4

[Article by Evzen Stanek: "Progress, but a Slow One"]

[Text] An important task of the program to promote participation of children and youth in technological development is to enroll in it about 450,000 children and young people by the year 1990. According to the report of the State Commission for Technological and Capital Investment Development (SKVTIR), which took on the responsibility for managing the program, part of the road toward this goal has already been negotiated. Some statistics will serve as an example.

The number of positions for young engineers and natural historians rose from 304 to almost 1,200 since 1984. A total of 2,566 elementary schools and high schools have made sponsorship agreements with enterprises and organizations which serve to develop interest in technology on the part of the students. State and cooperative organizations spent a total in excess of Kcs 20 million in 1986 to develop special-interest technical activities by children and youth, and national committees spent more than 70 million. Since 1984, the department of the electrical engineering industry gave free of charge to special-interest groups 900,000 out-of-tolerance micro-electronic parts. The economic contribution of young inventors and innovators has also increased substantially; in 1986 it amounted to almost Kcs 900 million.

Thus, since the previous report of this kind which mainly pointed out serious shortages in the supply of materials for the program, there has been some movement forward. The central agencies modified and issued appropriate notices to enable economic organizations to supply either free of charge or for negotiated prices parts, instruments, and other material no longer usable in manufacture. Departmental organizations made available almost 6,500 specialists who work as leaders of special-interest groups.... Nevertheless, the material base still remains a problem for the program, particularly in computer technology. In setting up the 2,000 automated

engineering workplaces, as was decreed by the 5th Plenum of the KSC Central Committee, conditions are being created even now to make it possible to train in each region young design and project engineers under the auspices of regional technical clubs. But the program has broader goals. And other obstacles are emerging on the road to their achievement.

One of the serious difficulties, which was discussed also at the 4th Congress of the Union of Socialist Youth, is a full utilization of demonstrably competent young workers. In many workplaces their creative potential is not being fully exploited, and they encounter dissension when they present proposals which, because of their new concepts, are outside the framework of conventional innovations. The economic pressure on enterprises is simply not yet such as to make them give preference to young, professionally well-trained people.

Also extremely important is the task of taking care of exceptionally talented youth, the principles of which were already worked out under the coordinating agency of SKVTIR. It is becoming obvious that this task cannot be managed within the framework of a single department. The system of special-interest activities in vocational schools also appears not to have been too well thought out. The level of developing the tasks of the program in individual regions is uneven as well. Thus far, only in Northern, Western, and Central Bohemia, in Southern and Northern Moravia, and in the Western Slovakia region and Bratislava did they work out their own programs.

Despite the mentioned, as well as other, difficulties the realization of the program to increase the participation of children and youth has again moved forward a step and is becoming a nation-wide project. The foremost task now is to further enhance the responsibility and the effectiveness of state agencies and organizations. This applies mainly to the central agencies and regional national committees whose measures appear to be insufficiently "forceful" in influencing the middle and basic links of management who are expected to contribute the lion's share in implementing the program in practice.

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